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Research in the last few years has indicated that, despite modern algorithms being 
secure against all published mathematical attacks and being far too complex to break by 
brute force, secret key data can be gathered by monitoring the power consumption. This 
is known as a power analysis attack, the most successful has been differential power 
analysis (DPA). Several countermeasures have been proposed for preventing power 
analysis attacks with varying degrees of efficacy. One thing all the countermeasures 
have in common is their large cost in terms of performance and or cost. In this thesis 
several modifications to the AES algorithm are proposed that seek to inherently secure 
it against DPA and their effectiveness and cost are investigated. 
Due to the statistical nature of DPA there is no set amount of power consumption 
data that will always give the correct result for a given device, rather, a value for the 
SNR and the number of power measurements involved in the attack will equate to a 
probability of success. In this thesis a statistical model of the DPA attack is derived and 
it is used to find a method for calculating the probability that a particular attack will be 
successful. 
A more benign use for DPA is also discussed. If the signature of a specific pattern 
of  register  transitions  can  be  detected  in  the  power  consumption  of  a  device  then 
designers can add hardware whose sole purpose is to be detectable in a power trace and 
act as a watermark to prove the presence of intellectual property.  
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1  Motivation 
This thesis investigates methods of attacks on secret-key cryptographic systems. 
A current pervasive approach for symmetric encryption is the use of block ciphers and 
specifically the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [1]. Research in the last few 
years has indicated that despite modern algorithms being secure against all published 
mathematical attacks and being far too complex to break by brute force, secret key 
data can be gathered by monitoring the power consumption. This is known as a side-
channel attack as instead of attacking the cipher in a traditional manner it is cracked 
using information extracted from the physical implementation of the cryptosystem. 
When the side channel is the power consumption it is known as a power analysis 
attack. In CMOS technology, when the value inside a register changes from 0 to 1 or 
1 to 0 the power consumption is significantly higher than when the value remains 
constant, this leads to a large data dependence in the power consumption. The most 
effective  power  analysis  attack  is  differential  power  analysis  (DPA),  it  combines 
power consumption information from several encryptions with predictions about the 
transitions  of  register  values  and  uses  statistical  evaluation  to  determine  the  most 
likely value of the key [2]. DPA is powerful enough to successfully retrieve the key 
from implementations of AES [3]. 
Several  countermeasures  have  been  proposed  for  preventing  power  analysis 
attacks,  these  include  balancing  the  logic  there  is  always  the  same  number  of  bit 
transitions  irrespective  of  the  data  that  is  being  processed,  masking  data  to  hide 
intermediate values and randomly changing the supply voltage and clock frequency of 
the device [4-11]. The countermeasures have varying degrees of efficacy, but even the 
most successful ones do not offer complete protection from the attack [5]. One thing Chapter 1 Introduction    2 
 
all the countermeasures have in common is their large cost in terms of performance 
and or area, this is due to the fact that they all add additional hardware to try to defeat 
power  analysis.  A  better  approach  is  needed.  Rather  than  trying  to  protect  the 
implementations of cryptographic algorithms after the fact it would be preferable if 
algorithms were designed in such a way as to already be immune from DPA.  
1.2  Objectives 
It was noted in the previous section that DPA can break even the most modern 
algorithms and that the current techniques for protecting implementations from the 
attack  do  not  offer  complete  security,  rather  they  simply  reduce  the  correlation 
between the data that is being processed and the power consumption. While this will 
make  it  harder  for  an  attacker  to  retrieve  the  key,  if  there  is  any  correlation  a 
determined enough attacker, who collected enough power consumption data, could 
exploit it.  The  exact  relationship  between  the  amount  of  power  consumption  data 
required and the level of correlation between the data and the power consumption is 
not known. This leads to two objectives: the derivation of the relationship between the 
correlation  and  the  level  of  information  required  to  perform  the  attack,  and  the 
development of a new type of countermeasure that defeats DPA. These are described 
in more detail in the following two paragraphs. 
Despite  the  fact  that  DPA  was  developed  in  1998  and  the  mathematical 
concepts that are employed in the attack are well developed there are still elements of 
the attack that are poorly understood. It is clear that the greater the dependence of the 
power  consumption  on  the  processed  data  the  lower  the  amount  of  power 
consumption data that must be recorded in order to attack the cryptographic device. 
There is no quantitative relationship, however, therefore it is not possible to calculate 
the  effect  of  halving  the  correlation  between  the  processed  data  and  the  power 
consumption. This is one of the aims of this thesis. It will allow the evaluation of the 
effects of a particular countermeasure on the effort involved in performing DPA and 
enable designers to tailor the amount of noise in a design to the particular security 
constraints of the system that they are creating.  
The only countermeasures to DPA that have been proposed so far are ad hoc 
modifications  to  cryptographic  implementations  that  are  costly  in  terms  of  the 
design’s speed and area requirements. Only partial protection from DPA is gained for Chapter 1 Introduction    3 
 
the  significant  price  that  is  paid.  The  main  goal  of  this  thesis  is  to  develop  a 
modification to the AES algorithm that will protect it completely from DPA while 
still allowing efficient implementation. It will then be possible to apply the technique 
to other existing algorithms and, most importantly, new algorithms can be designed to 
be immune from DPA. 
1.3  Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into 9 chapters. Chapters 2-4 deal with the background 
material and chapters 5-7 cover the original work. Chapter 8 summarises the thesis 
and Chapter 9 concludes and suggests some further work that can be done on the 
topic. 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the history of cryptography and cryptanalysis. 
Chapter 3 introduces the basic concepts and techniques in cryptography and the 
goes on to explain block ciphers in greater detail. Three important block ciphers: the 
Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple DES (TDES) and the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) are described in detail including security concerns surrounding their 
use. 
Chapter 4 deals with attacks on block ciphers. This includes both the perceived 
weaknesses  of  the  AES  algorithm  and  power  analysis  attacks,  specifically  DPA. 
Various  different  approaches  for  the  attacks  are  described,  as  are  some 
countermeasures. The effectiveness of the attacks and countermeasures are discussed 
using  published  results  of  the  application  of  power  analysis  to  real  cryptographic 
systems. 
Chapter  5  describes  the  systems  that  were  developed  in  the  course  of  this 
research  to  investigate  DPA.  First  the  attack  was  performed  in  simulation  using 
Modelsim  with  a  post-synthesis  VHDL  design  of  AES,  and  Matlab  with  a 
mathematical model of the power consumption of a general crypto-device. Also an 
oscilloscope was used to record the power consumption of an FPGA configured to 
perform AES. These systems were used to investigate the basic properties of DPA 
such as the effect of what part of the algorithm was being targeted by the attack. 
Chapter  6  gives  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  statistical  properties  of  DPA  and 
develops  a  model  of  the  attack.  Using  this  model,  a  method  was  developed  to Chapter 1 Introduction    4 
 
determine the probability that a particular DPA attack will be successful given the 
number of power traces available to an attacker and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 
the crypto device being attacked. Also, another use for DPA is proposed, using a 
pseudo-random number generator to add a pattern to the power consumption of a 
design to act like a watermark that will allow the identification of intellectual property 
within a larger system.  
In Chapter 7 a number of modifications were made to the AES algorithm with 
the hope of rendering it impervious to DPA. The most successful of these techniques, 
using the key schedule to change the round keys for each block, was then applied to 
TDES. While it did still protect it from DPA, an implementation of the new algorithm 
used significantly more resources and was slower. The structure of the key schedules 
of  a  selection  of  modern  algorithms  were  analysed  for  their  suitability  for 
implementing the technique efficiently, and the important properties were identified. 
The algorithm ARIA has these properties and so an implementation of the modified 
algorithm was made. It performed well in terms of both protection from DPA and 
implementational efficiency.  
 
Chapter 2  Background 
2.1  Introduction 
Since the invention of writing, people have sought to keep the nature of their 
most sensitive messages secret from their enemies. Failure to do so has led to lost 
battles, revealed secrets and the fall of monarchs. Cryptography is a constant battle 
between code makers and code breakers. Codes are developed and then techniques are 
developed to crack them, when it has become clear that a code is no longer secure 
new methods must be found to restore the protection that was offered previously. 
These new codes are inevitably eventually broken by increases in computing power, 
knowledge of mathematics, or the sheer determination of attackers. 
Historically cryptography has been purely the domain of generals and statesmen 
– and Casanova
1 – but in the digital age cryptography has become ubiquitous and an 
important tool for everyone to send data electronically. Members of the public use 
modern  encryption  techniques,  albeit  sometimes  unknowingly,  every  time  they 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
1"Shall I tell you the key?" 
"Pray do so." 
 I gave her the word, which belonged to no language that I know of, and the marchioness was 
quite thunderstruck. 
"This is too amazing," said she; "I thought myself the sole possessor of that mysterious word--I 
had never written it down, laying it up in my memory--and I am sure I have never told anyone of it." 
I might have informed her that the calculation which enabled me to decipher the manuscript 
furnished me also with the key, but the whim took me to tell her that a spirit had revealed it to me. This 
foolish tale completed my mastery over this truly learned and sensible woman on everything but her 
hobby. This false confidence gave me an immense ascendancy over Madame d'Urfe, and I often abused 
my power over her.[12]  J. Casanova, "The Complete Memoirs of Casanova," Globusz Publishing, 
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withdraw money from a cash machine, make a mobile phone call, or even watch a 
DVD. 
2.2  History of cryptography 
2.2.1  Classical ciphers 
There  were  two  main  types  of  cipher  that  existed  in  the  ancient  world,  the 
transposition  cipher  and  the  substitution  cipher.  Transposition  ciphers  hide  the 
meaning  of  a  message  by  rearranging  the  characters  in  it,  turning  it  into  a  large 
difficult  anagram.  Substitution  ciphers  change  letters  for  other  letters  or  symbols 
making the message unintelligible unless the reader knows how the letters have been 
changed.  
The first military cryptographic device encoded and decoded messages using 
transposition, it was the Spartan Scytale which dates back to the 5
th century BC [13]. 
A Scytale is a wooden rod of fixed diameter, a strip of leather or parchment is wound 
around  it  and  the  message  is  written  across  the  length  of  the  rod  so  that  each 
successive letter appears on a different section of the parchment. When unwound and 
read down the length of the parchment the letters are mixed and can only be read by 
wrapping the parchment around a stick of similar diameter. 
The  first  recorded  use  of  substitution  ciphers  dates  back  to  600-500  BC. 
Invented by Hebrew scholars, it is called the Atbash cipher and substitutes the first 
letter of the alphabet for the last, the second for the penultimate and so on. It is used in 
Jewish mysticism and in some bible passages, its main purpose is probably to create 
an air of mystery rather than actual concealment. 
The Caesar Cipher is named after Julius Caesar as he is reported to have used it 
when sending important military communications by Suetonius, a biographer of the 
first 12 emperors of Rome who was also Emperor Hadrian’s personal secretary. It is a 
very  simple  substitution  cipher,  the  alphabet  is  shifted  a  number  of  letters  in  a 
particular direction, for example if it was used on our alphabet and shifted two places 
to the right then ‘a’ would become ‘c’, ‘b’ would become ‘d’ and so on until ‘z’ 
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The weakness with these ciphers is that if the attacker knows the type of cipher 
it is then it becomes very easy to crack, with Atbash, there is only one possible set of 
substitutions, and with the Caesar cipher there are only 26. A slightly more complex 
substitution cipher is one where the letters are randomly substituted for others rather 
than in order. This would give a total of 26! (4*10
26) possible combinations. Even 
with this large number of combinations substitution ciphers are still not particularly 
secure  as  the  distribution  of  letters  in  the  plaintext  is  unhidden,  this  leaves  it 
vulnerable  to  frequency  analysis.  This  looks  at  the  frequency  of  letters  in  the 
ciphertext and compares them to the frequencies of various letters in the language that 
the plaintext is written in. For example, if a ciphertext contains a large number of ‘w’s 
then trying the substitution ‘e’ = ‘w’ is a reasonable place to start. The first known 
record of this technique is by the 9
th century Arabic scholar Abu Yusuf Yaqub ibn 
Ishaq al-Sabbah Al-Kindi. 
Probably  the  most  famous  historical  demonstration  of  the  weakness  of 
substitution ciphers is the Babington plot. In 1568 Mary Queen of Scots fled Scotland 
after  a  failed  attempt  to  regain  the  crown  of  Scotland  from  her  half-brother.  She 
sought  refuge  in  England  on  her  way  to  France,  unfortunately  for  her  she  had 
misjudged  the  mood  of  her  cousin  Queen  Elizabeth,  who  imprisoned  her.  She 
remained confined in a series of castles and manors and in 1586 after 18 years in 
prison she was allowed to neither send nor receive letters. Then suddenly, a large 
parcel  of  correspondence  arrived  in  her  possession.  They  were  smuggled  into  her 
prison by Gilbert Gifford who had placed them in a hollow bung inside a barrel of 
beer.  It  was  through  this  channel  of  communication  that  she  was  approached  by 
Anthony  Babington,  a  charming  and  charismatic  Catholic  who  hated  the  current 
protestant rule and wanted to see a Catholic monarch on the throne of England. He 
and six other conspirators informed Mary of a plan to assassinate Queen Elizabeth 
and free her from her prison. Unfortunately for Babington and his co-conspirators 
Gifford was a double-agent working for Elizabeth’s spymaster Francis Walsingham. 
Babington  was  rightly  cautious  and  had  not  only  hidden  his  messages,  but  also 
encrypted them. His cipher had substitutions for all the letters, 35 extra symbols for 
common phrases, four nulls to confuse any potential attacker and one symbol that 
meant  that  the  following  letter  was  double.  The  messages  were  delivered  to 
Walsingham by Gifford who had them copied and replaced and over the course of the Chapter 2 Background    8 
 
correspondence between Mary and Babington the cipher was broken by  his code-
breaker  Thomas  Phelipes.  Even  when  Walsingham  had  enough  evidence  to  arrest 
Babington  he  waited,  he  wanted  Mary  to  implicate  herself  so  she  too  could  be 
executed.  When  she  sent  a  message  to  Babington  endorsing  the  plot  Walsingham 
knew he had her, he just had one more thing to do before he sprung his trap. He had 
Phelipes, also an expert forger, add a post-script to the message, encrypted in the 
same  cipher,  asking  for  the  identities  of  Babington’s  co-conspirators.  Now 
Walsingham had everything he wanted he arrested everyone involved, Babington and 
his accomplices were hung, drawn and quartered, and on the 8
th of February 1587 
Mary Queen of Scots was beheaded. 
This is a clear example of how once an attacker has the key to a cipher the 
system is completely broken, they can both read any messages and, if they also have 
appropriate access to the channel of communication, can forge messages. This leaves 
the system completely vulnerable. 
2.2.2  Development of Poly-alphabet Ciphers 
Frequency analysis was such a successful technique against substitution ciphers 
that cryptographers had to develop new techniques to counter this. The next most 
significant group of ciphers that was developed were poly-alphabet ciphers. These use 
more than one set of substitutions to encrypt different letters in the message. The basis 
for  these  was  work  done  by  Leon  Battista  Alberti,  a  Florentine  polymath,  in  the 
1460s. He wrote an essay on cryptography after a casual conversation with his friend 
Leonardo  Dato,  the  pontifical  secretary,  in  the  Vatican  gardens.  Alberti  proposed 
using two substitution ciphers on alternating letters in a message but failed to develop 
the concept into a fully formed cryptographic system. His idea was developed by 
Johannes Trithemius, Giovanni Porta and finally Blaise de Vigenère. Vigenère was 
born  in  1523,  a  French  diplomat,  his  initial  interest  in  cryptography  was  purely 
professional and he had read the work by Alberti, Trithemius and Porta while on a 
two year diplomatic mission in Rome. In 1562 he decided he had earnt enough money 
to retire and dedicate his life to study. It was then that he developed a powerful new 
cipher. 
The  Vigenère  cipher  consists  of  26  alphabets  each  shifted  by  an  increasing 
number of letters. The key is a code word or phrase repeated over and over until it has Chapter 2 Background    9 
 
the  same  number  of  letters  as  the  message.  Each  letter  of  the  message  is  then 
substituted using the corresponding letter from the alphabet starting with the current 
letter  in  the  key.  In  1586,  ironically  the  same  year  as  Mary  Queen  of  Scots  was 
plotting with Babington, Vigenère published Traicte des Chiffres where he detailed 
his cipher. Even if Babington had have read Vigenère’s work it is possible that he still 
would not have used it as the new, more secure, system was largely overlooked for 
another 200 years. 
2.2.3  Adoption of Poly-Alphabet Ciphers 
The  main  complaint  against  poly-alphabet  ciphers  was  that  they  were  more 
complicated  to  encode  and  decode  and  hence  more  prone  to  errors.  In  order  to 
compromise between the security of polyalphabet ciphers and the simplicity of mono-
alphabet  ones  a  series  of  other  techniques  were  developed  to  defeat  frequency 
analysis.  
Homophonic ciphers are those that use more than one symbol to encode each 
letter. The number of symbols for a given letter is related to the frequency of that 
letter  in  the  language  that  the  message  is  written  in,  each  time  the  letter  is  then 
encoded a random symbol from the set is chosen and used. This would mask the 
frequencies of the letters. For example, in English, ‘e’ accounts for approximately 
13% of the letters in a given block of text and ‘g’ for about 2%, so the cipher could 
have two symbols for ‘g’ and 13 for ‘e’. The weakness in this system is that pairs of 
letter are not used homogenously, for example ‘q’ is almost always followed by ‘u’. 
This creates another potential avenue of attack for a cryptanalysts.  
In 1626 Antoine and Bonaventure Rossignol, a father and son team, were able 
to quickly decode a message that was captured by the  French army. After it was 
revealed that their secret message had been read the opposing force surrendered to the 
French. The Rossigols were appointed senior positions in the court of Louis XIII, they 
also worked for Louis XIV, who was so impressed he moved their office next to his 
own apartment. They were so successful the word Rossignol became slang for a lock 
picking device. Using their knowledge of cryptanalysis they developed the so called 
Great Cipher. After their deaths the cipher was no longer used and the details were 
soon lost. There were lots of historical documents, especially Louis XIV’s personal 
documents, which were only written in this encoded form, they remained unread for Chapter 2 Background    10 
 
hundreds of years. In 1890 some of these documents were passed onto the French 
army’s cryptography department where Etienne Bazeries spent three years trying to 
decode them. After going down several dead ends he discovered that each symbol in 
the code represented a syllable, with other little tricks, such as the symbol that meant 
ignore the previous symbol, added to fool would be attackers. The newly deciphered 
documents were a historical boon, one of them even identifying the Man in the Iron 
Mask  as  General  Bulonde,  a  French  general  who  had  disgraced  himself  through 
cowardice. 
By the 1700s cryptanalysis in Europe had become an industrial process with 
teams of cryptanalysts working to decode copies of supposedly secret messages that 
were being sent to embassies. It became clear that extra security was required and the 
Vigenère cipher was finally adopted for widespread use. 
Vigenère’s cipher remained unbroken for nearly 300 years until an argument 
between  Charles  Babbage  and  the  Bristol  dentist  John  Hall  Brock  Thwaite,  who, 
claiming he had invented a new cipher when really he had just re-invented Vigenère’s 
one,  inspired  the  eccentric  English  polymath  to  turn  his  mind  to  code-breaking. 
Babbage’s  main  breakthrough  came  when  realising  that  with  a  finite  length  key 
repeated blocks of plaintext could only be encrypted in a finite number of ways, and 
so could repeat in the ciphertext as well. By looking at two repeated blocks in a 
message it would be possible to determine the maximum length for the key, and all 
the possible lengths would be factors of that value. By looking for several repeated 
blocks of characters one would probably be able to find a unique value for the key-
length. After this has been determined the cipher becomes a group of n mono-alphabet 
ciphers that are now susceptible to frequency analysis. Once the frequencies of the 
letters in the n different streams have been noted peaks in the frequencies of letters 
can  be  matched  and  the  key  can  be  determined.  Although  Babbage  cracked  the 
Vigenère cipher in 1854 he didn’t publish his findings and they were only discovered 
when scholars were examining his notes, credit sometimes goes to Friedrich Kasiski, 
a  Prussian  infantry  officer  and  cryptographer,  who  independently  cracked  the 
Vigenère cipher and published his findings in 1863. Chapter 2 Background    11 
 
2.2.4  World War 1 
The invention of the radio created a communication revolution. Previously all 
communication  had  to  be  done  over  fixed  lines  which  had  to  be  laid  before  any 
communication could occur so could not be used to communicate with mobile units 
such as warships. The advantage of fixed line communication is that it is a lot harder 
for someone to eavesdrop on communication as they also need physical access to the 
line whereas radio transmissions can be listened to by anyone in range with a suitably 
tuned  receiver.  This  meant  that  encryption  became  more  important  than  ever  for 
military communications.  
Most of the codes developed for use during World War 1 (WW1) were based on 
ciphers from the previous century that had already been cracked. While they had been 
improved there was nothing radically different and they posed little challenge for the 
cryptanalysts  at  the  time.  This  fact  and  the  massive  increase  in  intercepted 
communications that radio transmission allowed meant that cryptanalysis paid a very 
important part in WW1. Probably the most significant example of its use was the 
deciphering of the Zimmerman Telegram.  
Initially  America  did  not  join  the  war  in  Europe,  their  president,  Woodrow 
Wilson thought that the conflict could only be resolved through diplomacy and that 
America could best serve the world by acting as mediator to any talks that may occur. 
However, this was threatened when a German U-boat sunk the Lusitania, 1198 people 
were killed including 128 American civilians. Germany agreed to surface their U-
boats before attacking so as to reduce the risk of accidentally attacking civilian ships. 
By  1917  the  war  was  not  going  well  for  Germany,  they  realised  that  if  they 
reinstituted the policy of unrestricted U-boat warfare then Britain would soon starve 
and  have  to  surrender,  worried  that  this  would  bring  America  into  the  war  they 
hatched a plan to keep them occupied until their enemies could be defeated. The plan 
was to convince Mexico to declare war on the USA and an encrypted telegram was 
sent to the German ambassador in America with instructions to forward details of the 
plan on to the ambassador in Mexico. 
On  the  first  day  of  WW1  the  British  ship  Telconia  sailed  under  cover  of 
darkness to near the German coast and cut Germany’s transatlantic cables. In order to 
carry out their plan they had to send a message to their Mexican embassy via the Chapter 2 Background    12 
 
American embassy over cables that passed through Britain. Britain intercepted this 
message and decoded it in Room 40, their cryptographic department, named after the 
office that it originally occupied. After decoding the message the British cryptanalysts 
passed it onto Admiral Sir William Hall. Hall realised the significance, he knew that if 
Germany were to reinitiate the full force of their U-boat campaign it would not be 
long before Britain would be forced out of the war. As Britain was reluctant to let the 
Germans know that they could read their secret messages and there was a chance that 
the U-boat attacks would bring the Americans into the war anyway Hall initially did 
nothing.  On  the  3
rd  of  February,  Wilson  announced  that  American  would  remain 
neutral in spite of the renewed German policy and Britain was forced to act. In order 
to hide their code-breaking activities Britain sent an agent to the German embassy in 
Mexico to steal a copy of the forwarded telegraph and handed it to the Americans. On 
the 6
th April America declared war on Germany and cryptanalysis had changed the 
course of WW1. 
2.2.5  Post World War 1 and the Development of the Enigma 
In 1918 Arthur Scherbus and Richard Ritter started an engineering company 
that developed lots of things, from turbines to heated pillows. Probably their most 
famous invention was the Enigma machine that was used to encrypt German Military 
communications  during  World  War  2  (WW2).  One  of  the  reasons  people  were 
reluctant to use the Vigenère cipher was its complexity, this made its use error prone. 
After it was broken it became clear that even more complicated ciphers had to be 
developed, these would be even harder for people to use and particularly impractical 
in the chaos of a battlefield. Scherbus had created a machine that used mechanical and 
electric signals to automate the encipherment of a message, thus eliminating human 
error.  The  Enigma  machine  consisted  of  a  keyboard,  a  plug-board,  a  series  of 
scramblers, a reflector and a series of output lamps. When a button was pressed on the 
keyboard, corresponding to an input character, an electrical signal travelled through a 
complex  path  until  it  reached  the  output  lamp  signifying  a  different  letter,  this 
represented the enciphered character. The path the electrical signal took, and hence 
the output character was determined by the settings of the scramblers and the plug-
board. The plug-board could be used to swap letters, by connecting cables between 
the  various  plugs,  each  representing  a  different  letter,  they  were  swapped.  For Chapter 2 Background    13 
 
example if the letters ‘a’ and ‘p’ were connected on the plug-board then when ‘a’ was 
pressed on the keyboard it would be the same as pressing ‘p’ on the keyboard when 
there were no plug-board connections. The scramblers were cylinders with a series of 
different mappings between the letters. A large part of the security of the enigma was 
due to the fact that each time a letter was pressed the scramblers would rotate one 
letter so if the same letter was pressed twice it would lead to a different output letter, 
and Enigma behaved like a polyalphabet cipher. The scramblers can also be removed 
so they can go in any order. The reflector sent the electrical signal back through the 
scramblers to the output. This had no cryptographic significance, but was there to 
make encryption the same as decryption. If the letter ‘r’ was entered and the electrical 
signal  weaved  its  way  through  the  plug-board  cables  and  the  scramblers  via  the 
reflector to the letter ‘h’ then someone trying to decode the message could press ‘h’ 
on their machine with the same settings and the electrical signal would do the reverse 
path and light the lamp for ‘r’. The entire machine was 34 * 28 * 15 cm, but weighed 
a hefty 12 kg. 
Scherbus initially had trouble finding anyone to buy Enigma machines, they 
costs the equivalent of £20,000 in today’s money, and most businesses said that they 
could  not  afford  it.  The  German  military  was  unaware  of  the  damage  enemy 
cryptanalysts  had  done  to  their  war  effort  and  so  were  initially  not  interested. 
Fortunately  for  Scherbus,  in  1923  Winston  Churchill  published  The  World  Crisis 
detailing an early German cryptographic failure, and later that year the Royal Navy 
published their official history of the WW1. The German military realised what their 
weak ciphers had cost them and started ordering Enigma machines. In 1925 they went 
into mass production. 
2.2.6  Cracking Enigma 
Until 1925 the rest of Europe were still receiving a large amount of intelligence 
from Germany via decrypted transmissions. After the German adoption of the Enigma 
machine this rapidly stopped. Previously British and French cryptanalysis had been 
tenacious in their efforts to decipher previously unbreakable codes, but when faced 
with Enigma they quickly gave up. After WW1 Germany’s military was had been 
largely neutralised and the country was in ruins. The French no longer feared her 
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Poland was caught between a strengthened Germany and Russia, a nation bent on 
spreading communism. Faced with these threats Poland was desperate for intelligence 
and had a very strong cryptanalysis department called Biuro Szyfrów. There was little 
that they could do without first understanding the workings of the cipher. 
On the 8
th of November they got their first break. A German working in the 
department  responsible  for  secure  communication,  Hans-Thilo  Schmidt,  sold  the 
plans to the Enigma machine to a French agent for 20,000 Marks. The French were 
not particularly interested in their new found knowledge, they assumed that even if 
they understood how the Enigma worked they would still not be able to work out a 
way  to  break  the  cipher.  They  did  however  have  a  decade  old  treaty  of  military 
cooperation with Poland, who had expressed interest in anything to do with Enigma. 
Thinking it of little practical value the French gave the information to Poland. Using 
this information the Biuro was able to create a replica of the Enigma machine to 
study. As well as details of the Enigma machine the French intelligence contained the 
protocol  that  the  Germans  were  using.  Codebooks  were  distributed  amongst  the 
German radio operators. The books contained a month’s worth of plug-board settings 
and scrambler arrangement and orientations, one for each day, called day-keys. To 
make  the  system  more  secure  messages  were  encrypted  with  different  scrambler 
orientation settings. This was called the message-key and was encrypted twice with 
the day-key and transmitted at the start of the message. This was done to ensure that 
the message-key was received correctly and the message could be decoded without 
error, but it introduced an insecurity into the system as the attacker knew that the 1st 
plaintext character of the message was the same as the 4
th although the ciphertext 
characters would be different. The difference between them would be determined by 
the scrambler settings. 
This was studied by the Polish cryptanalyst Marian Rejewski. He had at his 
disposal hundreds of messages every day, the first six characters of each of which 
would be encrypted using the same settings. Although he did not know the plaintext 
characters he studied the way they changed, finding they formed chains with varying 
numbers of links. For example, if the first character of one message was ‘L’ and the 
fourth was ‘W’, in another message the first would be ‘W’ and the forth ‘G’ and then 
in a third ‘G’ would change back to ‘L’, forming a chain with three links. Rejewski 
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not by the plug-board settings, they would only change the values individual letters in 
the  chain.  This  meant  that  the  chains  could  act  as  a  fingerprint  for  the  different 
scrambler settings. He spent a year cataloguing the chain lengths for all of the 105,456 
possible  scrambler  arrangements,  from  this  he  would  be  able  to  determine  the 
scrambler settings of the day-key, he could then use this to try and decrypt a message 
key and use that to decrypt a message, if the plug-board settings did not affect any of 
the letters in the message-key it would be possible to mostly decrypt the message. The 
plug-board setting could then be determined by looking at the generated message and 
changing letters until it made sense. Using this technique Rejewski could retrieve a 
day-key and read all of that day’s messages. 
When  the  Germans  adapted  the  way  they  transmitted  messages  it  made 
Rejewski’s  catalogue  of  chains  obsolete.  Instead  of  painstakingly  recreating  it  he 
developed a mechanical device, based on an enigma machine, which was capable of 
trying  lots  of  different  scrambler  settings  until  it  spotted  the  correct  one.  As  the 
scramblers could be arranged in six different ways six of the so called bombes were 
required.  In  December  1938  the  Germans  augmented  the  security  of  Enigma, 
increasing the number of different scramblers to five and the number of plug-board 
cables to ten. This vastly increased the number of possible plug-board permutations 
and  increased  the  number  of  bombes  required  by  a  factor  of  ten.  The  cost  of 
manufacturing the new bombes was beyond the resources of the Polish cryptographic 
department,  and  in  1939  the  flow  of  German  intelligence  into  Poland  dried  up. 
Sensing  an  imminent  German  invasion  the  Polish  were  willing  to  share  their 
cryptanalysis breakthroughs with their allies. On the 24
th of July senior cryptanalysts 
from France and Britain arrived in Poland where they were informed, to their surprise, 
of the Polish successes in reading secure German messages. Spare Enigma machines 
and blueprints for the bombes were shipped to London and Paris where the Polish 
work could continue. On the 1
st of September Hitler invaded Poland and WW2 had 
begun. 
In Britain the responsibility for breaking German codes had moved from Room 
40  to  Bletchley  Park,  a  large  Victorian  mansion  in  Buckinghamshire.  The  British 
cryptanalysts quickly mastered the polish techniques and with greater resources had 
created the bombes necessary to break the encryption. The Polish technique hinged on 
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message, this repetition was the weakness that allowed the cryptanalysts to peer inside 
the  Enigma  code.  Some  cryptanalysts  at  Bletchley  Park  were  responsible  for 
continuing  the  research  into  weaknesses  in  the  code,  in  case  the  Germans 
strengthened their transmission protocol and stopped sending the key twice. One of 
the researchers was Alan Turing, he realised that there was another potential avenue 
for attack due to the fact that Enigma was being used by the military. The military 
thrive on routine, the contents of some parts of the messages would be predictable, for 
example, a weather report would be transmitted shortly after 6 am every day. The 
section of plaintext that was known to the attackers was referred to as a crib. Using 
these cribs Turing developed a new technique for decoding Enigma messages. He also 
studied chains in encipherment of various letters, for example if a ‘w’ was ciphered as 
an ‘e’ and the next plaintext letter was ‘e’ that had been changed to a ‘t’ and later on 
in the message there was a plaintext ‘t’ that was converted to a ‘w’, this was the type 
of chain Turing was interested in. Turing imagined a machine that was a series of 
Enigma machines in parallel. Details of a chain would be entered into it by connecting 
the output of the first one to the input of the second and so on. In between the input of 
the first and the output of the third there was a lamp. The scrambler settings on the 
three  machines  would  rotate.  The  lamp  would  only  light  when  the  circuit  was 
complete, this would only happen when the scrambler settings were correct for all 
three machines. Again the study of these chains allowed the cryptanalysts to divorce 
the plug-board settings from the scramblers. This is because the plug-board settings 
are constant, although in the example chain above it is not known what letter the first 
‘w’ is converted to by the plug-board, it is known that when the ‘t’ is converted to a 
‘w’ the signal has travelled through the plug-board cable twice, cancelling out the 
effect. While the plug-board contributes the majority of the different combinations of 
settings an Enigma machine can have, it is only a mono-alphabetic substitution, and, 
as there were only ten plug-board cables, an incomplete one at that. By decoding the 
original  message  with  the  scrambler  settings  the  plug-board  settings  can  soon  be 
determined. Turing’s decoding machine was built; it arrived on the 14
th of March 
1940 but was a lot slower than anticipated. The design was refined and a new one was 
ordered, but it was going to take four months to build. On the 10
th of March 1940 the 
Germans changed their key transmission protocol so that the key was only sent once 
and the decoded Enigma messages dried up until the 8
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machine arrived. This fulfilled all of Turing’s hopes and messages could be decoded 
for the rest of the war. 
The information that was gained by cracking the Enigma code was of crucial 
value to the wartime effort of the allies. Lessons can be learnt for both cryptanalysts 
and the users of cryptographic algorithms. The Polish code-breakers, motivated by 
desperation,  never  gave  up  hope  that  Enigma  could  be  broken,  and  through  their 
tenacity found a technique that could retrieve German Keys. The real weakness in the 
enigma code wasn’t the code itself but the way  it was used. The  first method of 
breaking it used the fact that the message-key was enciphered twice and the second 
method relied on knowing sections of the plaintext. While the cipher isn’t secure by 
today’s standards, as it is important to assume that an attacker may have access to 
plaintexts as well as ciphertexts, any code can be made much weaker by using it 
improperly. It is important to minimise any additional information that is leaked to 
any potential attacker. 
2.2.7  Modern Cryptography 
In 1949 Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems was published in the Bell 
Labs Technical Journal by Claude Shannon [14]. It established the mathematical basis 
for modern cryptography and developed two metrics for measuring the security of a 
cipher, confusion and diffusion. Confusion is related to the relationship between the 
key and the ciphertext, this will be very complicated in a cipher with good levels of 
confusion. Substitution, generally performed by so called s-boxes, is a key component 
in ensuring confusion. Diffusion is the effect the plaintext has on the ciphertext, it is 
related to the avalanche effect, a term first used by Horst Feistel [15], which describes 
how changing one bit at the input causes an avalanche of changes through to the 
output. It was developed into the Strict Avalanche Criterion, which states that, for 
optimal diffusion, changing one bit in the plaintext should change on average half of 
the bits of the ciphertext. Diffusion is mostly associated with transposition operations 
in ciphers. Now that the mathematical theory behind encryption had been formalised 
ciphers could be designed in a rigorous way as opposed to the ad hoc methods that 
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2.2.7.1  Block Ciphers 
As computing developed the price of computers steadily reduced. By the 1970s 
companies  were  able  to  afford  computers  and  they  became  an  important  part  of 
business. Businesses would often have to send and receive secure messages, these 
would have to be encrypted and so businesses would develop their own encryption 
schemes. This posed no problems if the secure data had to be sent between different 
offices  of  the  same  company,  but  it  would  be  problematic  if  data  had  to  be  sent 
between different companies as the algorithms would not be compatible. To address 
this problem the US government decided to create a standard encryption algorithm 
that could be used by everyone. The new Data Encryption Standard (DES) was based 
on the algorithm  Lucifer which was developed by Horst Feistel [15], an engineer 
working for IBM. The NSA examined the algorithm to ensure that it was secure and 
made a couple of changes. They reduced the key length from 64 bits to 56. This 
meddling lead to speculation that the NSA had deliberately weakened the cipher in 
order for them, and only them, to be able to decrypt it. 
As  DES  was  so  widely  used  the  security  of  the  algorithm  was  heavily 
researched. The first attack to be proposed was Differential Cryptanalysis, which uses 
several different, but related, plaintexts to gain information about the key. When it 
was published in 1990 it was discovered that the chosen s-boxes had strengthened the 
cipher against this attack. Differential cryptanalysis was known to IBM researchers in 
1974 but as it is a powerful attack that can be applied to lots of different ciphers the 
NSA asked them to keep it secret. Although the cipher was resilient against this form 
of attack, an attacker with access to 2
47 chosen plaintexts can still break DES. In 1992 
Linear  Cryptanalysis  was  developed  [16],  this  involved  generating  linear 
approximations to sections of the cipher with either a high or a low probability of 
correctness. DES can be broken with  2
43 known plaintexts [17]. 
While in the strictest of senses this means that the security of DES has been 
compromised, the attacks are still not feasible, requiring unrealistically large amounts 
of known or chosen plaintexts. The death knell for DES came in 1997 when RSA 
Security  ran  a  competition  to  crack  DES  as  a  demonstration  that  with  modern 
computers the 56-bit key no longer provided adequate security. The competition was 
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to retrieve the key in 96 days. This has since been improved and DES can now be 
cracked in an average of 7.2 days [18].  
It was clear that a new stronger encryption standard was required and in 1997 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started the search for a 
new algorithm that would be dubbed the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). In 
2001 the new algorithm was chosen, it was Rijndael, developed by Vincent Rijmen 
and Joan Daemen. There are currently no successful mathematical attacks on AES, 
although it is vulnerable to side channel attacks. 
2.2.7.2  Public Key 
In order for secure communication to work both parties need to have access to 
the key. Transferring this in a secure way can be problematic. In the 1970s couriers 
were used to transfer keys to recipient of the secure data so it could be deciphered. 
While  this  is  more  secure  than  having  a  courier  carry  sensitive  documents  as  a 
potential  attacker  needs  to  get  both  the  key  from  the  courier  and  intercept  the 
encrypted  transmission  it  is  still  less  than  ideal.  In  1976  Whitfiel  Diffe,  Martin 
Hellman and Ralph Merkle developed Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This technique is 
best explained by an analogy. Alice and Bob want to get married and Alice needs to 
send her wedding ring to Bob. She can only send it through the post, but she does not 
trust her postman not to steal it. She locks the ring in a box and sends the box to Bob, 
he unfortunately does not have the key and Alice can’t post it to him for fear of the 
postman getting it. Bob puts his own padlock on the box and sends it back to Alice 
who  then  unlocks  her  padlock  and  sends  it  back  to  Bob.  The  ring  is  now  only 
protected by Bob’s padlock to which he has the key. In this analogy the ring is the key 
to a block cipher and the padlocks are special encryption algorithms. The biggest 
problem  in  developing  this  scheme  was  finding  a  way  to  encrypt  the  data  where 
encryption and decryption was commutative, that is to say that it doesn’t matter that 
the second encryption is performed before the first decryption. This was overcome by 
the use of discrete logarithms.  
This form of key exchange does have some problems; it requires three transfers 
of data between the two parties which is not always convenient, if communicating 
from vastly different time zones, for example. In 1975, while developing the idea for 
key exchange, Diffie also published his idea for asymmetric key algorithms. These are Chapter 2 Background    20 
 
group of algorithms where encryption and decryption are performed using different 
keys, the encryption key can be freely distributed so it is called the public key, it can 
be used by anyone to send secure data to the holder of the decryption or private key. 
In this way there needs to be no secure transfer of keys. Although Diffie described the 
concept of public key encryption he could not find any mathematical functions with 
suitable properties. It was left to Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman to 
develop a working system which was patented in 1977. Rivest, Shamir and Adleman 
created the company RSA Security to commercialise the research. 
Cryptography is a world of secrets, just like the invention of the computer at 
Bletchley park, British cryptanalysts were busy researching public key encryption and 
secure key exchange. In the late 60s Peter Ellis was working at GCHQ on the problem 
of key exchange, like Diffie, he came up with the idea of separate keys for encryption 
and decryption, but was unable to think up any suitable function. Then in 1973 a new 
mathematician joined, Clifford Cocks. He had been previously working in number 
theory and recognised the potential of prime numbers and factorisation to solve the 
problem. Unfortunately in the early 70s computers were still quite primitive and the 
amount of processing power required to implement the system was a stumbling block. 
In  1974  Cocks  was  explaining  his  idea  to  his  old  school  and  university  friend 
Malcolm Williamson, who had also started working at GCHQ. He was suspicious of 
the  idea  and  studied  it  in  detail  intent  on  finding  a  flaw.  Instead,  in  1975,  he 
discovered the Diffie-Helman key exchange. GCHQ scientists had discovered all of 
the principles of public key encryption before anyone else, but as they were sworn to 
secrecy this was not revealed until 1997 when Cocks was allowed to give a brief 
history  of  GCHQ’s  contribution  to  public  key  encryption  while  presenting  some 
unclassified research he had performed on RSA at a conference. 
2.2.7.3  The Digital Revolution 
In the 1970s Phil Zimmerman was deeply concerned about the threat of nuclear 
war and became an anti-nuclear political activist. In the 80s tensions between the US 
and the USSR calmed and Zimmerman’s focus changed to another political cause, the 
public’s right for privacy. Hundreds of millions of emails are sent every day and if 
they are unencrypted then they are particularly vulnerable to eavesdropping. At the 
time there was no software available for members of the public to use to encrypt their 
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designed to do just that. At the heart of the software was the public key algorithm 
RSA which is a lot more computationally intensive than a symmetric key system with 
an  equivalent  level  of  security.  To  get  round  the  problem  of  the  software  being 
prohibitively slow on the personal computers of the average user PGP only uses RSA 
to  encrypt  the  key  for  a  much  faster  symmetric  key  system  which  encrypts  the 
message.  By  1991  Zimmerman  had  a  fairly  polished  product,  but  there  were 
problems. He was worried that Congress were going to try an ban products like PGP 
in order to ensure that law enforcers could read criminals email, so in June he asked a 
friend to upload it to a Usenet bulletin board. 
Zimmerman had released his software and it was being used exactly for the 
purposes that he had intended, human rights groups all over the world were using 
PGP to protect their communications. Unfortunately his problems were not over yet. 
PGP used the RSA algorithm which was protected by a patent for which he did not 
have a licence. More seriously, Zimmerman’s work had attracted the attention of the 
FBI. The US had export controls on cryptographic systems and systems with more 
than 40 bits were considered munitions, in 1993 Zimmerman became the target of an 
investigation  into  exporting  munitions  without  a  licence.  Zimmerman  found  an 
interesting loop-hole to the export controls, he published the source code in a book 
and as the export of books is protected by the First Amendment all someone had to do 
was scan the book with OCR software and compile the program. In 1996 after three 
years of investigation the case was dropped. Zimmerman also managed to reach an 
agreement with RSA Inc. PGP was finally a legitimate program. 
In  the  90s  the  whole  cryptographic  climate  was  changing,  the  internet  was 
starting to develop allowing for the development of ecommerce. In order for this to be 
successful customers had to have faith in security of the new medium. In 1995 Hal 
Finney  set  a  challenge  to  break  the  40-bit  RC4  encryption  that  came  with  the 
international version of the Netscape browser. This was completed in less than two 
weeks, a worrying achievement for anyone buying anything over the internet. The 
government control on encryption had another economically damaging side-effect, the 
weakness of the Content Scrambling System (CSS). CSS is the encryption system 
used to protect the content of DVDs, it was developed in 1996 and in order for DVD 
players  to  be  freely  exportable  was  restricted  to  40  bits.  This  allowed  the  copy 
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internet, allegedly costing movie studios millions of dollars in lost profits. Due to the 
changing climate and the sense that strong encryption was needed domestically the 
export restrictions were dropped in 1996, paving the way for people all over the world 
to adopt secure ciphers to protect their secrets. 
2.2.7.4  Side Channel Attacks 
It has long been known that the various emissions that real devices make during 
their  operation  can  reveal  secret  information.  The  purpose  NSA’s  TEMPEST 
program, started in the 1960s, was to ensure that electronic emissions that escaped 
from a device would not reveal sensitive information about its operation. It wasn’t 
until the mid 90s that the information gathered through side channels was used to 
break encryption systems.  
In  1996  Paul  Kocher  developed  a  radical  new  type  of  attack.  All  previous 
cryptanalysis  had  relied  on  weaknesses  in  the  cipher,  exposing  patterns  in  the 
ciphertext that could be exploited. The new method used information gained through 
a side channels to determine the internal state of the device performing the encryption. 
The first side channel attack was timing analysis, it exploits the fact that operations 
take a certain amount of time to perform and so information can be gained by timing 
how long it takes a device to respond to a query [19]. Then in 1999 he extended the 
idea  to  power  consumption  [2].  In  modern  transistor  technology  more  power  is 
consumed when a value changes from ‘0’ to ‘1’ or ‘1’ to ‘0’ than if it stays the same, 
by measuring the power consumption information can be gathered about the state of 
registers inside a crypto-device. Some information can be gained by examining the 
power  trace,  the  power  consumption  data  for  one  encryption,  and  looking  for 
significant features, this is called Simple Power Analysis. A much more powerful 
technique  is  Differential  Power  Analysis,  this  combines  information  from  several 
encryptions  with  the  same  key  and  with  enough  power  traces  can  retrieve  the 
complete key, even from a state of the art algorithm such as AES [3]. 
Since the demonstration of the general technique a number of side channels 
have been proposed, from emitted EM radiation [20] to the acoustic noise a processor 
emits [21]. Although several countermeasures have been proposed [9, 22-25] none 
work  with  complete  efficacy  and  how  to  protect  algorithms  against  side  channel 
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2.2.8  Conclusion 
Over  the  last  30  years  cryptography  has  become  increasingly  pervasive  in 
modern life. Ciphers no longer just protect state secrets and military plans but trade 
secrets,  finances  and  privacy.  Cryptographic  hardware  has  been  transformed  from 
large cumbersome devices to small sections of existing chips or programs that are 
constantly carried. Since their development block ciphers have provided an efficient 
and conceptually simple way of generating the complex transforms that implement 
the principles of secure communication outlined in Shannon’s seminal 1949 paper. 
The advantages of block ciphers are such that  they have become by far the most 
common type of cipher in use today. 
While the increase in public use of cryptography is beneficial, as the general 
public are able to protect their secrets and ensure their privacy with secure encryption. 
There  is  another  side  to  the  coin,  cryptanalysis  is  becoming  increasingly  more 
important to criminals. Additionally, the increase in mobile cryptography has made 
ciphers  increasingly  vulnerable  to  attacks  like  Differential  Power  Analysis,  which 
requires physical access to the device and does not rely on a mathematical weakness 
in the algorithm. The ability to successfully protect secrets has always been, and will 
continue to be of very high importance to society.  
 
Chapter 3  Block Ciphers 
3.1  Introduction 
Block  ciphers  have  been  an  important  area  of  cryptography  since  their 
development in the 1970s. They work on a fixed size block of data and use the secret 
key  to  transform  the  unencrypted  data,  or  plaintext,  into  its  encrypted  form,  or 
ciphertext. In the 1970s a standard block cipher was developed by the US called Data 
Encryption  Standard  (DES).  This  reigned  supreme  for  over  two  decades  until 
increases in computing power rendered its security questionable. A modification to 
increase the effort an attacker must use to crack it by chaining three DES blocks 
together was developed and given the apt name Triple DES (TDES). Finally, in 2001, 
after the submission and lengthy evaluation of algorithms from the public, they were 
both  superseded  by  the  Advanced  Encryption  Standard  (AES),  which  remains  the 
accepted algorithm today. 
In  section  3.2  the  basic  concepts  in  modern  cryptography  are  introduced. 
Section 3.3 examines the basics of block ciphers in more detail. Sections 3.4 - 3.6 
describe the three most important block ciphers of the last 40 years, DES, TDES and 
AES. 
3.2  Basic Concepts in Cryptography 
3.2.1  Cryptographic Methods 
Cryptographic algorithms seek to make data unreadable by everyone except a 
trusted  subset  of  the  population.  To  achieve  this,  the  data  is  put  through  a 
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also by a secret key. The data can then only be decoded by someone who has the 
relevant key to unlock it. 
Figure 3-1 shows an example of a complete cryptographic system. Alice wants 
to send a message to Bob without Eve (or anybody else) being able to read it. She 
takes her unencrypted message, known as a plaintext, and encrypts it with a secret 
key; the enciphered message is called a ciphertext. She can then send this message to 
Bob, who can read it as he also has the secret key. Although Eve is able to intercept 
the message she cannot make sense of it as she does not have the key. 
 
Figure 3-1: An example of an encrypted communication. 
There  are  two  main  types  of  cryptographic  algorithm,  symmetric  and 
asymmetric key. Symmetric key algorithms have symmetry in the sense that the same 
key is used for both encryption and decryption. In order to use a symmetric algorithm 
all parties involved in the communication must have the key. 
Asymmetric key algorithms, also known as public key ciphers, use a different 
key for encryption and decryption. The key used to encrypt the data is called the 
public key and can be freely distributed. Only the private key, which is kept secret, 
can decrypt the message. 
Additionally there  are  also cryptographic hash functions. These are one-way 
functions that return a fixed length output and do not have a key. Once the data has 
been put through them it cannot be retrieved. They are used for a variety of purposes 
such as password verification and checking the integrity of a message. 
3.2.1.1  Symmetric Key Algorithms 
There are two main types of symmetric algorithms, block ciphers and stream 
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3.2.1.1.1 Block Ciphers 
Block ciphers are symmetric algorithms that act on fixed length groups of bits 
called blocks, modern algorithms typically have block sizes of around 128 bits. Block 
ciphers  are  key  dependent,  bijective  transforms,  meaning  each  plaintext  maps 
uniquely to exactly one ciphertext and the particular mapping is determined by the 
key (and the cipher being used). The specific transform is controlled by the secret key. 
Decryption is similar, application of the secret key and the inverse cipher reveals the 
original data. Block ciphers are discussed in more detail in section 3.3. 
3.2.1.1.2 Stream Ciphers 
Stream  ciphers  work  on  smaller  blocks,  typically  bits  or  bytes,  and  the 
transform  for  successive  blocks  does  not  remain  fixed  throughout  the  entire 
encryption.  The  difference  between  block  and  stream  ciphers  is  not  always  that 
distinct. Block ciphers can be modified to act as stream ciphers, although bespoke 
stream ciphers are generally faster and less complex than block ciphers. 
3.2.1.2  Asymmetric Key Algorithms 
Asymmetric public key cryptography uses two different keys. The encryption, 
or public, key may be freely given to anyone, while the decryption, or private, key is 
kept secret. The keys are related mathematically, but it is not feasible to determine the 
private key from the public key.  
The two main applications of public key cryptography are: 
•  Public Key Encryption: used to ensure the confidentiality of communication 
to the owner of the keys. Messages are encrypted with the public key, they 
then cannot be decrypted by anyone unless they possess the corresponding 
private key. 
•  Digital Signatures: used to verify the identity of the sender and the 
authenticity of the message. Messages are signed with the sender's private key, 
they can be verified by anyone who has access to the sender's public key  
Probably the most well known system is PGP which was developed by Philip 
Zimmerman in 1991and released free of charge on Usenet. It allows both the 
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3.2.1.3  Cryptographic Hash Functions 
A cryptographic hash function, h, takes an arbitrarily sized message, m, and 
creates a fixed length message digest, h (m), that appears random. Cryptographic hash 
functions have other required properties: 
•  Given h (m) it must be difficult to find m.  
•  Given h (m) it must be difficult to find m2 such that h (m2) = h (m). 
•  It must be difficult to find m1 and m2 such that h (m2) = h (m1).  
Hash functions are one of the most versatile cryptographic primitive and have 
several different applications: 
•  Commitment  scheme:  By  concatenating  a  message  with  a  random 
nonce, a value used to ensure uniqueness of output, and taking its hash a 
user can commit to a message while still keeping it hidden. By later 
revealing the nonce to another user it can be shown that the original user 
did commit to the message. 
•  Message integrity: Comparing the hash of a received message to a hash 
that was sent verifies that the message was received correctly. 
•  Digital  signature:  In  order  to  increase  performance  most  digital 
signature algorithms only sign the message digest rather than the entire 
message. 
•  Password  verification:  When  a  password  is  entered  the  hash  of  the 
entry is taken and compared to the hash of the actual password. Thus the 
actual password does not need to be stored as that would be insecure. 
3.2.2  Cryptanalysis Methods 
If data is worth protecting then it will be of some value, therefore code-breaking 
is  as  old  as  codes  themselves.  This  section  briefly  introduces  some  techniques  to 
break  cryptographic  algorithms.  Different  cryptanalysis  methods  assume  that  the 
attacker has different levels of knowledge or access to the cipher:  
•  Ciphertext-only: the attacker has a list of ciphertexts. 
•  Known-plaintext: a set of ciphertexts linked to corresponding plaintexts. Chapter 3 Block Ciphers    28 
 
•  Chosen-plaintext/-ciphertext: a set of ciphertexts (plaintexts) linked to 
corresponding plaintexts (ciphertexts) chosen by the attacker. 
•  Related-key attack: like a chosen-plaintext, except the attacker can obtain 
ciphertexts encrypted with different keys. The relationship between the keys is 
known e.g. one bit difference, although the actual values are not. 
Classical cryptanalysis mostly involved looking at the frequencies of various 
letters in ciphertext and comparing those to the frequencies of letters in the plaintext 
language.  As  cryptographic  algorithms  got  more  advanced  this  was  no  longer 
possible, so new techniques had to be created. There are several general attacks on 
block ciphers, such as differential cryptanalysis, a chosen plaintext attack that uses 
differentials, pairs of plaintexts related by a constant difference, to detect patterns in 
statistical distribution [26], and linear cryptanalysis, which involves generating linear 
approximations to sections of the cipher that have either a high or low probability of 
being correct [16]. It is also possible to exploit specific weaknesses in algorithms by 
designing bespoke attacks, for example the Davies attack [27], which makes use of 
the fact that adjacent s-boxes, non-linear functions that take a number of bits as input 
whose  output    is  determined  by  the  value  of  the  input,  in  the  Data  Encryption 
Standard (DES) share some input bits.  
The simplest form of attack is to simply go through all possible keys until the 
correct one is discovered. This is called a brute force attack. With current levels of 
computing power it is possible to attack outdated encryption algorithms like the block 
cipher DES [28, 29], which has a key length of 56 bits, giving a total of 7.2 * 10
16 
possible key values. Modern block ciphers, like AES generally use between 128 and 
256 bit keys, giving between 3.4 * 10
38 and 1.2 * 10
77 possible key values. This 
means it is not currently  feasible to perform brute force attacks on modern block 
ciphers. 
Another type of attack relies not on information derived from the algorithm, but 
instead  information  that  is  leaked  from  the  physical  implementation.  Real  world 
systems are not simple black boxes where the input goes in one end and the output 
comes out the other, but rather are complicated devices that consume power and emit 
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calculations. All of these things can leak information about what is going on inside 
the device and attacks that exploit this are known as side channel attacks.  
The  majority  of  the  work  presented  here  is  related  to  side  channel  attacks, 
specifically Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Power analysis uses the fact that the 
power consumption has a high dependence on the data that is being processed. DPA 
combines  the  power  consumption  data  from  several  encryptions  using  different 
plaintexts and uses statistical techniques to determine the most probable value for the 
key. Power analysis in general and DPA in particular are discussed in more detail in 
sections 4.3 and 4.3.2 respectively. 
3.3  Block Ciphers 
Block ciphers are a bijective transform that take the plaintext as an input and 
convert it into the ciphertext. In order to be secure this transform need to have certain 
mathematical  properties.  Section  3.3.1  introduces  the  most  important  properties 
required for security: confusion and diffusion. While the mathematical properties are 
clearly very important, knowing them and implementing a cipher that satisfies them 
are  very  different  things.  Section  3.3.2  describes  the  structures  that  make  up  the 
majority of modern block ciphers. Section 3.3.3 gives details on the various ways that 
a block cipher can be used to encrypt a set of data that is larger than a single block. 
3.3.1  Confusion and diffusion 
In  order  for  a  block  cipher  to  be  secure  against  statistical  attacks  it  must 
effectively deal with the redundancy in the plaintext data. In 1949 Claude Shannon 
published a seminal paper that is the mathematical basis for modern cryptography 
[14]. In this he defined two concepts, diffusion and confusion. 
Diffusion means that redundancy in the plaintext and key are dissipated in the 
ciphertext; the influence of the value of a single input bit will be diffused over several 
ciphertext bits and hence it will be difficult for an attacker to gain knowledge about 
the plaintext from the ciphertext. Diffusion is characterised by the Avalanche Effect 
and  the  Strict  Avalanche  Criterion  (SAC),  terms  first  used  by  Horst  Feistel.  The 
Avalanche Effect results in a significant change in the output bits, ideally one half of 
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this and it is satisfied if a change in each of the input bits changes each of the output 
bits with a probability of 0.5. This means that the ciphertext will appear to change 
randomly  between  related  messages,  hiding  message  relationships  which  could  be 
used by an attacker. Operations that transpose bits increase the level of diffusion. 
Confusion  refers  to  making  the  relationship  between  the  inputs  and  the 
ciphertext as complex as possible, this is to ensure that it is difficult for an attacker to 
discern  information  about  the  inputs  from  the  ciphertexts.  Ideally  it  would  be 
impossible for an attacker to distinguish a series of ciphertexts from a random bit-
stream.  Confusion  is  ensured  by  using  s-boxes,  these  are  look  up  tables  that 
implement highly non-linear transformations.  
3.3.1.1  Quantifying Confusion and Diffusion 
Diffusion is the distribution of the effect of the value of the plaintext in the 
ciphertext, in the ideal situation a change in any bit of the plaintext would affect each 
bit of the ciphertext with a probability of 0.5. This can be determined by calculating 
the ciphertexts for a large number of random plaintexts and counting the number of 
ciphertext bits that are affected by changing one bit of the plaintext. The distribution 
of the number of affected bits can then be compared to the theoretical distribution of 
the  ideal  case  using  the  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  (KS)  test  [30].  The  KS  test  is  a 
statistical test used specifically to test the equivalence of two probability distributions 
using a finite number of samples. This is then repeated for each bit of the plaintext 
and then the entire process is repeated for the key.  
Determining whether or not sufficient levels of confusion have been reached in 
a cryptographic algorithm can be achieved by testing for statistical randomness. A 
simple frequency test, checking that there is an approximately equal number of 1s and 
0s, can give an indication whether or not a cipher provides adequate confusion  [30].  
3.3.2  Block Cipher Structure 
Although block ciphers represent a very complicated transformation most are 
composed  of  repeating  iterations  of  simpler  functions.  By  combining  simple 
operations that mix in key data or increase either confusion or diffusion and having 
several iterations of sequences of these blocks, commonly referred to as rounds, a 
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as a whole, the combination of simple operations that forms a round is called the 
round function. Two popular schemes for designing block ciphers are Substitution-
Permutation Networks (SPN) and Feistel ciphers. 
As  the  name  implies,  Substitution-Permutation  Networks  based  ciphers  are 
mainly made up of operations that either substitute values, or permute bits. During 
substitution the data is separated into smaller blocks and the values in these blocks are 
substituted for others, typically using a non-linear s-box, this increases the confusion. 
Permutation  works  across  several  blocks  and  mixes  the  data,  swapping  bits  or 
combining values so the influence of data from one part of the plaintext is diffused 
through the whole ciphertext. An example of an algorithm based on SPN is AES. 
Using an SPN approach it is easy to design ciphers with sufficient levels of confusion 
and diffusion to be secure using a fairly simple set of cryptographic primitives. 
 
Figure 3-2: The structure of a Feistel cipher. 
Feistel networks were first used in the cipher Lucifer, developed at IBM by Don 
Coppersmith and the eponymous Horst Feistel. They are a subset of SPN so are also 
made up of a series of simple functions repeated in rounds. The plaintext is split into 
two equal halves. The round function is applied to the right hand half which is then 
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right hand side becomes the left. This is shown in Figure 3-2. An advantage of Feistel 
networks is that encryption and decryption is very similar, often requiring little more 
than a reversal of the key schedule. An example of an algorithm based on a Feistel 
structure is DES. 
3.3.3  Cryptographic Modes of Operation 
Block ciphers only work on fixed length blocks of data, but the actual data that 
needs  to  be  encrypted  can  be  of  any  arbitrary  length.  Several  different  modes  of 
operation for block ciphers have been devised. The most common ones are described 
in  this  section,  they  are:  Electronic  Code  Book,  Cipher  Block  Chaining,  Cipher 
Feedback, Output Feedback and Counter. 
3.3.3.1  Electronic Code Book 
The simplest mode is called Electronic Code Book (ECB), the input data is 
separated into blocks and each is encrypted individually. A block diagram is shown in 
Figure 3-3. Plaintexts with the same value will always give the same ciphertext, this 
means  that  patterns  in  the  data  can  still  be  seen  in  the  encrypted  data.  Also  this 
method is susceptible to the replay attack, a network attack where an attacker repeats 
valid data that was gained from eavesdropping on a previous session.  
 
Figure 3-3: Block diagram of the ECB cryptographic mode of operation. 
3.3.3.2  Cipher Block Chaining 
In  Cipher  Block  Chaining  (CBC)  the  plaintext  is  XORed  with  the  previous 
ciphertext  before  encrypting  it;  the  first  plaintext  is  XORed  with  an  initialisation 
vector, see section 3.3.3.6. A block diagram is shown in  Figure 3-4. Each ciphertext 
is now dependent on all previous plaintexts so 1 bit error in the plaintext corrupts all 
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plaintext block and flips the corresponding bit in the next block. Encryption must be 
done sequentially as the output from each block is needed at the input to the next, but 
as the converse is true, i.e. the only data required from the previous block is the input 
and it is only needed to convert the output of the decryption to the actual plaintext, 
decryption can be parallelised. 
 
Figure 3-4: Block diagram of the CBC cryptographic mode of operation. 
3.3.3.3  Cipher Feedback 
 In Cipher Feedback (CFB) an initialisation vector is encrypted, the plaintext is 
then  XORed  with  the  output  from  the  encryption  to  form  the  ciphertext,  this 
ciphertext is then encrypted and XORed with the next plaintext and so on, a block 
diagram is shown in Figure 3-5. 1 bit error in the plaintext corrupts the entire cipher 
stream; 1 bit error in a ciphertext flips the corresponding bit in the corresponding 
plaintext  and  the  entire  next  block.  Encryption  must  be  done  sequentially,  but 
decryption can be parallelised. It is important to realise that as the plaintext interacts 
with the output of the block cipher in both the encryption and the decryption forms 
the block cipher is used in encryption mode. 
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3.3.3.4  Output Feedback 
Output Feedback (OFB) is similar to CFB, an initialisation vector is encrypted 
and is XORed with the plaintext data to form the ciphertext, the difference is that the 
output of the encryption is fed back before the plaintext is added. A block diagram is 
shown  in  Figure  3-6.  Neither  encryption  nor  decryption  using  OFB  can  be 
parallelised, but unlike CFB and CBC modes errors do not propagate and will only 
affect  the  bits  in  question.  As  in  CFB,  both  encryption  and  decryption  use  block 
ciphers in their encryption mode, in fact the encryption and decryption modes are 
exactly the same, simplifying any implementation. It is very important to not use the 
same initialisation vector with the same key; this will result in an identical random 
bit-stream and will leak a lot of information about the plaintexts. Another possible 
insecurity with OFB is that if the output of the block cipher happens to give the same 
value  as  the  initialisation  vector  then  the  random  bit-stream  will  repeat.  The 
probability of this happening is related to the number of plaintexts that are encrypted 
with  the  same  key  and  so  this  problem  can  be  mitigated  by  changing  the  key 
regularly. 
 
Figure 3-6: Block diagram of the OFB cryptographic mode of operation. 
3.3.3.5  Counter 
Counter mode (CTR) is similar to CFB and OFB in the sense that it uses the 
output of a block cipher to generate a random bit-stream that is then XORed with the 
plaintext to form the ciphertext. The input to the block cipher is a unique number, 
called a nonce, a contraction of number used once, concatenated with a counter. It is 
important not to use the same key / nonce combination as it will leak information 
about the plaintext. Chapter 3 Block Ciphers    35 
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Figure 3-7: Block diagram of the CBC cryptographic mode of operation. 
3.3.3.6  Initialisation Vector 
The choice of initialisation vector (IV) can have a significant impact on the 
security of an encrypted message. If the same IV is used across several messages and 
those messages start with the same block, the first block of ciphertext will be the 
same, this will reveal information to any potential attacker. A random block of data 
can be generated and used as the IV, this will require the encryption algorithm to have 
access to a source of randomness, and also, in order to perform the decryption the IV 
must be known. If it is random then it must be sent along with the message, this 
increases the size of the ciphertext by 1 block. If there are a large number of relatively 
short messages this can form a significant overhead. 
A better method is to use a cryptographic nonce (a number used only once) to 
generate the IV, typically this takes the form of a message counter. The nonce must 
also be sent with the message, this still creates an overhead, but it can be much shorter 
than a block. It is converted into an entire block by encrypting it with padding. 
3.3.3.7  Summary of Modes of operation 
As the ciphertext of a constant plaintext is always the same with ECB it can leak 
some information about the data, additionally it is susceptible to a replay attack and it 
is generally suggested that it not be used [31]. OFB is very similar to CFB, it does 
have a number of advantages though, errors do not propagate, and both encryption 
and decryption are exactly the same, significantly simplifying an implementation, this 
more than makes up for the fact that the decryption cannot be parallelised. CTR, in 
turn, is preferable to OFB as the random bit-stream generated using CTR will not 
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the encryption is performed. There are also a number of advantages to using CTR 
over CBC. CTR does not require padding, it can be parallelised arbitrarily and it has a 
simpler  structure.  The  advantage  of  CBC  is  that  it  is  more  robust  and  leaks  less 
information if it is not setup securely.  
3.4  Data Encryption Standard 
3.4.1  Introduction 
The  Data  Encryption  Standard  (DES)  was  developed  in  the  early  1970s  by 
cryptographers at IBM, it is a Feistel cipher based on Lucifer. The National Bureau of 
Standards (renamed to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 
1988) identified a need for an encryption standard to protect unclassified but sensitive 
government  information.  After  consulting  the  NSA  they  solicited  proposals  for  a 
cipher  on  15
th  May  1973,  none  of  the  algorithms  were  suitable,  IBM  made  their 
submission after the second request was issued on 27
th August 1974. DES uses a 56-
bit key and works on 64-bit blocks of data [32]. 
3.4.2  Structure of DES 
  As DES is a Feistel cipher the structure is very much like that shown in Figure 
3-2, the only difference is there is an initial permutation that re-orders the bits and a 
final permutation that performs the inverse.  
The  round  function  for  DES  is  shown  in  Figure  3-8.  The  first  stage  is  the 
expansion operation that converts the 32-bit half block into 48 bits. This is achieved 
by duplicating some bits, each 4-bit block of the input provides the middle 4 bits in a 
6-bit block of the output, the 2 remaining bits at the edge of the block come from the 
bits at the edge of the adjacent 4 bit input blocks. This is shown in detail in Table 3-1. 
The expanded data is then mixed with the key and divided into 8 6-bit blocks which 
are each put through a different s-box with 4-bit outputs. The 8 4-bit blocks are then 
re-arranged by a fixed permutation, as shown in Table 3-2. There are a total of 16 
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Figure 3-8: The overall structure of DES and its round function. 
The 56-bit key is expanded into 16 48-bit blocks, a total of 768 bits. This is 
achieved by separating the initial 56 bits into two halves, each 28-bit half is then 
rotated left by either 1 or 2 bits depending on the round, 24 bits are then selected from 
each half by a fixed permutation. The process is repeated for each round. 
Output Bit  Input Bit  Output  Input  Output  Input  Output  Input 
0  31  12  7  24  15  36  23 
1  0  13  8  25  16  37  24 
2  1  14  9  26  17  38  25 
3  2  15  10  27  18  39  26 
4  3  16  11  28  19  40  27 
5  4  17  12  29  20  41  28 
6  3  18  11  30  19  42  27 
7  4  19  12  31  20  43  28 
8  5  20  13  32  21  44  29 
9  6  21  14  33  22  45  30 
10  7  22  15  34  23  46  31 
11  8  23  16  35  24  47  1 
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The inverse of the cipher is very similar, the final permutation is applied first, 
after that the algorithm is exactly the same except the round keys are provided in the 
reverse order, finally the initial permutation is applied to the data [33]. 
Output Bit  Input Bit  Output  Input  Output  Input  Output  Input 
0  15  8  0  16  1  24  18  
1  6  9  14  17  7  25  12 
2  19  10  22  18  23  26  29 
3  20  11  25  19  13  27  5 
4  28  12  4  20  31  28  21 
5  11  13  17  21  26  29  10 
6  27  14  30  22  2  30  3 
7  16  15  9  23  8  31  24 
Table 3-2: The DES Permutation function. 
3.4.3  Security of DES 
There have been a few attacks that can reduce the complexity of attacking full 
round DES to lower than that of a brute force attack, although generally not by much, 
and often they involve collecting large numbers of known or chosen plaintexts. These 
attacks are discussed briefly in section 3.4.3.1. DES is no longer considered secure as 
the key length is not long enough to make brute force attacks infeasible with current 
levels of processing power available.  
3.4.3.1  Theoretical Attacks 
There have been several attacks published on DES. Differential cryptanalysis is 
a  chosen  plaintext  attack  that  uses  differentials,  pairs  of  plaintexts  related  by  a 
constant difference, to detect patterns in statistical distribution. It was known to IBM 
in  1974  and  resistance  to  this  type  of  attack  was  one  of  the  design  goals  of  the 
algorithm [34]. When applied to DES differential cryptanalysis requires 2
47 chosen 
plaintexts. 
Linear  cryptanalysis  was  developed  by  Matsui  in  1992  [16].  It  involves 
generating linear approximations to sections of the cipher that have either a high or 
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expected probability of ½. It is the deviation from this that provides the cryptanalyst 
with information. To attack DES using a linear cryptanalysis approach requires 2
43 
known plaintexts [17]. 
The Davies attack is a statistical attack designed specifically for DES, it was 
developed by Davies in 1987 [27]. It is a known plaintext attack that exploits the fact 
that each adjacent s-box shares two input bits that are XORed with different key bits. 
After collecting enough known plaintext / ciphertext pairs some bits of the key can be 
calculated. This reduces the complexity of a brute force attack. There is a trade-off 
between  the  number  of  plaintexts,  the  number  of  key  bits  recovered  and  the 
probability of success. With 2
52 plaintexts 24 key bits can be recovered 53% of the 
time. 
3.4.3.2  Brute Force Attacks 
DES only uses a 56-bit key; this gives 7.2*10
16 possible combinations. In the 
1970s this was adequate for brute force to be infeasible. Computers are currently fast 
enough for this to no longer be true. To highlight this fact RSA Security created a 
series of contests called the DES Challenges. The first one was in 1997 and was 
solved  by  the  DESCHALL  Project  in  96  days,  a  distributed  computing  project 
designed  to  crack  DES.  DES  Challenge  II-1  was  solved  in  41  days  in  1998  by 
distributed.net, a worldwide distributed computing project that uses the idle time of 
lots of machines to solve large, computationally intensive problems. DES Challenge 
II-2 was solved in just 56 hours using Deep Crack, a custom built machine made by 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation. DES Challenge III was solved as a joint effort 
between Deep Crack and distributed.net in 22 hours and 15 minutes [29]. Additionally 
in  2006  the  universities  of  Bochum  and  Kiel  developed  COPACOBANA,  this 
retrieves DES keys in an average of 7.2 days and all keys can be tested in 14.4 days 
[28]. The aim was to get the best cost to performance ratio, as such it is built entirely 
from off the shelf components. It uses 120 FPGAs (Xilinx Spartan3-1000) and can be 
built for less than $10,000 [18].  
Clearly DES does not provide adequate security against brute force attacks by 
modern computers and DES is no longer considered secure. In order to increase the 
security against brute force attacks without having to change to a completely different 
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section 3.5.  In 1997 NIST announced the development of a new standard.  It  was 
published in 2002 and is called the Advanced Encryption Standard; it is discussed in 
section 3.6. 
3.4.3.3  Conclusion 
Even though they have a lower theoretical complexity than a brute for attack, 
the three attacks discussed in section 3.4.3.1 all require a large number of known 
plaintexts.  Linear  cryptanalysis  requires  2
43,  differential  cryptanalysis  requires  2
47, 
and the Davies attack requires 2
52 just to retrieve 24 key bits 53% of the time, these 
numbers of plaintexts are not realistic for a real attacker. However, in the strictest 
sense the algorithm can be described as being broken. Also, the relatively small size 
of the key compared to the availability of modern processing power enables brute 
force attacks to be successful in an average of 2 weeks. DES can therefore no longer 
be considered secure. 
3.5  Triple DES 
3.5.1  Introduction 
Triple DES (TDES) is a derivative of DES that is essentially 3 DES blocks in a 
row. It was developed as a way to increase the size of the key space provided by DES 
when it was realised that 56 bits was not enough to ensure security against brute-force 
attacks with the levels of computing power that had been developed. As it is derived 
from DES the security of a system can be vastly improved while not having to change 
the  underlying  algorithm.  TDES  is  slowly  being  replaced  by  the  current  standard 
algorithm AES. A notable exception is within the electronic payments industry, which 
still makes extensive use of TDES. 
3.5.2  Structure of Triple DES 
The simplest form TDES can take is simply the linking of 3 DES encryption 
blocks, this is commonly known as EEE, as all steps are encryptions. Generally, in 
order to make TDES systems more backwards compatible with DES ones, an EDE 
structure is used, this is one where the 2
nd DES block is in decryption mode, so that if 
all blocks are given the same key the output is the same as that of a single DES block. 
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than when decrypting not only does the operation of each block have to change, but 
also k1 and k3 must be swapped, the structure of EDE decryption is given in Figure 
3-9 c. Additionally there are 2 other variants of TDES, a 2-key version where k1 = k3 
and a 3-key version where k1, k2 and k3 all have different values. 
 
Figure 3-9 : The Structure of TDES for EEE Encryption (a), EDE Encryption (b) and  
decryption (c). 
3.5.3  Security of Triple DES 
When trying to increase the key space of an algorithm by using more than one 
independent  key  and  performing  a  number  of  encryption  algorithms  it  might  be 
assumed that the security would square each time the number of encryptions doubled, 
as an exhaustive search of all possible keys would take 2
2n attempts for each key n 
bits long. In 1977 Diffie and Hellman showed that this wasn’t true by developing the 
Meet-in-the-Middle  Attack  [35].  It  is  a  known  plaintext  attack  where  the  attacker 
calculates one encryption of the plaintext for all possible n keys and stores the results. 
Then the attacker calculates one decryption of the ciphertext for each key in turn, if 
the result is also in the previous list of results then it is likely that the correct keys 
have been found, this can then be verified with another plaintext / ciphertext pair. For 
this reason double DES would not increase the security from 2
2n, but to 2
n+1. 
DES Enc. 
DES Enc.
DES Dec.
Plaintext
Ciphertext
K1
K2
K3
DES Enc.
DES Enc.
DES Enc.
Plaintext
Ciphertext
K1
K2
K3
DES Dec.
DES Dec.
DES Enc.
Plaintext
Ciphertext
K3
K2 
K1 
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3-key  TDES  has  a  key  size  of  168  bits,  but  due  to  the  Meet-in-the-Middle 
Attack the effective security it provides is only 112 bits. 2-key TDES is susceptible to 
certain chosen-plaintext [36] or known-plaintext attacks [37] and thus it is officially 
designated to have only 80-bits of security. 
In  1998  Lucks  improved  the  Meet-in-the-Middle  attack  on  triple  encryption 
algorithms in general and TDES in particular [38]. His version requires around 2
32 
known plaintexts, 2
90 single DES encryptions, and 2
88 memory.  
3.6  Advanced Encryption Standard  
3.6.1  Introduction 
 
Figure 3-10: The structure of the forward and inverse AES algorithm. 
In  January  1997  the  National  Institute  of  Standards  and  Technology  (NIST) 
body  announced  the  initiation  of  the  Advanced  Encryption  Standard  (AES) 
development effort, to create a new standard for a block cipher that would provide 
secure encryption well into the next century. In September of that year NIST officially 
announced a call for algorithms to be submitted by the public and evaluated for their 
appropriateness. NIST stipulated that the algorithm had to work on a 128-bit block 
size and support key-lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits. In October 2001 the algorithm Chapter 3 Block Ciphers    43 
 
Rijndael, developed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen [1], was selected to be AES 
and the standard was published in November 2002 [39]. The structure of AES is 
shown in Figure 3-10: 
The 128-bit input is split into a 4*4 matrix of 8 bits called a state, an example is 
given in Figure 3-11 and it is put through a number of rounds of operations designed 
to encrypt the data, the number of rounds being determined by the size of the key, 10 
for 128, 12 for 192 and 14 for 256.  
 
Figure 3-11: An example of a state. 
Each round consists of a number of operations; Sub Bytes, Shift Rows Mix 
Columns and Add Key, all of the manipulation in these operations are performed in 
the finite field GF (2
8). GF (2
8) mathematics is explained in section 3.6.2 and the 
operations are described in detail in sections 3.6.3 - 3.6.7. 
3.6.2  Finite Field Mathematics 
A finite field is a field, an algebraic construct in which addition, subtraction, 
multiplication and division can be performed, in which there is a finite number of 
elements. The order of a field, the number of elements in it, is of the form p
n where p 
is a prime number called the characteristic and n is a positive integer. There is more 
than one forms of notation for finite fields, for example.  , the notation used in this 
document is GF (p
n). In this notation GF stands for Galois Field, an alternative name 
for finite fields named after Évariste Galois who discovered them shortly before his 
death in a duel in 1832 aged 20 [40]. AES makes use of finite field mathematics, and 
as previously stated all the normal arithmetic operations can be performed on finite 
fields. The next section details the specific finite field that is used in AES, explains 
how it is used and gives examples of its manipulation. Chapter 3 Block Ciphers    44 
 
3.6.2.1  GF (2
8) and AES 
When performing mathematical operations in AES the data is interpreted as 
being in the finite field GF (2
8). In the normal representation of numbers in binary 
notation  the  i
th  bit  of  number  represents  2
i  and  the  resultant  values  from  all  the 
individual  bits  are  summed  to  give  the  total.  In  GF  (2
8)  the  number  represents  a 
polynomial where the i
th bit represents bix
i where b is a modulo-2 coefficient and i can 
range from 0 to 7. An example is given in equation (3-1) with its hexadecimal and 
binary equivalents; it represents the hexadecimal number A7. 
  x
7 + x
5 + x
2 + x +1 = 0xA7 = 10100111  (3-1) 
When performing addition the coefficients are added, as it is modulo 2 this is 
equivalent to an exclusive or (XOR), an example is given in lines 2 – 4 of the example 
in  Figure  3-12.  When  performing  multiplication  each  term  in  one  operand  is 
multiplied  by  each  term  in  the  other  by  adding  the  indices  and  multiplying  the 
coefficients. Coefficients with the same index are then summed modulo-2. The new 
polynomial might have an order greater than 7; if this is the case then it could not be 
represented  in  1  byte  and  the  order  needs  to  be  reduced.  This  is  achieved  by 
representing all results modulo an irreducible polynomial of degree 8. A polynomial 
is irreducible if its only divisors are one and itself. The irreducible polynomial for 
AES is shown in equation (3-2). 
  x
8 + x
4 + x
3 + x +1 = 0x011B  (3-2) 
An example multiplication between the values 0x18 and 0x09 is shown below 
in Figure 3-12. 
1.  (x
5 + x
3) * (x
3 + x)  Initial multiplication   
2.  (x
5+3 + x
5+1) + (x
3+3 + x
3+1)  Multiply out brackets   
3.  x
8 + x
6 + x
6 + x
4     
4.  x
8 + x
4  Addition is XOR so x
6 cancels   
5.  (x
8 + x
4) + (x
8 + x
4 + x
3 + x + 1)  Result has order greater than 8   
6.  x
3 + x + 1  Result is reduced by the irreducible 
polynomial 
Figure 3-12: An example multiplication in GF (2
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3.6.3  Sub Bytes 
The Sub Bytes operation is a data dependent substitution of the values in the 
state. The transform is made up of 2 steps, finding the multiplicative inverse in the 
finite field GF (2
8) and adding an affine transform. The multiplicative inverse is the 
number that when multiplied by the original in GF (2
8) and reduced by the relevant 
irreducible polynomial, gives the value 1 as the answer. An affine transform is a linear 
transform followed by a translation. A general affine transform is shown in equation 
(3-3) and the particular one used by AES is shown in equation (3-4). 
  C Ax x + →   (3-3) 
  x→ 0x1F * x + 0x63  (3-4) 
The affine transform is implemented by calculating each bit in turn using the 
formula given in equation (3-5) it required XORing bits from the original number 
together and then one bit from the constant C. 
  b'i = bi ⊕ b(i + 4) mod 8 ⊕ b(i + 5) mod 8 ⊕ b(i +6) mod 8 ⊕ b(i + 7) mod 8 ⊕  ci  (3-5) 
3.6.4  Shift Rows 
The Shift Rows operation rotates the rows in the state one byte to the left for 
each row there is above it, i.e. the top row remains the same but the one below it is 
rotated one byte to the left.  
 
Figure 3-13: The effect of the Shift Rows operation. 
3.6.5  Mix Columns 
The Mix Columns operation performs a vector dot product on each column in 
turn with a constant matrix. This is shown in Figure 3-14. Chapter 3 Block Ciphers    46 
 
Encryption Matrix: 












02 01 01 03
03 02 01 01
01 03 02 01
01 01 03 02
 
Hence: 












3
2
1
0
c
c
c
c
 becomes 












⊕ ⊕ ⊕
⊕ ⊕ ⊕
⊕ ⊕ ⊕
⊕ ⊕ ⊕
) * } 02 ({ ) ( ) ( ) * } 03 ({
) * } 03 ({ ) * } 02 ({ ) ( ) (
) ( ) * } 03 ({ ) * } 02 ({ ) (
) ( ) ( ) * } 03 ({ ) * } 02 ({
3 2 1 0
3 2 1 0
3 2 1 0
3 2 1 0
c c c c
c c c c
c c c c
c c c c
 
Decryption Matrix: 












e d b
b e d
d b e
d b e
0 09 0 0
0 0 09 0
0 0 0 09
09 0 0 0
 
 Hence: 












3
2
1
0
c
c
c
c
 becomes 












⊕ ⊕ ⊕
⊕ ⊕ ⊕
⊕ ⊕ ⊕
⊕ ⊕ ⊕
) * } 0 ({ ) * } 09 ({ ) * } 0 ({ ) * } 0 ({
) * } 0 ({ ) * } 0 ({ ) * } 09 ({ ) * } 0 ({
) * } 0 ({ ) * } 0 ({ ) * } 0 ({ ) * } 09 ({
) * } 09 ({ ) * } 0 ({ ) * } 0 ({ ) * } 0 ({
3 2 1 0
3 2 1 0
3 2 1 0
3 2 1 0
c e c c d c b
c b c e c c d
c d c b c e c
c c d c b c e
 
Figure 3-14: The matrices for the encryption and decryption versions of the Mix Columns 
operation in hexadecimal. 
3.6.6  Add Key 
Add Key adds the 128-bit round key to the state using an XOR, an example of 
this is shown in Figure 3-15. 
 
Figure 3-15: An example of the Add Key operation in AES. Chapter 3 Block Ciphers    47 
 
3.6.7  Key Expansion 
The round key for each round is different and is derived from the secret key by 
the key scheduler. The number of encryption rounds that a block must go through is 
determined by the key length, 10 rounds for a 128-bit key, 12 for 192-bit and 14 for a 
256-bit key, there is also an initial Add Key operation at the start of the encryption 
process. The size of the key used in each round key is 128 bits, and the original secret 
key data is always used first. This means that for a key size of 128-bits a total of 11 
keys are needed, as the original secret key is always used first the key scheduler needs 
to create only another 10 keys, or 1280-bits of data. For a 192-bit key length 13 round 
keys are required, equivalent to 1472 bits of expanded data. For a key length of 256-
bits 15 round keys are needed, requiring 1664 bits of expanded data. 
 
Figure 3-16: Examples of the key matrices for the three different key lengths in AES. 
During the expansion process the original key is arranged into a matrix similar 
in structure to that of the state. Each element has 8 bits and there are 4 rows, the 
number of columns is determined by the key length, a 128-bit key has 4, a 192-bit key 
had 6 and a 256-bit key has 8, examples are shown in Figure 3-16. Each expansion 
round produces a block of data equal in size to the key matrix, so although longer 
keys need to generate greater amounts of round keys they produce more data in each 
key expansion round and hence require less of them. 10 rounds are needed for 128 
bits, 8 for 192 and 7 for 256 bits.  
To perform one round of the key expansion the last column of the previous 
matrix is rotated downwards, i.e. the bottom byte becomes the top one and the rest are 
shifted  down  by  one;  the  values  are  substituted  using  the  same  s-box  as  during 
encryption, that column is then XORed with the first column in the key matrix and a 
column from the constant RCON, as shown in Figure 3-17. To get the rest of the key 
matrix the previously generated column is XORed with the new columns counterpart 
from the previous matrix, e.g. the 3
rd column in the new block is the 2
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new block combined with the 3
rd column in the old one. An example of the generation 
of the first 2 columns of a round key is shown in Figure 3-18.The only exception to 
this is when there is a 256-bit key, in this case another substitution performed on the 
data in the forth generated column before it is XORed it with the previous matrix’s 
column.  
 
Figure 3-17: The constant RCON. 
 
Figure 3-18: Example of the expansion of the first two columns of the first round key of a 
128-bit key. 
3.6.8  Inverse Cipher 
To decrypt data using AES the inverse of the cipher has to be performed, this 
requires performing the inverse of each operation in the reverse order to the forward 
cipher. The structure of the inverse cipher is also shown in Figure 3-10. The inverse 
of Sub Bytes is again a substitution, the inverse of the affine transform is applied and Chapter 3 Block Ciphers    49 
 
then the multiplicative inverse of the value is found. The inverse of the Shift Rows 
operation is exactly the same except the rows are shifted to the right instead of the 
left. The inverse of the Mix Columns has a similar structure; the only difference is the 
values in the matrix are now the multiplicative inverses of the original ones. The XOR 
operation is its own inverse so Add Key remains the same; the only difference is that 
the first inverse Add Key that is performed has to cancel out the last Add Key that 
was performed during encryption so the round keys are used in the opposite order.  
3.6.9  Implementing the Algorithm 
The following sections  give details on implementing the various blocks that 
make up the algorithm and describe some of the reported implementations. 
3.6.9.1  Shift Rows 
The Shift Rows operation is a simple remapping of the order of bytes within the 
state. This can be accomplished by the way the bytes are wired between the Sub Bytes 
and Mix Columns operations, e.g. the first byte on the second row of the output of the 
Sub Bytes becomes the input to the second byte of the second row of Mix Columns. 
Changing the order of the wiring between blocks does not increase the delay and so 
there are no reasonable improvements that can be made to this approach. 
3.6.9.2  Sub Bytes 
Sub Bytes is the hardest operation as it involves calculating the multiplicative 
inverse in GF (2
8), which can be computationally intensive [41].  It is  possible to 
calculate it using Euclid’s algorithm [42], but this is an iterative process so would 
require several clock cycles [43]. In order to perform the substitution in one clock 
cycle a look up table (LUT) is required, this is commonly referred to as an s-box. This 
approach is not very area efficient. If a standard LUT is implemented in ROM then it 
requires 256 bytes of memory. The s-box is potentially the most replicated element in 
an AES implementation as 16 are needed to perform a complete Sub Bytes operation 
in one clock cycle and an additional four are used to expand the key, this represents a 
significant proportion of the area. The s-box is also the slowest function [41]. There is 
an  optimisation  that  is  commonly  used  in  software  implementations  of  AES  that 
merges the Sub Bytes and Mix Columns stages of the algorithm by storing modified Chapter 3 Block Ciphers    50 
 
s-boxes that give the result of the substitutions multiplied by the relevant constant. 
The modified s-boxes are called t-boxes [41].  
In order to improve the timing performance of the LUT for the AES s, or t-box, 
Morioka and Satoh [41] developed a twisted binary decision diagram (BDD). They 
reported  an  increase  in  speed  by  a  factor  of  between  1.5  and  2  compared  to 
conventional  implementations.  A  BDD  is  a  rooted,  directed,  acyclic  graph,  where 
each non-terminating node has two directed edges. Each level of nodes represents a 
different variable and by following the graph to a terminating node it is possible to 
determine a value for the function represented by the graph. An example BDD is 
shown in Figure 3-19. 
There  are  a  number  of  characteristics  of  the  s-box  that  would  decrease  the 
performance  if  it  was  implemented  in  a  standard  BDD  form.  A  large  sharing  of 
selectors in the first and second stages of the diagram causes a large fan-out. In the 
proposed  twisted  BDD  architecture,  eight  BDDs  are  arranged  in  parallel,  each 
corresponding to an output bit. No node is shared between them and their variable 
ordering is twisted so that each primary input i drives the ((8 – i + j mod 8) +1)th 
input of BDD j. This causes the fan-out to be greatly reduced. Morioka and Satoh 
reported a delay of 440 ps using 2815 gates in a 0.13-µm technology. This fast s-box 
allowed them to achieve encryption rates of 11.6 Gbits/s without using pipelining.  
 
Figure 3-19: An example Binary Decision Diagram and associated Truth Table. 
There are other more space efficient implementations of the s-box. Rijmen [44] 
suggested calculating the multiplicative inverse of a GF (2
8) value by converting it 
into a polynomial of degree 1 with coefficients in GF (2
4). Denoting the irreducible 
polynomial used for multiplication as x
2 + Ax + B and the converted polynomial as bx 
+ c, the multiplicative inverse is given by: Chapter 3 Block Ciphers    51 
 
  1 2 2 1 2 2 1 ) )( ( ) ( ) (
− − − + + + + + + = + c bcA B b bA c x c bcA B b b c bx   (3-6) 
A flow diagram showing the required operations is given in Figure 3-20. This 
approach still requires calculating the multiplicative inverse of a GF (2
4) value. This is 
a much easier problem requiring a smaller LUT as there are only 16 possibilities for 4 
bits. This creates a much smaller s-box, but greatly increases the critical path. This 
optimisation  was  developed  further  by  Hodjat  and  Verbauwhede  [45]  by  adding 
pipelining inside the s-box. Pipelining is discussed in section 3.6.9.7. The speed area 
trade-off that they reported on a 1.8-µm technology is shown in Figure 3-21. 
 
Figure 3-20: Calculating the multiplicative inverse in GF (2
8) using GF (2
4). 
 
Figure 3-21: The speed area trade-off for different s-boxes using a 1.8-µm technology. [45] Chapter 3 Block Ciphers    52 
 
3.6.9.3  Add Key 
The Add Key operation is only an XOR, there is no reasonable way that is can 
be further optimised. 
3.6.9.4  Mix Columns 
Mix Columns is made up of multiplications and additions. Additions, as in the 
Add Key module are simply XOR gates and as stated in section 3.6.9.3 additions are 
too simple to be further optimised. Multipliers are more complicated and the design of 
them is discussed in the following section. 
3.6.9.5  Multiplication 
c7  (a7.b0) ⊕ (a6.b1) ⊕ (a5.b2) ⊕ (a4.b3) 
c6  (a6.b0) ⊕ (a5.b1) ⊕ (a4.b2) ⊕ (a3.b3) ⊕ (a7.b3) 
c5  (a7.b3) ⊕ (a7.b2) ⊕ (a6.b3) ⊕ (a5.b0) ⊕ (a4.b1) ⊕ (a3.b2) ⊕ (a2.b3) 
c4  (a7.b2) ⊕ (a6.b3) ⊕ (a4.b0) ⊕ (a3.b1) ⊕ (a2.b2) ⊕ (a1.b3) 
c3  (a7.b3) ⊕ (a7.b1) ⊕ (a6.b2) ⊕ (a5.b3) ⊕ (a3.b0) ⊕ (a2.b1) ⊕  (a1.b2) ⊕ (a0.b3) 
c2  (a7.b3) ⊕ (a7.b2) ⊕ (a6.b3) ⊕ (a2.b0) ⊕ (a1.b1) ⊕ (a0.b2) 
c1  (a7.b2) ⊕ (a6.b3) ⊕ (a7.b1) ⊕ (a6.b2) ⊕ (a5.b3) ⊕ (a1.b0) ⊕ (a0.b1) 
c0  (a0.b0) ⊕ (a7.b1) ⊕ (a6.b2) ⊕ (a5.b3) 
Table 3-3: The equations for a generic 8-bit by 4-bit GF (28) multiplier. 
In order to design a multiplier it is important to understand how multiplication 
in GF (2
8) is performed, this is described in detail in section 3.6.2. When two finite 
field elements are multiplied together they cause an effect in the element representing 
the sum of the value of their individual elements, e.g. x
3 * x
4 = x
7. Therefore each 
element is the addition (XOR) of each possible combination of pairs of bits, one from 
each  multiplicand,  whose  element  numbers  sum  to  the  value  of  the  element  in 
question. This could give a number that is larger than 2
8 so it has to be reduced 
modulo an irreducible polynomial, the one that is used is given in equation (3-2). The 
8
th element of the irreducible polynomial is ‘1’; this means by adding it to a number 
that is too large it can be used to cancel the 8
th element. Any other values can be Chapter 3 Block Ciphers    53 
 
cancelled by multiplying it by the relevant power of x. The equations for a generic 8-
bit by 4-bit GF (2
8) are shown in Table 3-3. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  when  performing  the  multiplication  in  the  mix 
columns  operation  one  of  the  operands  is  a  constant.  This  can  lead  to  a  slightly 
smaller design by creating a series of separate fixed value multipliers. The bits of the 
polynomial x that must be XORed together for each bit of the polynomial y for each 
of the constant multipliers are given in Table 3-4 [46]. This only reduces area if the 
multipliers are going to be replicated enough times to mix at least one column in a 
clock cycle. 
  02  03  09  0b  0d  0e 
y7  x6  x6 x7  x4 x7   x4 x6 x7  x4 x5 x7  x4 x5 x6 
y6  x5  x5 x6  x3 x6 x7   x3 x5 x6 x7  x3 x4 x6 x7  x3 x4 x5 x7 
y5  x4  x4 x5  x2 x5 x6 x7   x2 x4 x5 x6 x7  x2 x3 x5 x6  x2 x3 x4 x6 
y4  x3 x7  x3 x4 x7  x1 x4 x5 x6  x1 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7  x1 x2 x4 x5 x7  x1 x2 x3 x5 
y3  x2 x7  x2 x3 x7  x0 x3 x5 x7  x0 x2 x3 x5  x0 x1 x3 x5 x6 x7  x0 x1 x2 x5 x6 
y2  x1  x1 x2  x2 x6 x7   x1 x2 x6 x7  x0 x2 x6  x0 x1 x6 
y1  x0 x7  x0 x1 x7  x1 x5 x6  x0 x1 x5 x6 x7  x1 x5 x7  x0 x5  
y0  x7  x0 x7  x0 x5  x0 x5 x7  x0 x5 x6  x5 x6 x7 
Table 3-4: The bits that must be XORed together to calculate each bit for the constant 
multipliers. 
3.6.9.6  Key Scheduler 
There are two main types of key scheduler that have been reported, offline and 
online. In an offline approach all of the round keys are generated at the start and 
stored in memory, whereas in an online approach round keys are generated as they are 
required. If the encryption architecture is unrolled then all the round keys are needed 
on any given clock cycle. An offline key scheduler can reduce the area requirements 
if  the  key  does  not  change  very  often  compared  to  the  data.  This  is  because  the 
advantage gained by unrolling the key scheduler is minimal so it is more efficient to 
calculate the values once and store them. If the encryptor is not unrolled then there is Chapter 3 Block Ciphers    54 
 
no space advantage to making the key scheduler offline as there would only be the 
need to generate one key at any given time anyway so storing them would only waste 
space. Also the memory access time could potentially be greater than the time it takes 
to generate the keys online. It is important to note that as the keys are needed in the 
reverse  order  when  performing  decryption  the  online  key  scheduler  is  only 
appropriate for a device that only performs encryption.  
3.6.9.7  Pipelining 
There are two approaches to pipelining, outer-pipelining and inner-pipelining. 
Outer-pipelining involves the addition of registers between rounds so that multiple 
blocks  of  data  can  be  processed  in  parallel.  An  architecture  is  said  to  be  fully 
pipelined if the number of pipeline stages, k, is equal to the number of rounds. If an 
architecture is only partially pipelined it can process k blocks in the same number of 
clock cycles as there are rounds, and after k clock cycles data has to be fed back round 
from the final stage. For this reason k is generally chosen to be a factor of the number 
of rounds otherwise when one block has been completely processed the new data 
would have to be added to a non-constant point in the pipeline and this would increase 
the complexity of the controller. Due to the need to replicate round blocks in order to 
process more than one data block at once the area of the pipelined architecture is 
proportional to k. 
Inner-pipelining  is  similar  except  the  registers  are  inserted  inside  the 
combinational logic of a round block. If there are n blocks with the same delay then 
the inner pipelining can achieve an increase in speed of almost a factor of n, with only 
a marginal increase in area. The minimum clock period is determined by the longest 
critical path between registers, so dividing blocks that are not the longest has no effect 
on the clock speed. 
The effects of pipelining on the performance of an AES implementation were 
investigated  by  Hodjat  and  Verbauwhede  in  [47].  They  designed  and  simulated 
different implementations for an AES processor using a 1.8-µm technology. One with 
both inner and outer pipelining, one with only outer pipelining and a third design that 
has 5 pipeline stages that each contain 2 rounds and take 2 clock cycles to complete. 
The rounds and key generators were split into four sections for the inner pipelining. 
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effect that pipelining has on the area is less than the effect that pipelining has on the 
speed, this can be seen from the graph below. When moving up to an implementation 
with more pipelining the throughput is increases by a greater factor than the number 
of gates. For example, the difference in the number of gates for the largest multi-
round  pipeline  implementation  and  the  largest  inner  and  outer  round  pipelined 
implementation is slightly greater than 2 while the throughput increases by nearly a 
factor of 4. 
   
Figure 3-22: The Area-throughput trade-off for a 1.8-µm AES implementation. [45] 
It is important to note that if pipelining is used it limits the cryptographic modes 
of operation that can be used with the device to ECB only. With modes like CBC the 
previous  ciphertext  is  XORed  with  the  plaintext,  so  an  entire  encryption  must  be 
complete before the next one is started. This is the reason that pipelining was not 
included in the design reported by Morioka and Satoh in [41].  
3.6.10  Reported Performance of Hardware Implementations 
There have been several implementations of AES developed that use different 
optimisations  in  order  to  improve  the  performance  of  the  hardware  in  some.  The 
results  for  ASIC  implementations  are  summarised  in  Table  3-5  and  the  FPGA 
implementations in Table 3-6. 
The implementations using t-boxes rather than s-boxes produced faster chips, an 
increase in throughput of nearly 30% compared to similar implementations that used 
s-boxes [41]. There is a price to pay in area though, as it increased by 350%. This is 
because in order to run one column through the Sub Bytes and Mix Columns requires 
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multipliers. To perform decryption 4 s-boxes and 16 multipliers, or 16 t-boxes are 
required. 
Description  Throughput 
(Gbits/s) 
Clock 
(MHz) 
Gates  Tech. 
(µm) 
LUT s-box full AES offline key [48]  1.64  465  28626  0.18 
GF (2
4) s-box, offline key, full AES [49]  2.381  200  58430  0.35 
GF (2
4) s-box, offline key, full AES [50]  2.977  250  63400  0.25 
BDD s-box 128 bit dec. no pipe [41]  8.9  699  61841  0.13 
BDD t-box 128 bit dec. no pipe [41]  11.3  885  282494  0.13 
BDD t-box 128 bit enc. no pipe [41]  11.6  909  167566  0.13 
128 bit enc. multi pipelining [47]  23.1  362  222000  0.18 
128 bit enc. outer pipelining [47]  48.2  377  482000  0.18 
128 bit enc. both  pipelining [47]  77.6  606  471000  0.18 
Table 3-5: Reported ASIC implementation performances. 
In  both  [51]  and  [52]  they  have  made  a  similar  encryptor  /  decryptor 
combination  and  encryptor  pair.  In  [51]  the  throughput  of  the  implementation  is 
reduced by a factor of 4 and the area requirements increase by two thirds. In [52] the 
area more than doubles and the speed halves although it is later implemented on a 
more complex FPGA. Supporting more than one key length can also significantly 
reduce the performance of AES chips due to increased complexity.  
Description  Throughput 
(Gb/s) 
Clock 
(MHz) 
Slices  FPGA 
Small low cost Enc/Dec [53]   0.208  71.5  163  XC3S50 
Small low cost Enc/Dec [53]  0.358  123  146  XC2V40 
Generic 128 bit Enc. [52]  0.310  25.4  4681  XCV600E 
LUT s-box 128 bit enc/dec  [51]  0.463  76  5150  XCV1000E 
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Description  Throughput 
(Gb/s) 
Clock 
(MHz) 
Slices  FPGA 
Full pipeline 128 bit enc/dec [52]  3.239  25.3  7576  XCV3200E 
Full pipeline 128 bit enc [52]  6.956  54.35  2222  XCV812E 
GF (2
4) 3 stage inner pipeline [54]  9.184  71.8  9406  XCV800 
GF (2
4) 3 stage inner pipeline [54]  11.965  93.5  9406  XCV812E 
GF (2
4) 7 stage inner pipeline [54]  16.032  125.3  11014  XCV1000 
GF (2
4) 7 stage inner pipeline [54]  21.556  168.4  11022  XCV1000E 
Full pipe online key 128 bit enc [55]  16.54  129.2  11719  XCV1000E 
Full pipe online key 128 bit enc [55]  17.8  139.1  10750  XC2V2000 
Table 3-6: Reported FPGA implementation results. 
3.6.11  Testing and Validation of AES 
In  order  to  check  the  validity  of  an  AES  implementation  NIST  created  the 
Advanced  Encryption  Standard  Algorithm  Validation  Suite  (AESAVS)  [56].  It  is 
designed to perform automated testing of an implementation, using Known Answer 
Test (KAT), the Multi-block Message Test (MMT), and the Monte Carlo Test (MCT). 
The  KATs  can  be  split  into  four  groups  GF  s-box,  key  s-box,  variable  key  and 
variable plaintext. In variable key tests the plaintext is always made entirely of zeros 
and the key is made of increasing number of contiguous ones starting from the left 
hand side. The relevant ciphertexts are given for all of these, for all of the possible 
key lengths. Similarly the keys for the variable plaintext tests are made entirely of 
zeros and the plaintext is made of an increasing number of ones.  
MMT  tests  the  implementation’s  ability  to  correctly  process  multi-block 
messages.  These  require  the  chaining  of  information  between  consecutive  blocks. 
Several different modes of operation are tested by MMT, namely: ECB, CBC, OFB, 
and Cipher Feedback with 128, 8 and 1 blocks of data (CFB128, CFB8 and CFB1). 
The block length is 8 bits for CFB8, 1 bit for CFB1 and 128 bits for the others. For 
each supported mode 10 messages are supplied with lengths of i * blocklength, where 
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In the MCT, the implementation under test encrypts 100 plaintexts iteratively 
1000  times,  by  feeding  the  generated  ciphertext  back  round  using  the  appropriate 
method for the cryptographic mode under test. Hence any MCT test involves 100,000 
encryption, or decryption, operations, this requires a long simulation. 
To perform the test a request file is generated that contains all of the plaintexts, 
keys and initialisation vectors, for the tests. The implementation then reads in this 
data, processes it and creates a response file. The data in the response file is then 
verified with a trusted implementation of AES. 
3.6.12  Security of AES 
There have been no attacks of full strength AES, however there have been some 
concerns voiced over its security. AES has a simple algebraic structure and while this 
has  not  yet  led  to  the  discovery  of  any  vulnerabilities  it  has  been  criticised  as  a 
potential weakness [57]. AES is based on the algorithm Square, also designed by 
Rijmen  and  Daemen  [58],  in the  specification  they  include  a  potential  attack  that 
utilises the byte oriented structure of the algorithm, this is described in more detail in 
section  4.2.1.  The  basic  square  attack  can  only  break  four  rounds  but  it  can  be 
extended to up to eight [30]. It is possible that it could be potentially be extended 
further  in  the  future.  The  algorithms  itself  achieves  good  levels  of  confusion  and 
diffusion, the same cannot be said for the key-schedule [30], this is discussed further 
in section 4.2.2. Finally, like all block ciphers, AES is susceptible to power analysis 
attacks and Differential Power Analysis is able to retrieve the key [3, 59-61], this is 
discussed further in section 4.3.2. 
3.7  Conclusion 
Block ciphers were the first type of cipher to be developed in the modern era of 
digital cryptography. The foundations were laid by Shannon in the 1949 and they 
have evolved significantly since the 1970s, increasing in size and complexity and 
becoming immune to several different classes of attacks along the way. They are a 
valuable and versatile weapon in the cryptographer’s arsenal, being able to secure 
messages sent to trusted recipients, protect files and even encrypt arbitrary length 
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In the 1970s DES was developed and it remained the standard block cipher for 
nearly three decades, until computing power and cryptanalysis had advanced to such a 
degree that it was no longer deemed secure. After the cracks started to appear its 
successor was developed, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). There have been 
no published mathematical attacks on full round AES and although there have been 
criticisms of some elements of the design it is accepted to be currently secure. There 
is one class of attacks that no algorithm can currently claim to be immune from and 
that is side channel attacks, these are explored in chapter 4.3.  
 
Chapter 4  Security of 
Algorithms 
4.1  Introduction 
There are several different techniques for cryptanalysis. The attacks all make 
assumptions about how much information can be observed by the attacker and what 
kind of access he has to the device. It is generally assumed that the structure of the 
algorithm is known by the attacker. Keeping the algorithm secret is a dangerous way 
to try and ensure security, there is no real guarantee that an attacker could not acquire 
an implementation of the algorithm and reverse engineer it, or find some other way to 
get the details. The complete details of AES have been published and are in the public 
domain.  When  it  was  being  developed  as  well  as  being  evaluated  by  various  US 
government security agencies it also went through a system of public review to ensure 
it was secure. If an algorithm stands up to public review then there is more faith in its 
security and if a weakness is discovered then it reported.  
The majority of analyses focus on algorithmic weaknesses. There is another 
group  of  attacks  called  side  channel  attacks;  these  use  information  gained  from 
analysis of emissions from the physical cryptosystem, and can result in the extraction 
of  the  secret  key  or  some  important  intermediate  values.  As  the  attacks  use 
information generated during the specific encryption an attacker, or some of their 
equipment,  must  be  present  when  that  encryption  was  performed.  Generally  side 
channel attacks fall into one of the following groups: Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    61 
 
•  Timing attacks – the attacker exploits the fact that some computation time for 
some operations is data-dependent. This attack applies more to asymmetric 
ciphers [19]. 
•  Power consumption based attacks – the attacker uses variations in the power 
consumption during the encryption to try and retrieve key data from the chip. 
•  Emitted electromagnetic radiation attacks – the attacker uses the emitted 
electromagnetic radiation to try and gain information about what is going on 
inside a cryptographic chip [20]. 
•  Acoustic cryptanalysis – the attacker uses the acoustic noise emitted by the 
keyboard during data entry [62], or by the hum of the processor during a 
cryptographic operation [21]. 
Section  4.2  reviews  the  general  security  of  AES,  it  contains  details  of  a 
proposed  attack,  outlines  a  possible  weakness  and  an  improvement  for  the  key 
schedule. The rest of the section gives the background theory and some examples of 
power analysis attacks. This chapter is mostly a review of current research with some 
analysis to draw the ideas together. 
4.2  Security of AES 
Although  no  successful  attacks  on  a  complete  implementation  of  AES  have 
been published some concerns have been expressed over its security. Section 4.2.1 
describes the square attack, an attack that was identified in the original paper about 
the square algorithm on which Rijndael, and hence AES, is based [58]. Section 4.2.2 
is about the security of key schedules in general and the AES one in particular. 
4.2.1  The Square Attack 
While no attacks on full round AES have been published, there have been some 
concerns of the security of AES due to the simplicity of its algebraic structure [57]. 
The byte-oriented structure of AES causes it to be susceptible to an attack known as 
the Square Attack. It was published in the original paper that proposed the algorithm 
Square,  on  which  AES  is  heavily  based  [58].  It  is  a  chosen  plaintext  attack  that 
recovers the last round sub-key of a reduced round AES [1], the basic attack can break 
four rounds but it can be extended to up to eight [30].  Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    62 
 
The plaintexts are chosen to have a specific number of active and passive bytes, 
where in this context all passive bytes have the same value and all active ones have a 
different value. The plaintexts are chosen in groups of 256 so that the active bytes 
vary over the range of all possible values. The sub bytes and add key operations do 
not change the positions of the active bytes. The mix columns operation creates a 
column of active bytes if there is at least one active byte in the column, the next shift 
rows  operation  then  spreads  these  active  bytes  into  all  four  columns  so  after  the 
second mix columns there are four columns of only active bytes. As the values of 
active bytes range over all possible values, the inputs to the third round are balanced 
over each input set, i.e. the bitwise XOR of all the values of an active byte in the set 
of chosen plaintexts is 0. As it is a reduced round AES and the 4
th round is the final 
round it does not include a Mix Columns operation. This means the output bytes of 
the 4
th round each depend on a single input byte of the 4
th round and are given by the 
following formula: 
  j i j i j i byte key sub input th Sbox output th , ' , ' , _ _ ) _ 4 ( _ 4 ⊕ =   (4-1) 
The input bytes to the 4
th round are balances over the set of chosen plaintexts. 
By assuming a value for the sub-key byte, the value of the input byte for each chosen 
plaintext in the set can be calculated from the ciphertexts. If these values are not 
balanced, the hypothesised sub-key byte was incorrect. This can then be repeated for 
all possible values of all bytes of the sub-key. 
By increasing the number of plaintexts the attack can be  extended up to an 
eight-round attack. The key schedule of AES is not a one way function and exhibits 
bit-leakage, this means that the Square Attack can be used to recover all the sub-keys 
including the master key from knowledge of a single n-round sub-key.  
4.2.2  The Security of the Key Schedules 
When designing cryptographic algorithms, lots of care is given to the design of 
the  cipher  itself,  assuring  it  quickly  reaches  sufficient  levels  of  diffusion  and 
confusion, two properties related to the overall cryptographic strength of a cipher, 
defined by Shannon in [14]. Key schedule design receives much less attention, with 
the majority of block ciphers having ad hoc designed ones [63]. This is despite the 
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cipher’s  susceptibility  to  linear  and  differential  cryptanalysis.  Knudsen  and 
Mathiassen  [63] demonstrate using experiments on small, simplified ciphers that the 
complexity of the key schedule influences the probability of differentials and linear 
hulls (the linear hull of a set S is the intersection of all subsets in a field that contain 
S). These affect a cipher’s susceptibility to differential and linear cryptanalysis. They 
argue that the more complex the key schedule the greater the resistance to these types 
of attack. 
In [30], May et al provide a list of three properties that are necessary for a key 
schedule to be efficacious, they are as follows:  
1.  Collision-resistant one-way function: If the key schedule is a one-way 
function then it will not be possible for an attacker to gain information about 
the master key or other sub-keys from a known sub-key. It may also be easier 
to find weak keys and related keys for key schedules which are not one-way 
[64].  
2.  Minimal mutual information: This property aims to eliminate bit leakage 
between sub-keys and the master key. Leakage of information to an adjacent 
sub-key is impossible if property 1 is satisfied. The direct use of master key 
bits in sub-keys gives worst case bit leakage; however this can be easily 
avoided. 
3.  Efficient implementation: The cipher algorithm and the key schedule should 
complement each other in implementation aspects as well as security. By re-
using already optimised components of the encryption algorithm and with 
some careful consideration during the key schedule design, a fast 
implementation is attainable, without the necessity for major additional cost in 
circuitry or code size due to design constraints. 
4.2.2.1  Analysis of AES Key Schedule  
The main weakness in the AES key schedule is that given knowledge of a sub-
key (or part of one), knowledge of other sub-keys (or parts) is derivable, i.e. there is 
significant  bit  leakage.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  a  column  is  XORed  with  its 
equivalent in the previous sub-key to get the next column, and hence knowledge of 
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nature  of  the  sub-key  generation  leads  to  good  computational  efficiency  but  the 
iteration is too simplistic leading to the bit leakage problem. 
Sub-key  Freq  SAC 
1  0.0000  125.053 
2  0.0000  105.433 
3  0.0000  72.563 
4  0.0000  46.858 
5  0.0593  31.840 
6  0.0000  28.057 
7  0.0000  28.153 
8  0.0034  28.237 
9  0.0000  28.161 
10  0.0110  28.215 
Table 4-1: AES key schedule Crypt-X 
statistical test results [30]. 
Round  Freq  SAC 
2  0.0000  96.083 
3  0.0048  20.687 
4  0.7560  1.183 
Table 4-2: AES cipher Crypt-X statistical 
test results [30]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As well as not fulfilling the three necessary properties for a strong key schedule 
defined in section 4.2.2, the AES key schedule performs poorly, in contrast to the rest 
of  the  cipher,  in  terms  of  quickly  achieving  acceptable  levels  of  confusion  and 
diffusion. To show this May et al used two statistical tests, the frequency test and the 
Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) test, available in the software package Crypt-X. The 
frequency test is used to test the randomness of a sequence of zeroes and ones, more 
specifically in this context it is being used to test the level of confusion, the influence 
of each key bit on the output bits, achieved by the algorithm. The result of this test is a 
probability,  where  a  value  greater  than  0.01  /  0.001  indicates  that  bit  mixing  is 
satisfied  with  a  confidence  of  99%  /  99.9%.  The  SAC  test  measures  the  level  of 
diffusion, the degree of change in the output after the change of a single bit of the 
input. This is tested with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS test). The KS test is a 
goodness-of-fit test used to determine whether two sets of samples come from the 
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probability  distribution  for  a  finite  set  of  samples  differs  from  a  hypothesized 
distribution, in this case, that the probability of each output bit changing is 0.5 after 
the change of a single input bit.  A value less than 1.628 / 1.949 indicates that bit 
diffusion is satisfied with a probability of error of 1% / 0.1%. 
It is evident from the above tables that the AES cipher achieves confusion and 
diffusion by round 4 but the majority of the sub-keys do not achieve complete bit 
mixing and hence do not achieve significant levels of confusion. Additionally none of 
the sub-keys satisfy the SAC test. 
4.2.2.2  Improved AES Key Schedule 
In  order  to  combat  these  weaknesses  May  et  al  [30]  designed  a  new  key 
schedule for AES. In order to maximise the efficiency of the new design, functions 
from the AES cipher are used in the new key schedule. The key schedule takes the 
master key, adds a round constant, and this value is put through three rounds of AES 
using itself as the key, a more detailed description of the algorithm is given in Figure 
4-1. 
for round = 0 to 10 
for j = 0 to 15 
KS Plaintext j = KS Round Key j = Master Key j ⊕ Sub Bytes ((round * 16) + j) 
for i = 0 to 2 
Sub Bytes 
Shift Rows 
Mix Columns 
Add Key 
Figure 4-1: Pseudo-code for the improved AES key schedule [30]. 
The performance of both the cipher with the new key schedule and the schedule 
itself were measured in Crypt-X and the results are reported in Table 4-3 and Table 
4-4, Table 4-5 repeats the results for AES without the key schedule modifications. 
The results show that both confusion and diffusion in the new key schedule reached 
significant levels after three rounds, and this increased the speed with which the new 
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Round   Freq  SAC  
2   0.1557  15.775 
3  0.8757  1.212 
4  0.3498  1.689 
Table 4-3: Crypt-X results for the new 
128-bit key schedule [30].  
Round   Freq  SAC 
2  0.0000  21.113 
3  0.2663  1.282 
4  0.3110  1.347 
Table 4-4: Crypt-X results for 128-bit 
AES with new key schedule [30] 
 
Round  Freq  SAC 
2  0.0000  96.083 
3  0.0048  20.687 
4  0.7560  1.183 
Table 4-5: Crypt-X results for normal AES 
[30]. 
Instead of adding Round Keys to the cipher round in the key schedule, which 
would  require  a  separate  key  schedule,  the  Master  Key  is  used.  This  does  not 
adversely affect the security. One potential worry might be that it adds a vulnerability 
to power analysis attacks (for a detailed description of these see section 4.3), but this 
is unfounded as these attacks require the interaction of key data with chosen or known 
data. In the case of the new key schedule it is only XORed with KSPlaintext, which is 
ultimately derived from the Master Key anyway. 
The use of the cipher assures that the key generation is one way. Also as each of 
the sub keys are generated independently and the master key is not used as one of 
them, there is no bit leakage and knowledge of one sub-key does not give knowledge 
of the others. 
Although the main aim of the work was to make a key schedule that fulfilled the 
properties  outlined  in  section  4.2.2  May  et  al  [30]  also  report  that  the  new  key Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    67 
 
schedule improves the resistance to several reduced round cryptanalysis techniques 
such as differential cryptanalysis and the Square attack. 
4.3  Power Analysis Attacks 
Currently the vast majority of electronics are made using CMOS technology. 
This has the advantage of having low static power consumption; the dynamic power 
consumption  is  a  much  more  significant  component.  This  means  that  there  is  a 
relatively high amount of correlation between the power consumption and both the 
operations that the chip is performing and the data that is being operated on. This 
allows a cryptanalysis technique called power analysis, where by observing the power 
consumption  of  a  device  when  performing  encryption  or  decryption  can  yield 
information  about  the  algorithm,  implementation  and  the  secret  key.  Most  of  the 
different  techniques  for  performing  power  analysis  involve  measuring  the  power 
consumption while encrypting or decrypting a large number of known plaintexts or 
ciphertexts, combining the input with a guess at a byte of the key, and using the fact 
that there is a large data set to enable a statistical test as to the correctness of the 
guess. This is then repeated for all guesses of all bytes of the key, the values that 
appear to be the most correct are assumed to be the key. More detailed descriptions of 
specific power analysis techniques are given in the following sections. 
4.3.1  Simple Power Analysis 
Simple power analysis (SPA) involves directly interpreting power consumption 
measurements collected during a cryptographic process [2]. It is possible to identify 
which  instruction  is  being  executed  by  a  microprocessor  by  inspecting  the  power 
consumption trace. This can provide an attacker with information about the key if the 
execution path is data dependent, for example if there are conditional branches based 
on key data, multiplication and exponentiation can also leak significant amounts of 
data  via  SPA.  Some  microprocessors  also  have  heavily  operand-dependent  power 
consumption features. These systems can have serious SPA vulnerabilities, even if the 
execution path is not key dependent [2]. 
There are several techniques for the prevention of SPA that are fairly easy to 
implement.  Avoiding  the  use  of  secret  intermediate  values  or  key  values  as  the 
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such branches are inherent in the algorithm this can require a coding techniques that 
can  negatively  affect  performance.  Most  ASIC  implementations  of  symmetric 
cryptographic algorithms have sufficiently small variations in power consumption to 
not leak information about the key material via SPA [2]. 
4.3.2  Differential Power Analysis 
Differential  power  analysis  (DPA)  is  a  statistical  attack  that  uses  power 
consumption data from a large number of encryptions to retrieve secret information 
about the key. DPA has proved to be a powerful cryptanalysis technique that  has 
been able to extract the secret key from several DES implementations [2]. The DPA 
algorithm is presented below [2]: 
1.  A set of N plaintexts are randomly generated. 
2.  The power consumption during the encryption of the N plaintexts is measured. 
The attacker gets N traces each containing n values. 
3.  A hypothetical model of the chip is fed with the plaintexts (or ciphertexts) and 
a guess at one byte of the first (or last) sub-key. 
4.  A selection function, D, is applied to the output of the hypothetical model 
which separates the traces into two sets. 
5.  The average of both sets is computed and the difference between the averages 
is calculated. 
6.  Steps 3 to 5 are repeated for each sub-key guess. This will give 2
8 differential 
traces. 
7.  For each differential trace the peak and mean value is determined and the ratio 
between the two is calculated. 
8.  For a correct sub-key guess there will be large peaks seen in an otherwise flat 
differential trace. 
9.  To get all the sub-keys, steps 2 to 8 are repeated 16 times (for a 128-bit key). 
The choice of hypothetical model determines the section of the algorithm that is 
being attacked. It takes the input or output to that section, generally a section of the 
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either the output or the input to section. The selection function separates the plain- or 
ciphertexts,  and  therefore  their  associated  power  traces,  into  two  sets.  Kocher’s 
original hypothetical model and selection function D (C; b; Ks) [2] attacked the left 
hand intermediate at the beginning of the 16
th round. It accepted the ciphertext, C, a 6-
bit sub-key guess, Ks, to predict the output and a value between 0 and 31 representing 
which bit of the DES intermediate was being attacked, b, as inputs. The selection 
function applies the ciphertext and sub-key guess to an inverse DES algorithm and 
returns either a 1 or a 0 depending on the value of the b
th bit that would give these 
values. Varying the value of b modulus 4 targets different sub-bytes of the key, as in 
DES there are 8 s-boxes each with a 4-bit output. Kocher was using DPA to analyse 
DES; Schuster reported that while the original selection function used by Kocher on 
DES works with the AES power consumption model it was unsuccessful with real test 
data [3] and proposes a new one based on the Hamming weight of the output of the s-
box, if it is greater than four then the trace is added to one set, if it is not then it is 
added to the other. Schuster uses this to successfully crack an AES implementation 
that is being run on an 8-bit microcontroller 
4.3.2.1  Leakage Based Differential Power Analysis 
As  CMOS  technology  shrinks  in  size  the  leakage  power  becomes  a  more 
significant  portion  of  overall  power  consumption.  While  leakage  power  is  mainly 
dependent  on  physical  parameters  its  dependence  on  input  patterns  becomes 
significant  in  sub-90  nm  technology  [65],  therefore  leakage  power  needs  to  be 
considered when evaluation a system for susceptibility to DPA. Lin and Burleson 
took this into account and developed “Leakage-based” DPA (LDPA) [66]. 
The  LPDA  algorithm  is  essentially  the  same  as  the  regular  DPA  algorithm 
except the power traces that are recorded capture both the dynamic power and the 
leakage power. The attack was tested on a SPICE simulation of an implementation of 
DES and it revealed the correct key after 120 traces using 45 nm CMOS, compared to 
200 traces for regular DPA using 180 nm CMOS.  
4.3.2.2  Correlation as the Statistical Test in DPA 
The  DPA  attack  described  in  section  4.3.2  uses  a  statistical  test  called  the 
difference-of-means. The distance-of-mean test simply takes the difference between 
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same and not much information from the model can be included. Other tests have 
been proposed, including analysis of variance (ANOVA), which can simultaneously 
compare the means of several sets of data and works better than the distance-of-mean 
test  [67].  This  section  discusses  the  use  of  correlation  in  DPA  using  the  Pearson 
correlation coefficient. It was first described by Brier et al in [68]. This coefficient 
reflects the degree of linear relationship between two random variables, it can be used 
to provide a direct comparison between the real and hypothetical model of the device. 
It is defined as the sum of the products of the standard scores of the two measures 
divided  by  the  degrees  of  freedom.  This  is  equivalent  to  dividing  the  covariance 
between the two variables by the product of their standard deviations as shown in 
equation (4-2).  
 
Y X
Y X
σ σ
ρ
) , cov(
=  
(4-2) 
 
In order to calculate an estimate of the correlation from a number of samples the 
formula in equation (4-3) must be used. 
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The coefficient ranges from −1 to 1, the sign indicating the direction of the 
relationship. If the coefficient has the value 1 then a linear equation describes the 
relationship  perfectly  and  positively,  all  data  points  lie  on  the  same  line  and  Y 
increases with X. A value of −1 means a linear equation describes the relationship 
perfectly but negatively, i.e. all data points lie on a single line but Y increases as X 
decreases. A correlation value of 0 means that there is no linear relationship between 
the variables. 
The technique described by Kocher in [2] attacks an algorithm by predicting the 
value of one bit and partitions the traces accordingly. The method proposed by Brier 
is a multi-bit attack; it predicts the number of bits that change in a byte of registers. 
This means that the technique involved is slightly different from regular DPA. It has 
three stages, prediction, measurement and correlation, a description is given below 
[61]: 
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a.  Predict the number of bit changes inside a number of targeted registers 
in a specific clock cycle.  
b.  Repeat this for all 2
8 possible values of a byte of the key and for N 
different randomly chosen plaintexts. 
c.  Put them in N * 2
8 matrix. This is called the Prediction Matrix 
2.  Measurement Stage 
a.  Measure the power consumption over all (C) clock cycles in the 
encryption process 
b.  Record the highest power consumption in each clock cycle in an N * C 
matrix. This is called the Consumption Matrix 
 
3.  Correlation Stage 
a.  Calculate the correlation between the column representing the clock 
cycle that was targeted in the prediction phase in the Consumption 
Matrix and each column in the Prediction Matrix. 
b.  The column of the Prediction Matrix that shows the greatest 
correlation is the one that represents a correct key guess. 
It is possible to perform this type of attack using purely simulated data. This 
requires using a more detailed hypothetical model of the device that can be used to 
predict the bit changes in all of the registers in the device for all cycles and entering 
the data into an N * C Prediction Matrix. This is then used instead of the Consumption 
Matrix in the Correlation Stage. 
4.3.2.3  Choice of Target in Differential Power Analysis 
Both forms of power analysis attack a specific point in an algorithm. In DPA the 
position of this is selected by the choice selection function and in a correlation attack 
the  choice  of  which  register  to  target  is  explicitly  made.  This  section  defines  the 
properties that determine whether a particular register is an appropriate target for the 
attack.  Figure  4-2  shows  a  diagram  of  the  AES  algorithm  with  all  the  possible 
positions of registers between the stages. It shows which of the registers in the design 
have the properties that make them suitable for the target of a DPA attack. Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    72 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Diagram showing the predictability and fullness of registers at different points in 
AES. 
Both forms of power analysis find the correct key value by testing all possible 
key  values  and  finding  the  value  whose  result  best  fulfils  the  attack’s  selection 
criterion, the target must therefore be determined by a small enough number of key 
bits for this to be computationally feasible. In practise this limit is assumed to be 16 
bits [60], below this a register is said to be predictable. In AES the s-boxes are 8 bits 
wide; this gives 256 different key values to test which is easily performed. The Mix 
Columns operation mixes the data from 4 bytes; this means the output depends on 32 
key bits, above the predictability limit. Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    73 
 
A  register  is  described  as  full  if  it  leaks  information  about  the  key  via  its 
transitions. This is also a property required in order to make a register a valid target. 
As seen in Figure 4-2 register 1 does not leak information as it only contains plaintext 
data. Interestingly, registers 2 and 3 do not necessarily leak information either as the 
influence of the key on the transition cancels out over two successive plaintexts as 
illustrated in equation (4-4). They can be made to be full by resetting the contents to 
0s between plaintexts. Also they can be full in smart card implementations where 
there is a constant instruction address loaded. 
  Reg21 ⊕ Reg22 = (plaintext1 ⊕ key) ⊕ (plaintext2 ⊕ key) 
 = plaintext1 ⊕ plaintext2 
(4-4) 
 
Registers after the s-box will all be full as the non-linearity of the substitution 
stops the influence of the key on the transition value over 2 successive plaintexts 
cancelling. 
4.3.3  Inferential Power Analysis 
Fahn and Pearson have also developed a type of power attack that is similar to 
DPA [69]. It is called inferential power analysis (IPA) and consists of two stages, a 
long, computationally intensive profiling stage and a shorter key extraction stage. It 
has the advantage over DPA that the attacker does not need to know the plain or 
ciphertexts relating to the recorded power traces in order to perform the attack. The 
first step in the profiling stage is to record a large number of power consumption 
traces, between 100 and 1000 are generally required. The traces do not need to have 
the same key, although for simplicity when it was performed in [69] the key was kept 
constant.  
1.  The traces are aligned so that the power consumptions are all matched. 
2.  These matched traces are averaged to create a Mean Trace. 
3.  The Mean Trace is chopped into rounds to give Mean Rounds. 
4.  The Mean Rounds are averaged to give a Super-Average Round. 
5.  The difference between each Mean Round and the Super-Average Round is 
computed, this gives the Differential Traces. 
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The first averaging of all the traces that have been collected removes the effect 
of the plaintext, but, in the case of the constant key example, leaves the key bits. 
Averaging the different rounds removes the effect of the key bits on the data; this will 
leave only the code features. These are cancelled out by calculating the difference 
between the average round and the super-average. After this, only the effects of the 
specific sub-key ki remain. The mean square of the differential traces contains peaks 
at the locations of the key bits. The number of peaks that can be seen in the final 
traces can differ from the number of bits in the sub-key, but there should be a simple 
mathematical relationship determined by the specific implementation details of the 
device, for example, the binary compliment of the value.  
After the locations of the key bits have been identified each key bit has to be 
connected  to  its  specific  position.  How  this  is  actually  achieved  depends  on  the 
algorithm that is used and can be quite complicated. For an algorithm like DES where 
there  are  no  fixed  rules  about  the  order  inherent  in  the  algorithm  it  can  get  very 
complicated if the most obvious guesses as to the order have failed. In situations like 
that  it  can  be  useful  to  examine  the  specification  of  the  key  scheduling  in  the 
algorithm to gain additional information that can help, although this obviously negates 
the advantage that details of the algorithm do not need to be known. 
It is useful to observe the distribution of recorded power levels at the peaks that 
are indicated by the first stage of the profiling. If the peak is in the correct place and it 
represents the manipulation of a single bit of key data, which will be either 0 or 1 with 
a  probability  of  ½,  then  it  should  have  a  bimodal  distribution,  with  each  mode 
representing either a 0 or a 1. If more than one bit is being handled then there should 
be  a  binomial  distribution,  the  shape  of  which  indicates  how  the  bits  are  being 
handled  and  gives  information  relating  to  the  Hamming  weight  of  the  key  bit 
grouping. 
IPA has several advantages over DPA, the attacker does not need to know the 
plaintext  (or  ciphertext),  removing  the  possibility  of  simply  shielding  this  data  in 
order to prevent the attack. DPA is restricted to examining points where the plaintext 
and key interact directly, generally limiting analysis to the first few rounds whereas 
IPA can probe all rounds of an algorithm. After a lengthy profiling stage IPA can 
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the computational overhead when attacking data that has been encrypted with several 
different keys. 
There  are  a  few  countermeasures  that  can  make  performing  IPA  harder. 
Avoiding  handling  key  data  one  bit  at  a  time  will  remove  some  of  the  data. 
Randomising the order of execution of the code and adding random delays to the 
system will cause problems with alignment and creating a system with an offline key 
scheduler may offer some resistance to IPA. 
4.3.4  High-Order DPA 
High  order  differential  power  analysis  (HODPA)  is  a  variation  of  DPA  in 
which instead of finding the statistical properties of the signal at each sample time the 
attacker  can  use  the  joint  statistics  across  several  sample  times  to  use  data  from 
multiple intermediate values [70]. 
This can be used in order to defeat whitening DPA countermeasures. In order to 
try  and  defeat  DPA  intermediate  values  can  be  masked  by  XORing  them  with 
randomly generated numbers, this de-correlates the Hamming weight from any key 
data and so information about it is not leaked. Obviously in order to still give the 
correct result for the calculation the data must be unmasked, this is again achieved by 
XORing the data with the previously generated number. By combining information 
gathered from the power consumption trace at the point where mask is generated and 
the  point  where  it  is  removed  it  is  possible  to  compensate  for  the  masking  and 
uncover information about the key. If a duplication countermeasure with k shares is 
used then the attacker needs to mount a k
th order attack. 
Although using a higher order approach to DPA has its advantages it also has a 
number of disadvantages, if the standard deviation of the noise is the same at all of the 
n sample positions then the product has the standard deviation of the original raised to 
the power of n, this increases the amount of noise and hence the number of traces that 
is required to recover information. In order to extract information using DPA it is 
important to know which point in the samples relates to the intermediate value that is 
being attacked. In HODPA the effect of the intermediate value that is being attacked 
exerts  influence  on  several  points  in  the  traces,  but  to  take  advantage  of  this  the 
positions of all of these correlated points must be known. In first order DPA this 
problem is avoided by calculating the entire differential trace, a computationally un-Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    76 
 
intensive  operation.  The  natural  higher  order  generalisation  of  this  technique,  to 
calculate the differential traces with each sample correlated to every other sample in 
turn, can quickly become prohibitively expensive. 
Waddle  and  Wagner  proposed  two  methods  for  second  order  DPA,  one  for 
where the correlation time is zero, or known, and one for when it is non-zero and 
known  [71].  Zero-Offset  2
nd  Order  DPA  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the 
intermediate values that are the point of attack occur at the same time. This is not 
necessarily an unrealistic assumption, for example a parallel processor that calculates 
both the random and the masked bits simultaneously. It works by squaring the values 
of the samples in the power traces before performing regular DPA. This leads to a 
related attack, Known-Offset 2
nd Order DPA [71], where instead of calculating the 
square the lagged product is calculated, i.e. the sample multiplied by the value of the 
sample one offset later. 
If the offset is non-zero and is not known then a Fourier transform can be used 
to auto-correlate the trace. This is achieved by calculating the squared L2-norm of the 
Fourier  transform  of  the  DPA  trace;  this  involves  multiplying  the  complex  value 
generated by the FFT by its complex conjugate. The inverse Fourier transform of this 
data set is then calculated. This is repeated for all traces and this is summed for all of 
the traces within a particular bit-guess group. Values are only non-zero for correct 
correlations. The noise from the other traces significantly contributes to the standard 
deviation, so this attack is only practical for short traces.  
4.3.5  Mathematics of Differential Power Analysis 
DPA uses statistical techniques to gain information about the encryption key. 
This section discusses the mathematics behind the way secrets are leaked. Section 
4.3.5.1 defines the leakage model for DPA and discusses the way XORing known 
data with an unknown constant reveals data. Also the correlation for a system with a 
given signal to noise ratio is derived and it is shown that, assuming the correlations 
are worked out to a high enough level of accuracy, the attack will always give the 
correct  answer.  Section  4.3.5.3  defines  a  new  property  of  s-boxes  called  the 
transparency order it is the degree that an s-box leaks information about the key, then 
it  is  shown  that  an  s-box  that  prevents  linear  and  differential  cryptanalysis  in  an 
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4.3.5.1  Statistics of Secret Leakage 
Power analysis attacks use statistical techniques to exploit the leakage of secret 
data  via  the  power  consumption.  As  they  are  statistical  attacks  it  is  important  to 
understand the statistics of the secret leakage model which is shown in equation (4-5) 
and was investigated by Brier et al. in [68]. 
  b R D aH W + ⊕ = ) (   (4-5) 
Where R is the information the attacker is trying to extract, D is the state the 
target  register  was  in  from  the  previous  clock  cycle,  H  represents  the  Hamming 
distance  function, a is the linear gain between the Hamming distance and the power 
consumption of the register, b is the noise and W is the power consumption of the 
device. As the noise is, by definition, uncorrelated with the data dependent power 
consumption, and the variance of the sum of two independent variables is the sum of 
the component variances we get equation (4-6). 
  2 2 2 2
b H W a σ σ σ + =   (4-6) 
The Brier et al.’s model requires a number of assumptions: 
•  The same amount of energy is required for the transition from 0 to 1 and 1 to 
0. 
•  All bits in the target register are balanced and require the same amount of 
energy for transitions. 
These are reasonable assumptions to make. If these assumptions are incorrect 
then this will reduce the linear correlation between the registers’ power consumption 
and the total power consumption, which is analogous to there being more noise. An 
important point is that (D ⊕ R) is a uniform variable; this means that the Hamming 
weight  is  binomially  distributed,  the  binomial  distribution  being  a  discrete 
approximation to the normal distribution, with an average value of m/2 and a variance 
(σH
2) of m/4, where m is the number of bits in R. 
From  the  signal  to  noise  ratio  of  the  power  consumption  it  is  possible  to 
calculate the population correlation of the leakage and power consumption. As the 
number of traces used in a correlation attack increases the correlation of the power 
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more accurate estimate of the population correlation of the system. The correlation 
between two variables is defined as the ratio of their covariance to the product of their 
standard deviations (equation (4-2)), hence: 
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The noise is assumed to be uncorrelated to the Hamming distance, leading to: 
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The SNR is given by the ratio of the standard deviations of the signal and the 
noise as defined in equation (4-11). 
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Combining with equations (4-6) and (4-10) the relationship between correlation 
and SNR can be derived. 
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Correlation based DPA analysis is based on the assumption that the correlation 
of the correct key value with the power consumption will have the greatest value. This Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    79 
 
can be shown to be true by examining the correlation of an incorrect value denoted by 
H' with the power consumption. 
'
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As H  and b are independent: 
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As the correlation between an incorrect key guess and the power consumption 
(ρWH’) is equal to the correlation for a correct key guess (ρWH) scaled by the correlation 
between the correct and incorrect guess (ρHH’), which is necessarily less than 1, the 
correct guess will always have the highest correlation. Assuming that value that gives 
H' has the same value as the one that gives H except for k bits, e.g. for H (0xE4 ⊕ R) 
and H’ (0xE3 ⊕ R), k is 3, then the Hamming weights of the two values are given by 
equations (4-20) and (4-21). 
  k k m H H H + = −  
k H H H H H k k m k k m + − = + = − − ' ' '  
(4-20) 
(4-21) 
Where Hm-k is the Hamming weight of the bits that are the same in both and Hk 
is the Hamming weight of the bits that are different. As k is constant: 
  ) , cov( ) ' , cov( ) ' , cov( k k m k k m H H H H k H H H H − + = − = − −  
From the expected values this gives 
2 2 2 2 ) ' , cov( k k m k k m H H H H H H + − − = − −  
(4-22) 
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as the mean of the Hamming weight 
of a word will always be half of the number of bits in the word assuming the values 
are evenly distributed. Additionally, 
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be derived from the definition of variance. Substituting these values into equation 
(4-23) gives: 
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As  stated  earlier  with  an  increasing  number  of  traces  the  estimate  of  the 
population  correlation  becomes  more  accurate.  The  sampling  distribution  of 
correlation,  how  much  the  correlation  will  vary  with  the  number  of  samples,  is 
approximately normally distributed when the correlation is close to zero. As the value 
of the correlation is bounded between -1 and 1 there is a skew. If the value is positive 
then it can extend further in the negative direction than in the positive and vice versa. 
After  Fisher’s  transform  is  applied  it  becomes  normal  with  a  standard  error  of 
3
1
− N
where N is the number of traces. Fisher’s transform is given in (4-26) [72]. 
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As the population correlation decreases with the addition of more noise, the 
margin between a correct and an incorrect key guess decreases and it is more likely 
that  the  variation  due  to  the  random  nature  of  the  variables  will  overshadow  it. 
Therefore the more noise there is in the system the greater the number of traces that 
must be used in order to get the same level of confidence in the accuracy of a result. 
4.3.5.2  Lower Bound for the Number of Traces Needed to Perform DPA 
In [73] Mangard uses a statistical model of DPA to determine a lower bound for 
the number of traces  required to successfully identify the key from a  system that 
implements  DPA  countermeasures.  He  considers  countermeasures  that  reduce  the 
SNR and countermeasures that change the time the intermediate result is processed. 
The  maximum  correlation  between  the  correct  key  hypothesis  and  the  power 
consumption is defined in equation (4-27): Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    81 
 
 
) var(
) var(
* *
1 1
) , (
2
max P
P
p
SNR
H H
′
′
+
′
=
ρ
ρ   (4-27) 
 
Where p’ is the probability that the power consumption at the sampling point is 
due to the processing of an attacked intermediate, P is the power consumption due to 
the processing of an attacked intermediate and P’ is the power consumption of the 
device at the sample time.  
Mangard reasoned that the number of samples required to correctly identify the 
key is determined by the distance between the sampling distributions with means of 0 
and ρmax as all of the values will be taken from one of these distributions, the greater 
the  overlap  between  the  two  distributions  greater  the  chance  of  the  incorrect 
correlation  appearing  higher  than  the  correct  one.  The  amount  of  overlap  can  be 
reduced  by  increasing  the  number  of  traces  used  as  this  will  reduce  the  standard 
deviation  of  the  distributions.  Using  equation  (4-28)  Mangard  calculated  the 
probability of value drawn from ρ = ρmax distribution being higher than one from the 
distribution ρ = 0. 
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Equation (4-28) can be transformed into (4-29) to directly calculate the number 
of samples required, where Zα is the quantile that determines the distance between the 
distributions.  Quantiles  are  evenly  spread  points  in  a  cumulative  probability 
distribution,  this  marks  the  boundaries  between  consecutive  sub-sets.  There  is  a 
probability of k / n that a value drawn from a distribution is lower that its kth n-tile. In 
actual DPA several values are drawn from the distributions, for AES 255 are drawn 
from ρ = 0 for each ρ = ρmax, these values are not independent so getting an exact Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    82 
 
probability for a peak is difficult. Based on a series of experiments with different 
values of α it was determined that α = 0.9 is a reasonable lower bound for the number 
of samples, α = 0.9999 leads to a number of samples that has a high probability of 
revealing the attacked sub-key. Between those two values it is less clear. 
4.3.5.3  S-Boxes and DPA 
In [74] Prouff studied the effects the s-box has on the resistance of an algorithm 
to DPA. He defined a new property called the transparency order for an s-box. He 
showed  that  when  s-boxes  are  optimally  resistant  to  linear  and  differential 
cryptanalysis they perform inherently poorly in terms of their transparency order.  
In order to derive the transparency order for a function first we must introduce 
some mathematical and notational preliminaries. F is an (n, m) function, that is a 
function that maps from GF (2
n) to GF (2
m), v is a vector in GF (2
m) and u is a vector 
in GF (2
n). The sign function is defined in equation (4-30), it is a Boolean function, 
the output of this function is either 0 or 1. 
  F v F v
⋅ − − = ⋅ ) 1 (
2
1
2
1
  (4-30) 
The Fourier transform of the sign function of F is defined by the Walsh function 
W. 
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A mapping function F is balanced if the weight of the function, the sum of the 
outputs of the function across all inputs, equals 2
n-1, i.e. there is an equal number of 1s 
and 0s at the output. This is a requirement for a function to be a secure cryptographic 
primitive. A function is balanced if and only if WF (0, v) equals zero for every vector v 
∈ GF (2
m). Bent functions are another set of Boolean functions, they are maximally 
non-linear and have only balanced non-zero derivatives. They are not balanced so 
they  can  not  be  used  as  cryptographic  primitives  but  they  do  resist  linear  and 
differential cryptanalysis in an optimal way [74]. Another important concept is that of 
a derivative, they are used in differential attacks. The derivative of a function F with 
respect to the vector a is an (n, m)-function that maps x to F (x) + F (x + a): 
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As stated in section 4.2.2.1 in order to have good levels of diffusion a function 
must satisfy SAC, it was generalised to the Propagation Criterion (PC) by Preneel in 
[75]. In order for a function F to satisfy PC (l) at a high level DaF must be balanced 
for  every  vector  a  of  weight  at  most  l.  The  correlation  coefficient  between  two 
functions Boolean f and g is given by: 
  ∑
∈
+ − =
) 2 (
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) , (
n GF x
x g x f g f corr   (4-33) 
It is also important to note that the correlation coefficient between the function 
that maps x to v.F (x) and the function that maps x to v.F (x + a) is the Walsh function 
of the derivative of F. This relationship is also expressed in equation (4-34). 
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The rest of this section derives the transparency order for an s-box and describes 
the properties of the transparency of a few important functions. For the purposes of 
this section the power consumption of a cryptographic device is defined as: 
  b X F K X cH X C K K + + = )) ( ) , ( ( ) ( α   (4-35) 
 Where b is the noise, c is the energy required to switch one bit from 0 to 1 or 1 
to 0, α is the data on the device before the targeted transition and FK is the data that 
replaces it K is the key and X is the plaintext.  
We can define the single bit correlation attack as follows: 
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In this case u is a vector where only 1 bit is 1 and the rest are 0, these serve to 
select a single bit in the vector (Fk + α), K is a round key guess and 
•
K  is the correct 
value  of  the  key.  This  can  be  generalised  to  a  multi-bit  attack  by  summing  the 
contributions of each bit in v. 
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It becomes much more difficult to perform a successful DPA attack on an s-box 
when the peaks are not high enough for the correct values to be distinguished from the Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    84 
 
incorrect ones. This is the case if the error in the computation of the correlation δ is 
larger than the average value given in equation (4-38). 
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In order to prevent differential and statistical attacks, cryptographic algorithms 
are  designed  so  that  round  functions  with  different  keys  are  as  uncorrelated  as 
possible, hence it is reasonable to assume that corr (v.FK, u.  •
K
F ) equals zero, unless u 
= v. Also if we assume that α and F are independent corr (v.F+ u. •
K
F , u.α) is equal to 
zero unless v.F+ u. •
K
F  is constant. Taking equation (4-31) and (4-33) into account this 
leads us from equation (4-36) to equation (4-39) 
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Hence: 
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This leads us from equation (4-38) to equation (4-41). 
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Now if we assume that the function α equals the constant value β, then due to 
equation (4-31), equation (4-42) is true. This is a realistic assumption if the device 
uses  pre-charge  logic,  where  the  registers  are  cleared  between  operations,  or  the 
previous value represent the op-code for a microprocessor. 
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Hence:  
  )) ( 2 ( 2 ) , 0 (
1 ) ( , 2
β β H n v W
n
v H GF v
n
− = ∑
= ∈
  (4-43) Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    85 
 
As 1 is not added but subtracted for each non-zero bit in β, the total is has a 
maximum  value  of  n.  Also,  if  α  is  a  constant,  then  from  equation  (4-36)  we  get 
equation (4-44), as constants make no contribution to the correlation. 
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Due to equation (4-34), equation (4-44) becomes:  
 
) , 0 ( ) 1 (
2
) (
.
,
v W
c
K F D
v
n K K K K
•
+
• − = ∆
β   (4-45) 
From equations (4-37), (4-41), (4-43) and (4-45) we can derive (4-46). 
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Thus we come to the definition of the transparency order shown in equation 
(4-47), it is generalised for (n, m)-functions. This gives an idea of how susceptible an 
s-box is to DPA attacks. It is the highest value of D (
• ⋅
K ) across all possible values of 
β. This is because the peak will have to be small enough not to be discernable for all 
values of both the round keys and β. 
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The transparency order can vary from 0 to m. If the function F is bent then WDaF 
will be 0 for all values of v and hence TF will equal m. Bent functions are not balanced 
so are never used as cryptographic primitives, but they do resist linear and differential 
cryptanalysis in an optimal way. More generally if a function satisfies PC (l) at a high 
level it does not have a good transparency order. If F satisfies PC (l) then DaF is 
balanced, and hence WDaF (0, v), for every vector H (a) ≤ l. This means: 
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The number of values of a for which the Walsh function of the derivative of F 
with respect to a is not zero is given by:  ∑
=
−
l
j
j
n n C
0
2 . As WDaF is lower than 2
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Finally: 
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It is also shown by Carlet in [76] that the inverse function, which is used as the 
basis of the AES s-box, the Gold functions and the Kasami functions also have large 
transparency orders. Carlet discovers that in the case of the AES s-box, for which m = 
n = 8, the transparency order is ≥ 7.8, this is close to the maximum, hence the AES s-
box has a very poor transparency order. 
4.3.6  Signal Processing Techniques 
It is possible to combine power analysis with other signal processing techniques 
in  order  to  improve  the  performance.  Bohy  et  al  [77]  used  principal  component 
analysis (PCA) and independent component analysis (ICA), statistical pre-processing 
techniques more commonly associated with neural networks, to increase the signal to 
noise ratio and improve the performance of power analysis attacks. PCA searches for 
linear  combinations  of  variables  with  the  largest  variances,  when  several  linear 
combinations are needed it orders the variances in decreasing importance, thereby 
allowing the attacker to ignore less relevant measurements. This technique was used 
to  remove  noise  that  was  added  to  the  power  consumption  by  masking 
countermeasures on a smart card. This enabled the Hamming weight to be read from 
power traces at the point when a PIN being entered was compared to the stored one. 
They reported results of approximately a 65% chance of being able to recover a PIN 
from a Microchip PIC 16F84 smart card using this technique with SPA. ICA is a more 
powerful technique that separates a complex data set into independent sub-parts. The 
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trace, thereby reducing the noise. It was able to unmask the power traces as long as 
the  added  noise  was  independent  of  the  power  consumption.  It  also  allowed  the 
recovery of the clock pulse, which would be useful when performing attacks like 
differential fault analysis. 
4.3.7  Other Uses for Power Analysis 
The most widely used cryptographic algorithms are open to public review, so 
any  insecurities  in  algorithms  are  more  likely  to  be  identified  and  fixed.  Some 
algorithms are kept secret under the assumption that if the details are not publicly 
known then any insecurities cannot be exploited. This is not necessarily true, as power 
analysis techniques can be used to reverse engineer algorithms.  
Quisquater  and  Samyde  [78]  used  the  analysis  of  power  consumption  and 
electromagnetic emissions to determine the instructions that were being executed on a 
smart card processor. The processor that was being analysed contained a four stage 
pipeline; this means that each instruction influences the power trace of the following 
three clock cycles after it starts. Each instruction gives a different power analysis trace 
and it is a function of its address in memory, the data that is handled and, if relevant, 
the address where that data will be stored and the Hamming weight of the instruction 
is clearly visible. Additional data can also be recovered by measuring the electric 
field. The concept was shown to be workable by creating a dictionary of the power 
consumption for various instructions and then recording the power consumption and 
electric field data for a set of instructions and correlating them with the dictionary 
entries.  A  success  rate  of  higher  that  87%  was  reported,  it  was  better  for  CISC 
processors that for RISC ones. On the Z80 95% of the software was recovered. Neural 
networks were then employed in order to automate the process. 
When performing DPA the sign of the peaks in the differential power traces are 
not given any significance, Novak proposed Sign-Based Differential Power Analysis 
(SDPA), which can be  used to reverse engineer secret algorithms [79]. The basic 
method is to perform DPA and to record the signs of the power bias in a SDPA 
vector. A SDPA vector is a vector with n elements, where n is equal to the number of 
peaks in the DPA trace. Each element has either a 1, representing a positive bias, or a 
0, representing a negative bias. This can then be converted into a SDPA value by 
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numbered 0 to m, each containing the value 2
m. It is difficult to directly interpret the 
sign  data,  as  there  are  several  different  possible  explanations,  so  cross-iteration 
analysis is used. This is where the SDPA data from several iterations of the algorithm 
are combined and stored in a SDPA matrix, which can be more conveniently written 
in the form of a vector containing SDPA values. This makes it easier to interpret how 
the data relates to each other. New intermediate values can then be identified. These 
intermediates  can  then  be  subjected  to  SDPA,  this  new  information  can  then  be 
combined with other methods such as SPA and the algorithm is gradually revealed. 
Novak  successfully  applied  this  attack  and  reverse  engineered  an  unknown  GSM 
authentication algorithm. 
4.3.8  Countermeasures 
Various countermeasures have been proposed for power analysis attacks with 
varying degrees of efficacy. These countermeasures can be broadly separated into 
several  groups:  balanced  logic  styles,  these  seek  to  avoid  leaking  information  by 
making the power consumption of transitions the same as non-transitions, masking 
techniques, these seek to hide details of the internal variables from an attacker and 
Dynamic  Voltage  and  Frequency  Switching  (DVFS)  that  confuses  the  attacker  by 
randomly  changing  the  clock  frequency  and  supply  voltage  of  the  chip.  Sections 
4.3.8.1  –  4.3.8.3  outline  these  techniques  and  describe  the  effectiveness  of  the 
countermeasures  as  well  as  the  cost  in  terms  of  area  and  performance,  the 
performance costs for the various countermeasures are also summarised in section 
4.3.8.5. Section 4.3.8.4 discusses countermeasures to higher order DPA. 
4.3.8.1  Balanced Logic 
Section 4.3.8.1.1 discusses the use of Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL), this 
is a logic style that has exactly one transition per clock cycle irrespective of the data 
that is being processed. Tiri et al report an AES processor made using this technique 
where  the  full  key  cannot  be  retrieved  even  after  1.5  million  traces  [5].  Section 
4.3.8.1.2 discusses Yu and Bree’s attempts to prevent DPA by using an asynchronous 
design that has no clock [80]. This approach offers no DPA resistance unless it also 
uses a dual rail balanced logic approach. Section 4.3.8.1.3 discusses the effectiveness 
of the countermeasure and methods for defeating it. Section 4.3.8.1.4 details the effect 
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4.3.8.1.1 Sense Amplifier Based Logic 
Tiri and Verbauwhede have investigated the possibility of using a different logic 
style that does not leak information in order to defeat DPA [25, 81-84]. The style they 
suggested is Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL). In every cycle SABL charges a 
capacitance with a constant value and uses this constant amount of charge for every 
transition, including those where the inputs of a gate do not change in value. This is 
because SABL is based on the Dynamic and Differential Logic (DDL), where there is 
exactly one switching event irrespective of the input pattern. This is achieved by using 
DeMorgan’s law to create a gate with two halves, one that calculates the result and 
one that calculates the complement, this assures that there is always one output high 
and one low. Additionally there is an AND gate on each output and a pre-charge 
signal that sets the outputs of the gate to 0 for half of each cycle. The design of the 
AND and OR gates and their truth tables are shown in Figure 4-3. 
 
Figure 4-3: The basic design of DDL AND and OR gates and their respective truth tables. 
There is no guarantee that there will only be one switching event per cycle if 
this approach is used to build DDL versions of compound gates, e.g. XOR gates. 
Fortunately  all  logic  functions  can  be  made  with  AND,  OR  and  NOT  gates, 
additionally  the  inverter  is  unnecessary  in  this  style  as  both  the  result  and  its 
complement are calculated, so to invert a signal the Z and Zconnections are switched. 
During the pre-charge phase of the cycle the output of both halves of the gate 
are 0, due to the lack of inverters this means the output of any gates connected to them 
are 0, so there is no need to pre-charge them. This means that the pre-charge signal 
propagates as a wave through the block, this reduces the load on the pre-charge signal. 
This style is called Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL). In WDDL the pre-
charge signal is added to the input of the block. This is shown in Figure 4-4, the 
output of the pre-charge inputs is 0 when the prch signal is high. Figure 4-4 also Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    90 
 
shows a WDDL flip-flop, during the evaluation phase the registers at the output to the 
block store the pre-charged 0s and launch the pre-charge wave in successive blocks. It 
is  important  to  note  that  a  clock  speed  of  twice  the  data  rate  is  required  for  this 
scheme as the pre-charge and evaluation phases happen on different clock cycles.  
 
Figure 4-4: A WDDL Flip-Flop with pre-charge inputs. [25] 
If there is no inversion in a block of logic then the gates that calculate the result 
and the ones that calculate the inverted result are on distinct paths, and hence can be 
separated into two blocks. This can make it easier for the router to match the paths. 
In order for this technique to be truly useful it would have to be easily integrated 
into  a  design  flow.  This  was  achieved  by  Tiri  and  Verbauwhede  by  using  the 
following technique. First the design is synthesised using a subset of a standard cell 
library using only AND, OR and NOT gates. A script then converts the AND and OR 
gates into WDDL form and replaces the NOT gates with the appropriate connecting 
of gates. The placement of the logic proceeds as normal, and the router matches the 
output lines of the two halves of each gate. A designer does not need any specialised 
knowledge  of  the  underlying  principle  of  the  countermeasure,  normal  Verilog  or 
VHDL can be used as an input to the automated design flow. This approach was 
tested by simulation and an ASIC was developed that contained two AES cores, one 
that used a WDDL approach and one that did not. 
4.3.8.1.2 Clock-less AES Design 
Yu and Brée proposed a countermeasure that involved creating a completely 
asynchronous AES chip [80]. This was hoped to provide added security as the clock 
in  a  synchronous  design  guarantees  the  timing  of  each  operation  and  so  aids  the 
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chip using a single-rail  asynchronous style. The chip was  a 128-bit  encryptor, no 
pipelining was used and computations were performed at the byte level. The s-boxes 
were implemented as LUTs using dynamic ROM, and RAM was used to store the 
plaintext, ciphertext and round keys. The asynchronous design language Balsa was 
used to synthesise the core. 
The new design was simulated and the results showed a strong data dependence 
in the power consumption levels. One of the weaknesses was the ROM; it has two 
modes, charge and read. When the ROM is in charge mode the output is set to zero, in 
the read mode the ROM is discharged and the data is loaded onto the output, hence 
only  ‘1’  bits  consume  current.  A  new  approach  was  adopted  that  used  dual  rail 
balanced logic instead. This approach was hoped to be more secure against DPA. 
Everything including the ROM, ROM controller and the RAM had to be made secure 
using the dual rail approach. This had the unfortunate side-effect of doubling the size, 
therefore an online key-scheduler was used. 
4.3.8.1.3 Efficacy 
The  clock-less  dual  rail  design  developed  by  Yu  and  Brée  was  not  directly 
evaluated for DPA susceptibility, but instead the power consumption was simulated 
using 500 encryptions with the same key but different plaintexts, and the amount of 
energy that was consumed was recorded. The mean energy consumed was 764.81 mJ, 
there were variations of 2.85 mJ around this; the standard deviation was 0.79 mJ. 
These values were not compared to a single-rail design, so no details of the level of 
improvement  that  their  technique  offered  is  available.  While  these  variations  are 
small, the standard deviation being just over 0.1% of the mean, they could still be 
exploited by a determined attacker. The source of the variations was reported to be 
that some of the dual rail buses were not routed as pair and the logic gates did not 
have balanced loads.  
Tiri and Verbauwhede tested the DPA resistance of the WDDL logic style in 
simulation [82] and found that if layout parasitics were ignored then it gave perfect 
security. As stated in section 4.3.8.1.1 Tiri and et al also developed an ASIC with 
both single and dual rail AES cores on it so the gains in security due to the WDDL 
logic style could be fully evaluated [5]. They recorded 15,000 power traces for the 
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between  320  and  8,168  traces,  the  average  being  2,133.  They  also  recorded  1.5 
million power traces for the WDDL AES core. 11 out of the 16 key bytes could be 
retrieved using between 21,185 and 1,276,186 traces, with an average of 255,391. The 
remaining five key bytes could not be retrieved, even using the full 1.5 million traces. 
As the key can sometimes be retrieved there is still some data leaking from the 
WDDL implementation. This can be attributed to two main factors: differences in the 
loading capacitances of two complementary logic gates and differences in the delay 
time between the input signals [85]. Improving the placement and routing could even 
out the capacitance and may help with some of the difference in delay, but as some 
difference in delay is due to the two inputs travelling through a different number of 
gates it will not be possible to completely eliminate it. 
As only dynamic power has been considered when designing the WDDL logic 
gates it is still susceptible to Leakage-Based DPA. Lin and Burleson used normal 
DPA and the approach described in section 4.3.2.1 to attack an implementation of 
DES protected by WDDL simulated in SPICE. The key could be retrieved using 5000 
traces with regular DPA, this fell to 2000 with LDPA [66]. 
4.3.8.1.4 Efficiency 
In order to balance the logic it needs to be replicated so that there is always one 
transition, this requires doubling the amount of logic and hence the area of the design. 
Additionally, balanced flip-flops require four normal ones, so the overall area of a 
design will more than double.  
The ASIC that Tiri et al developed containing both single and dual rail AES 
cores shows an increase in area of a factor of 3, going from 0.79 to 2.45 mm
2, the 
maximum clock speed falls by nearly a factor of 4, going from 330 to 85.5 MHz and 
the  power  consumption  rises  from  0.054  to  0.200  W,  again  nearly  a  factor  of  4. 
Clearly this is an expensive DPA countermeasure. 
4.3.8.1.5 Conclusion  
Dual rail designs can significantly reduce the information leakage from a crypto 
device.  In ideal conditions, when parasitics and path length are ignored they  give 
perfect  security  in  simulation.  Clearly  these  are  unrealistic  assumptions  and  when 
these are included information is leaked. There are more complex place-and-route Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    93 
 
algorithms that can match them in the two paths and reduce the correlation between 
power consumption and data, but there are some sources of the correlation and hence 
leakage that are currently unavoidable, inputs to a logic block travelling through a 
different number of  gates for example. Even though some unrealistic assumptions 
were made for some simulations of dual rail designs, these criticisms clearly cannot 
be made against the WDDL ASIC made by Tiri and Verbauwehede. The ASIC clearly 
demonstrated  that  WDDL  is  capable  of  significantly  reducing  the  amount  of 
information leaked through power consumption. Dual rail designs do come at a high 
cost in terms of performance, for the WDDL ASIC the area increased by a factor of 4, 
the speed fell by a factor of 4 and the power consumption increased by a factor of 4. 
4.3.8.2  Hiding Intermediate Values 
Section 4.3.8.2.2 discusses the use of masking, this is where the plaintext is 
masked with a random value and encrypted; the mask is removed after the encryption. 
This hides all the intermediate values from the attacker. Section 4.3.8.2.1 discusses 
the duplication method, which splits the intermediate values into a number of other 
variables using a secret splitting scheme. Section 4.3.8.2.3 discusses the effectiveness 
of the countermeasure and methods for defeating it. Section 4.3.8.2.4 details the effect 
on performance. 
4.3.8.2.1 Duplication Method 
A method proposed by Goubin and Patarin [86] and again later by Chari et al 
[10] called the duplication method involves replacing each intermediate value that 
depends on the input with k variables that form into a secret sharing scheme. An 
example of the secret sharing scheme that could be used is if the k variables were 
XORed together to form the actual intermediate value. Computations  can then be 
performed securely on the shares using a modified algorithm and then recombining 
the data at the end. 
In  general  operations  in  cryptographic  algorithms  will  fall  into  one  of  five 
categories: 
1.  Permutation. 
2.  Expansion. 
3.  XOR with another intermediate variable. 
4.  XOR with key data. Chapter 4 Security of Algorithms    94 
 
5.  Non-linear transform. 
Permutation  and  expansion  operations  simply  need  to  be  performed  on  all 
variables in the secret share, the relationship between them before the operation will 
still be correct after it. With the two types of XOR operation, if it is between two 
variables dependent on the input then the corresponding section of each variable must 
be XORed together, if it is with key data then the key data must be XORed with each 
section  of  the  intermediate  variable.  The  non-linear  transforms  are  slightly  more 
complicated  to  implement,  k  different  s-boxes  are  required,  each  with  all  of  the 
sections of the secret share as an input and one as an output. Of these k s-boxes, k-1 of 
them  implement  randomly  chosen  secret  transformations  and  the  remaining  one 
implements a transform that when combined with all the others will give the value 
that would have been given if they were combined before transformation. As tables 
are used for the substitutions there is no need to recombine the different sections of 
the secret share and hence it remains secure against DPA.  
4.3.8.2.2 Masking 
Masking involves ensuring the attacker cannot predict any full registers in the 
system without making run-specific assumptions that are independent of the inputs to 
the system. This is achieved by applying a reversible random mask to the plaintext 
data before encryption with a modified algorithm. This makes exploiting data from 
several encryptions impossible as it would require guessing the correct mask for each 
run, increasing the number of traces decreases the probability of this. The difficulty 
with this technique is that if a mask is added in a linear way it will be difficult to 
remove after the non-linear section of the algorithm, in AES the Sub Bytes operation. 
 Several different masking techniques have been designed for AES, the three 
main ones were developed by Akkar and Giraud [87], Oswald et al [4, 7, 88] and 
Trichina and Seta [8]. Akkar describes a masking technique for both AES and DES 
although only the AES method will be discussed here. It involves adding a mask to 
the  plaintext,  removing  it  before  the  Sub  Bytes  operation  and  replacing  it  with  a 
multiplicative mask. After the byte inversion in Sub Byte the multiplicative mask is 
replaced with the original additive mask. Trichina’s method uses a similar technique 
to that of Akkar’s except that it re-uses the additive mask as the multiplicative mask, 
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is that a new mask is generated every round. The third approach, by Oswald et al, 
adds  a  mask  at  the  start  and  does  not  remove  for  the  non-linear  sections  of  the 
algorithm, but converts the calculated (data + mask)
-1 to the wanted (data
-1 + mask) 
by calculating a correction in parallel.  
4.3.8.2.3 Efficacy 
The  duplication  method  does  not  offer  complete  security  against  DPA,  it  is 
possible  to  perform  k
th  order  DPA  on  it.  Generally  the  complexity  of  HODPA 
increases exponentially with order, as the traces must be combined with the correct 
time offset between them. This means DPA would probably become infeasible with a 
relatively small k. If the system is not carefully designed however, then it may be 
possible to spot the positions on the power trace where the data is being handled and 
hence reduce the complexity to something manageable [89]. 
In  order  to  evaluate  the  security  gains  of  the  various  masking  techniques 
Pramstaller et al made a processor utilising the three types as described in section 
4.3.8.2.2,  they  discuss  this  in  [23,  90].  No  attempts  to  perform  DPA  on  these 
implementations was made, the standard DPA algorithm is not applicable to a masked 
implementation. This does not guarantee security however; both the Akkar and the 
Trichina approaches are vulnerable to a “zero value attack”. This is where the partial 
data and the partial key have the same value after the additive mask is removed so the 
value will be zero and the multiplicative mask will have no effect [91]. Also it was 
shown  in  [92]  that  the  Trichina  method  can  be  defeated  by  regular  DPA.  Akkar 
reports in [87] that HODPA, albeit with considerable effort, can defeat the masking 
countermeasure.  Mangard  et  al  implemented  an  AES  ASIC  using  the  Oswald 
approach, the Akkar approach and an unmasked implementation [93]. Despite the fact 
that  these  masking  techniques  were  provably  secure  against  first  order  DPA  the 
implementations  could  still  be  attacked  using  results  from  simulations  to  make 
predictions  about  the  outputs  of  logic  gates  rather  than  registers.  For  Akkar’s 
technique  this  required  130,000  traces.  For  Oswald’s  technique  only  30,000  were 
required, this was of a similar order to the 25,000 traces required for the unmasked s-
box. 
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The effect that the duplication method has on the performance of the design 
depends on the value of k. For each additional secret share variable an additional data 
path needs to be added. Additionally, as well as needing more s-boxes they are all 
bigger, the size increasing to the power of k. The size of the design will have to 
increase by a factor greater than k. The duplication method significantly increases the 
amount of memory required for the s-boxes so it is not appropriate for smart card 
implementations without modification. In [86] Goubin and Patarin suggest ways to 
reduce the memory requirements so as to be able to fit a duplication protected DES 
implementation with a k of 2 on a smart card. If the same random transformation is 
used for all of the 8 DES s-boxes then the number of s-boxes that need to be stored in 
memory is 9 rather than 16. These s-boxes can be made smaller by combining the 
parts  of  the  secret  share  in  a  secure  way,  by  doing  it  inside  a  bijective  masking 
function  so  the  actual  value  never  appears  in  registers.  The  two  post-s-box 
intermediate  values  are:  some  randomly  chosen  secret  transform  of  the  securely 
combined value, and, that value XORed with what the output of the s-box would be in 
an  unmodified  implementation.  The  unmodified  s-box  output  can  be  calculated 
securely from the altered combined value from a table that has been rearranged. 
Pramstaller  et  al  implemented  an  ASIC  with  AES  s-boxes  using  the  three 
masking  techniques  described  in  section  4.3.8.2.2  [9,  23],  they  used  a  0.25  µm 
process. The effect of the countermeasures on the area and the critical path are shown 
in Table 4-6. Akkar’s implementation is the largest, and Trichina’s is the smallest, 
Oswald’s is the slowest. Compared to the smallest AES s-box the area increases by 
between a factor of just under 3 to over 4, and the critical path increases by a factor of 
between approximately 1.5 and 2. While compared to the fastest AES s-box the area 
increases  by  a  factor  of  between  1  and  2  and  the  critical  path  by  between 
approximately 4 and 6. The final column of Table 4-6 gives the number of random 
bits per data bit required by the algorithm. Oswald’s masking algorithm requires a 
128-bit mask for each 128-bit input block. Akkar’s masking algorithm required both a 
multiplicative and additive mask and hence required 256 random bits for each input 
block. Trichina’s masking algorithm reuses the additive mask as a multiplicative mask 
but requires one for each round so requires 1,280 random bits for each input block. 
This  will  put  additional  strain  on  the  efficiency  of  the  algorithm  as  the  random 
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time. Pramstaller et al also developed a 128-bit implementation of AES Oswald’s 
masking method, it was designed as a high throughput chip and they compared it to 
Fastcore [94]. They reported an similar area, Fastcore had 45,325 gates, their design 
had 42,408, this did not include the circuitry required to generate the random masks 
and the Fastcore datapath includes some additional functionality [9]. The throughput 
fell from 2.12 Gb/s for Fastcore to 1.15Gb/s for Pramstaller et al’s design. Both chips 
used a 0.25 µm CMOS process. 
S-box Implementation  Area (mm
2)  Critical Path (ns)  Random Bits / Data Bit 
AES  0.0075 – 0.0125  4 – 5.8  0 
AES LUT  0.015 – 0.037  1 – 3  0 
Oswald  0.025 – 0.033  8.3 – 14.4  1 
Akkar  0.034 – 0.054  6.5 – 12.2   2 
Trichina  0.020 – 0.035  6 – 9.2  10 
Table 4-6: A table comparing the area, speed and random bit requirements for masked and 
unmasked implementations of the AES s-box [23]. 
4.3.8.2.5 Conclusion  
Clearly masking techniques are not a solution to the problem of DPA, the costs 
on performance are significant, increasing the size of an s-box by a factor of between 
3 and 6 [9, 23] and in an full implementation of AES decreasing the speed by a factor 
of 2 [94]. That doesn’t even include the penalties for generating the massive amount 
of random bits required to make the masks. Much more significant that the cost to 
performance is the inability of any of the proposed masking techniques to actually 
protect a system from DPA, the Trichina technique is vulnerable to regular DPA [92], 
and  the  Akkar  and  Oswald  techniques  are  vulnerable  to  DPA  against  logic  gates 
rather than registers, using simulations to predict the values of the logic gates [93]. 
This pretty much rules masking out as an effective DPA countermeasure. 
The duplication method can protect implementations against DPA but it can be 
defeated with HODPA. The order of HODPA to which it is vulnerable is determined 
by the number of duplications that are used to protect it. HODPA is computationally 
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determine the correct time offset. One possible weakness of the duplication method is 
the random transformations that are used to make the s-boxes need to be kept secret, if 
an attacker was able to determine what they were then the implementation may be 
vulnerable.  
4.3.8.3  Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Switching 
Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Switching (DVFS) was originally proposed as 
a  technique  to  reduce  power  consumption.  Yang  et  al  realised  that  is  would  also 
frustrate an attacker who was trying to perform DPA on a cryptosystem as they would 
typically assume that the device is operating at a constant frequency and hence take 
power samples at constant intervals [11].  
When DVFS is used as a DPA countermeasure it is composed of three parts, the 
processor  core,  the  DVFS  feedback  loop  and  the  DVFS  scheduler.  The  DVFS 
scheduler randomly generates a voltage or a frequency value, the feedback loop then 
implements the frequency and voltage using a phase locked loop and a ring oscillator 
and supplies it to the processor core. 
4.3.8.3.1 Efficacy 
Yang et al [11] created a simulated DES implementation with DVFS but did not 
perform  actual  DPA  on  it.  Instead,  to  measure  the  effectiveness  of  their 
countermeasure  they  simulated  1000  of  encryptions,  collected  statistics  about  the 
variation  in  the  power  and  timing,  and  defined  two  performance  metrics,  Power 
Traces Entropy (PTE) and Time Trace Entropy (TTE). These represent uncertainty in 
the power and consumption and clock period traces. They found that in their design 
with DVFS the PTE was 7.5% higher than their design without. The TTE was ∞% 
higher as there wasn’t any uncertainty in the timing in designs without DVFS. 
Baddam and Zwolinski [95] attempted to perform DPA on a simulation of a 
cryptosystem using this technique and discovered that they could not retrieve the key 
after 10,000 traces. As any circuit with a clock frequency is necessarily sequential, 
lots of values will change in the circuit on the rising edge of the clock, this will create 
a detectible spike in the power consumption, which the attacker is already measuring. 
This information can be used to determine the altered frequency, this in turn give 
information  about  the  new  supply  voltage.  Applying  this  new  data  to  their  DPA 
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protected  cryptosystem.  As  an  improvement  to  the  technique  they  suggested  only 
modifying supply voltage and keeping the frequency constant so as not to give the 
attacker  the  tools  to  defeat  the  countermeasure.  When  tested  this  reduced  the 
correlation  with  power  consumption  by  a  factor  of  5,  although  DPA  could  be 
performed on a single AES s-box using 2,500 traces it could not be performed on a 
full implementation of AES with 10,000 traces. 
4.3.8.3.2 Efficiency 
The  area  overheads  for  DVFS  are  not  particularly  large,  as  adding  the 
countermeasure simply involves including the DVFS scheduler and feedback loop. In 
[11] it was assumed that the underlying hardware was already available in the design 
essentially reducing the area cost to nothing. The accuracy of that assumption depends 
on the exact nature of the device in question and it will not always be true. Changing 
the  frequency  and  the  voltage  affects  the  amount  of  power  and  time  required  to 
perform encryption. When Yang et al implemented DES using DVFS they reported a 
speed overhead of 16% but the amount of power used fell by 27% [11]. 
4.3.8.3.3 Conclusion 
In terms of the performance cost to an implementation that a countermeasure 
incurs DVFS is cheap. The size of the design will not increase very much, especially 
if the chip already has a phase-locked loop and ring oscillator. The speed decrease is a 
moderate 16% and the power consumption was even reduced by 27%.  
If the operating frequency is altered as well as the voltage then it is possible to 
use the large increase in power consumption that accompanies the rising edge of a 
clock pulse to deduce the new clock frequency and hence the supply  voltage and 
defeat the countermeasure [11]. If only the power consumption is altered then this is 
not possible and the countermeasure can achieve a factor of five reduction in the 
correlation with power consumption [95], making it infeasible to attack a simulation 
of full AES with 10,000 traces. 
4.3.8.4  High Order DPA Countermeasures 
Designing ad hoc countermeasures for DPA does not assure security against 
HODPA. It has been shown that masking techniques are not secure against HODPA 
[92]. The Duplication method, using k shares, does not provide security against k
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order DPA attacks. However, while the complexity of the implementation increases 
with order k, the complexity of the attack increases exponentially with k, so an attack 
would quickly become infeasible. 
A modification to the masking technique was suggested by Chang and Kim that 
would make it secure against 2
nd order DPA [96]. It involves generating two masks 
and selecting one at random and applying it to the data. This provides security as the 
attacker is not able to determine the point at which the mask is loaded. 
Another masking technique that is not vulnerable to HODPA was proposed by 
Goubin and Akkar [97] and applied to DES. A 32-bit number is generated randomly 
and  this  is  used  to  create  2  new  s-boxes,  one  that  masks  the  value  and  one  that 
unmasks it. The intermediate values in DES have variable vulnerability to DPA, that 
is to say that information about some of the rounds does not gives more information 
about the key than others. The middle 2 two rounds are not vulnerable, at this point 
the data is unmasked and a new set of secure s-boxes is used. If only one mask was 
used then it would be susceptible to HODPA in the same way that other masking 
techniques are.  
 
 
4.3.8.5  Summary of Power Analysis Countermeasures  
Countermeasure  Penalty  Effectiveness 
Speed  Area   Power 
Balanced logic 
WDDL   4  3  4  11 out of 16 key bytes identified with 
average of 255,391 traces, others not 
identified with 1.5 million traces. 
Masking  
Oswald [23]  2.1  2.5  -  Susceptible  to  DPA  targeting  logic 
gates  with  back  annotated  netlist. 
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Trichina [23]  1.5  2.8  -  Susceptible to DPA [92]. 
Akkar [23]  1.7  4.2  -  Susceptible  to  DPA  targeting  logic 
gates  with  back  annotated  netlist. 
[93]. 
Duplication  -  > k  -  Susceptible to HODPA [22]. 
DVFS 
Frequency and 
supply voltage 
1.2  -  .73  Can be defeated using power surges 
to  find  new  rising  edges  of  clock 
pulse [95]. 
Supply Voltage  -  -  -  Correlation  strength  decreased  by  a 
factor of 5 [95]. 
Table 4-7: Summary of DPA countermeasures. 
4.3.8.6  Conclusion 
As discussed in section 4.3.8.5 adding hardware countermeasures to DPA is 
expensive in terms of area and time requirements, increasing them by a factor of 1.2 
to 4 and 1.8 to 4 respectively. 
The effectiveness of the countermeasures is often debatable, even if it has been 
demonstrated  that  they  work.  Some  masking  techniques  that  were  proposed  were 
shown  to  be  susceptible  to  higher  order  DPA  attacks  [87]  and  one  was  even 
vulnerable  to  first  order  DPA  [92].  Even  techniques  that  were  shown  to  be 
theoretically provably secure [6, 7, 46], was susceptible to DPA using predictions 
based on simulations and a back-annotated netlist [93]. 
Most other countermeasures were generally shown to be secure in simulation 
with  unrealistic  assumptions  about  parasitics.  Even  if  the  countermeasures  are 
implemented it is still difficult to show that they are definitely secure by attempting 
DPA on them. However many traces are recorded in the experiments it is still possible 
that  if  more  were  taken  enough  information  would  leak  to  enable  an  attacker  to 
retrieve the key. It is only possible to show that countermeasures are not secure, or are 
effective up to a certain limit. In order to assure security this limit has to be greater 
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definite figure, and is largely dependent on the application for which the encryption is 
used. Hwang et al collected 1.5 million traces and could not retrieve the key from 
their WDDL AES ASIC [98], they claimed that this demonstrates that their method is 
secure. 1.5 million traces is equivalent to the encryption of 12 MB of data.  
4.4  Conclusion 
Cryptography  is  a  constant  battle  between  cryptanalysts  and  code  makers. 
Algorithms are developed, weaknesses are found and techniques to overcome these 
vulnerabilities are discovered and included in the next generation of algorithms. As 
processing power becomes cheaper algorithms have to become more complex, with 
longer keys to withstand the ever increasing brute force attacks. The current standard 
is AES which has no known mathematical attacks and with key lengths of 128, 192 
and 256 bits cannot be feasibly brute forced with current technology. Even the most 
modern algorithms however fall to side channels, until an effective countermeasure is 
developed the cryptanalysts have the upper hand. 
There are no truly successful techniques to protect AES against DPA. Hardware 
countermeasures are expensive in terms of area and speed and cannot be guaranteed 
to work. Masking techniques have been shown to vulnerable to a variety of DPA 
based  attacks  such  as  targeting  logic  gates  [93]  and  the  duplication  method  is 
vulnerable to high order attacks [22]. Clock frequency based countermeasures can be 
compensated for and defeated [95]. Balanced logic styles can protect implementations 
up to a point, but any data dependence in power consumption, no matter how small, 
can be exploited by an attacker if they have access to enough power traces, and the 
logic can never be perfectly balanced.  
The countermeasures that have partial success,  balanced logic  and randomly 
varying  the  supply  voltage,  both  reduce  the  effectiveness  of  DPA.  This  does  not 
prevent it, but does increase the number of traces required to successfully perform an 
attack. This leads to the question: how many traces are required for an attack before it 
is considered secure against DPA? There is no general answer to this, it is determined 
by the specific use of the system in question, if it is not feasible to get enough power 
traces to retrieve the key before the key is changed then it is essentially secure. If the 
key is never changed then the attacker has a theoretically infinite number of power 
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consumption will eventually betray the key. Tiri et al tested their WDDL system with 
1.5 million traces and found that they could not retrieve the entire key using DPA [5] 
but DES is considered vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis even though it requires 
2
47 chosen plaintexts. Additionally, even retrieving some key bits weakens the cipher. 
In the WDDL example 11 out of 16 key bytes were successfully determined, this just 
leaves 40 key bits unknown. That is well within the reach of an exhaustive search 
with current levels of available computing power. It is important not to forget the 
words of Robert Morris at Crypto 95: 
 
“Never underestimate the time, expense, and effort an opponent will expend to 
break a code.”[99]  
 
Chapter 5  Recording and 
Analysing Power Data and 
Benchmark DPA Results  
5.1  Introduction 
In order to investigate potential countermeasures to differential power analysis 
it must first be possible to perform DPA so the efficacy of any modification can be 
determined. This requires both a design of a suitable cryptographic algorithm, in this 
case AES, the implementation of which is described in section 5.2, and a system to 
extract  power  consumption  measurements.  A  system  was  developed  that  used  an 
oscilloscope  to  measure  the  power  consumption  of  an  FPGA  while  performing 
encryption  and  is  described  in  section  5.3.2.  The  data  was  then  analysed  using  a 
program that is described in section 5.3.3. Also DPA was performed in simulation in 
two different ways. Firstly the power consumption was estimated using transitions in 
registers in a VHDL simulation as, this is described in section 5.3.1.1. Also, a model 
of DPA was made in Matlab that can be used to quickly perform lots of experiments, 
this  is  useful  for  performing  Monte  Carlo  simulations  and  is  described  in  section 
5.3.1.2. 
5.2  AES Core 
This section describes the AES core that was implemented in order to have a 
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Another  advantage  of  developing  a  new  AES  implementation  was  that  a  greater 
understanding of the algorithm and issues regarding implementation was gained. 
5.2.1  Modules 
A highly modular design style was used to implement AES. This simplified the 
addition of optimisations and the creation of a variety of architectures. 
5.2.1.1  Sub Bytes 
For the Sub Bytes operation two different s-boxes have been produced, one that 
uses the LUT approach and one that converts the values from GF (2
8) to GF (2
4), also 
versions of these were made for pure encryptors, for further details see section 3.6.9.2. 
The designs were synthesised and details are given Table 5-1. 
S-box  Slices  Delay ns 
LUT Full AES  139  9.41 
LUT Encryptor  68  8.44 
GF (2
4) Full AES  58  20.33 
GF (2
4) Encryptor  46  17.45 
Table 5-1: Details of the various s-box implementations. 
As  the  Shift  Rows  operation  can  simply  by  implemented  as  routing  it  was 
combined with Sub Bytes in the top level of the module, with the substitution of each 
input going to a different output.  
5.2.1.2  Mix Columns 
Originally the multiplication for the mix columns was performed by a series of 
generic GF (2
8) multiplication modules. One of the operands in each multiplication is 
constant,  so  this  was  then  changed  to  a  series  of  custom  built  constant  value 
multipliers,  the  equations  for  which  are  given  in  Table  3-4.  There  is  a  degree  of 
sharing of values in the equations so there is a further optimisation that can take place, 
the 4
th bit of the 03 multiplier is the 4
th bit of the 02 multiplier and x4. When a purely 
encrypting implementation of AES was made the custom multiplier was changed so it 
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synthesised and details are given Table 5-2. The custom multipliers outperform the 
generic ones in both speed and area.   
Multiplier  Slices  Delay ns 
Generic  724  13.13 
Custom  600  11.97 
Custom enc  208  5.65 
Table 5-2: Details of the various Mix Columns implementations. 
5.2.1.3  Key Scheduler 
Several different key schedulers were designed that could calculate an entire 
round key in 1 clock cycle. They were 128-bit online and offline schedulers and a full 
AES offline key scheduler. Online key schedules generate the round keys as they are 
required whereas offline ones pre-calculate them and store them for future use. The 
designs were synthesised and details are given Table 5-3. 
Key Scheduler  Slices  DFFs  Delay 
128-bit Online  428  128  31.03 ns 
128-bit Offline  1,383  1,285  769 ns 
Full AES Offline  7,688  1,824  84.78 ns 
Table 5-3: Details of the various Key Scheduler implementations. 
5.2.2  Architectures 
Several  different  architectures  were  implemented,  a  128-bit  encryptor  with 
online and offline key schedulers, a 128-bit encryptor / decryptor with online and 
offline key schedulers, a full AES encryptor / decryptor with an offline key scheduler 
and a fully pipelined 128-bit encryptor with online and offline key schedulers. The 
designs were synthesised for a Xilinx XCV100E with a speed grade of -6.  
The area, speed and throughput in bits per second are given in Table 5-4. For 
implementations  that  have  an  offline  key  schedule  additional  clock  cycles  were 
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the throughput would be dependent on how many blocks were encrypted with each 
key. For the implementation of full AES with three different possible key lengths, the 
number of rounds and the setup time of the expanded key is determined by the key 
length. It can be seen from Table 5-3 that although an online key scheduler is smaller 
for one round this is because the overhead in creating an offline version is very large, 
when the pipelined architectures were created the offline key schedule approach used 
nearly 2,000 less slices. The complexity involved in creating an implementation that 
supports multiple key lengths is so great that there is a significant increase in area and 
reduction in clock speed. 
Implementation  Clock 
(MHz) 
Cycles / 
Result 
Throughput 
(Mb/s) 
Slices  DFF 
128-bit Enc online   33.4  10  427  2,446  516 
128-bit Enc offline   25.2  10   323  3,099  1,702 
128-bit Enc/Dec off.  28.1  10   360  4,364  1,575 
Full AES Enc/Dec off  12.5  10–14  114-160  10,003  2,085 
128-Bit Enc piped on.  43.9  1  5,620  11,709  2,309 
128-Bit Enc piped off.  28.5  1  3,650  9,991  3,624 
Table 5-4: The performance results from the various AES implementations. 
5.3  Performing a Correlation Attack 
In  order  to  gain  any  real  insight  into  power  analysis  attacks  and  their 
countermeasures such an attack must be performed. The ultimate aim of this is to 
develop a system where the resistance to power analysis attacks can be measured. 
This  section  describes  the  various  methods  that  have  been  used  to  perform  a 
correlation attack on AES and the tools that were developed in order to facilitate 
them. 
5.3.1  Simulation 
Before  an  attack  was  performed  on  a  physical  system  it  was  first  done  in 
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VHDL design of an AES chip. Section 5.3.1.2 discusses the use of Matlab to simulate 
a realistic but simplified model of a device being subjected to power analysis. This 
allows  investigation  into  properties  of  the  attack  that  would  otherwise  take  a 
prohibitively long time. 
5.3.1.1  FPGA Power Estimation 
As shown in [60] the number of bit transitions inside the registers of an FPGA 
gives a reasonable estimation of the power consumption at that time. For this reason a 
program was written that could accept an FPGA design file and use it to produce a file 
containing  the  number  of  bit  changes  within  all  registers  in  the  design  on  each 
successive clock cycle. Details of the program are given below. 
The program parses post-synthesis VHDL files and extracts the names of the 
registers in the design. The program then writes a test bench containing the key to be 
extracted and a list of plaintexts. Additionally a Modelsim script file is written that 
loads the design and a test bench, runs the simulation and records the values in the 
registers  at  each  delta  time  into  a  file.  This  file  is  then  read,  and  the  number  of 
transitions in a given clock cycle is counted. This information is used to perform DPA 
on the design using the method described in section 4.3.2.2, to extract the key that 
was specified in the test bench. In this example 742 traces were required to extract all 
16 bytes of the key.  
The first byte of the key had the decimal value 43. In Figure 5-1 the correlation 
between the consumption matrix and the prediction matrix for the first byte of the key 
is shown for all 256 possible values of the key, the value with the highest correlation 
is  43,  this  means  that  the  correct  value  for  the  first  key  byte  can  be  correctly 
identified. 
In Figure 5-1 it can be seen that there are a series of distinct levels that the 
values of the correlation take. This is due to the effect discussed in section 4.3.5.1. 
Each  time  the  Hamming  distance  between  the  key  guess  and  the  correct  key  is 
increased, the correlation falls by a fraction equal to the number of bits in the key 
guess, in this case 8. This can be seen in Figure 5-1 as the correlation when the key 
guess is 42 is approximately the same as when it is 47, both having a Hamming 
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approximately  0,  and  when  all  bits  are  incorrect  the  correlation  is  negatively 
correlated by the same amount as the largest peak.  
 
Figure 5-1: Graph showing the correlation of the 256 key guesses for a correlation attack on 
the power estimation of an AES FPGA with 1,000 traces. 
5.3.1.2  Matlab Simulations of the Consumption Model 
The simulated attack described in section 5.3.1.1 takes a significant amount of 
time. The majority of this is taken up by the Modelsim simulation, as to be sure that 
enough register transition data was collected 4,000 plaintexts were used, this took 
over 2.5 hours on a 3  GHz Pentium 4. Using  Matlab it is possible to simulate a 
correlation attack on AES much faster and so investigate a wider variety of properties 
of the attack, such as the affect of the SNR and number of traces on the results of the 
correlation.  
In the AES design that was attacked using a Modelsim simulation in section 
5.3.1.1 there were 516  registers, 128 are used  for storing the data relevant to the 
attack, the rest are not used at all during the targeted clock cycle of the encryption. 
This may seem to imply that there is no noise in the measurements, but this is not 
true. All of the bytes are calculated in parallel but each one is targeted individually 
and the data is independent so the data from one byte appears as noise when attacking 
another. This means that the signal-to-noise ratio of this system is 0.25. The Matlab Chapter 5 Recording and Analysing Power Data and Benchmark DPA Results  110 
 
model to simulate an attack randomly generates 16 1-byte integers for the plaintext 
and XORs them with a 16 byte key and then sums the Hamming weight of each 
number. This value is entered into the consumption matrix. The prediction matrix is 
the  Hamming  weight  of  all  256  possible  key  values  XORed  with  the  randomly 
generated plaintext value of the target byte.  
 
Figure 5-2: Graph showing the correlation of the 256 key guesses for the Matlab model of a 
correlation attack on AES. 
The first byte of the key had the decimal value 43. In Figure 5-2 the correlation 
between the consumption matrix and the prediction matrix for the first byte of the key 
is shown for all 256 possible values of the key, the value with the highest correlation 
is  43,  this  means  that  the  correct  value  for  the  first  key  byte  can  be  correctly 
identified. 
The signal to noise ratio can be improved by combining data from two key 
bytes. This does increase the size of the key-space that must be exhaustively searched 
from 2
8 to 2
16. The value of the 2-byte section of the key that was being targeted was 
0x2B7E  or  11,134  in  decimal  notation.  In  Figure  5-3  the  correlation  between  the 
consumption matrix and the prediction matrix for the first byte of the key is shown for 
all 65,536 possible values of the key, the value with the highest correlation is 11,134, 
this  means  that  the  correct  value  for  the  first  two  key  bytes  has  been  correctly 
identified. As stated in section 4.3.5.1 the correlation of the correct key choice is 
related to the signal to noise ratio of the system, as this has been increased from Chapter 5 Recording and Analysing Power Data and Benchmark DPA Results  111 
 
16
1 to  8
1  the value of the maximum correlation as calculated by equation (4-15) 
becomes 1/3. Like Figure 5-1, Figure 5-3 also has a regular pattern in the values of the 
correlation, with key guesses that have the same Hamming distance from the correct 
value having the same correlation. The only difference is that in this example there 
are 2 bytes, and so 17 different possible values for the Hamming distance between the 
correct and incorrect values. 
 
Figure 5-3: Graph showing the correlation of the 65,536 key guesses for the Matlab model of 
a correlation attack on 2 bytes of AES (2B 7E) with 1,000 traces. 
5.3.2  Performing a Correlation Attack on an FPGA 
An AES core was combined with an LFSR to provide the plaintexts and loaded 
onto  a  Xilinx  XCV1000E  FPGA.  The  FPGA  was  put  into  a  Xilinx  BG560 
prototyping  board.  The  board  only  contains  wiring  for  the  JTAG,  sockets  for 
oscillators and some LEDs. The power for the internal logic of the FPGA is supplied 
via separate power supply jacks, this means that the power consumed by other things 
on the board does not interfere with the power consumed by the chip itself, this will 
reduce  the  noise  for  power  analysis  attacks.  The  power  consumption  data  was Chapter 5 Recording and Analysing Power Data and Benchmark DPA Results  112 
 
captured using an Agilent Technologies 4 channel mixed signal oscilloscope with a 
maximum sample rate of 1GHz (MSO6104A). The power consumption of the FPGA 
can  be  deduced  by  measuring  the  current  drawn  from  the  power  supply,  the 
oscilloscope only measures voltage. A 0.5   resistor was connected in serial with the 
FPGA and the voltage across it was measured by connecting an oscilloscope probe 
either side of it and subtracting one value from the other. The FPGA generated a 
Doing signal, one pin went high when an encryption was being performed in order to 
trigger the oscilloscope. In addition to the power consumption data the oscilloscope 
also captures the Doing signal and the clock pulse to aid the synchronisation of the 
power  consumption  traces.  The  output  from  the  oscilloscope  is  an  array  of  1,000 
floating point numbers signifying the values displayed on the screen.  
 
Figure 5-4: Correlation for all possible key values for an attack on a single AES s-box on an 
FPGA with 10,000 traces. 
To test the setup, an attack was performed on a single AES s-box. A random 8-
bit plaintext was generated using a 128-bit LFSR, this was XORed with a constant 
value (0x2B) to represent the key and this was fed into the s-box and the output was 
stored in a register. A graph showing the correlation of all possible values of the 
constant key for 10,000 traces is shown in Figure 5-4, there is a clear peak at the 
decimal value 43, showing the correct value of the constant that was XORed to the 
LFSR output. Figure 5-4 looks different to the previous graphs of the correlation of all 
possible  key  values,  there  is  not  the  distinct  set  of  levels  for  the  correlation  of Chapter 5 Recording and Analysing Power Data and Benchmark DPA Results  113 
 
incorrect  values,  this  is  because  the  predictions  are  made  after  the  s-box.  This  is 
discussed in more detail in section 5.4. 
 
Figure 5-5: The correlation for all possible key values after 30,000 traces while attacking the 
first byte of the first sub-key of AES before the s-box. 
After the correct function of the test-bed was verified a correlation attack was 
performed on an AES core. The correlation of all possible key values of the first byte 
of the first sub-key after 30,000 traces is shown in Figure 5-5, again the correct value 
is 43 and this is the largest peak in the graph. Even though the correct answer is still 
clearly visible in the graph the actual value for the correlation is much lower in this 
attack, at 0.03785, compared to the simulated attack, at 0.2599. This is because there 
is a lot more noise this system as the Modelsim simulation considers only register 
transitions whereas in the real system there is noise from all parts of the circuit.  
5.3.3  DPA Software 
As noted in section 4.3.2.2 a correlation attack is a three stage process involving 
predicting the values in registers based on the plaintext and the key, generating and 
capturing the power consumption information and performing the correlation. These 
can  be  grouped  into  two  more  general  tasks  of  capturing  power  data  and  then 
processing it. Power consumption data from the FPGA was captured using the Agilent 
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it. The program has two main tasks, initialising the settings on the oscilloscope and 
transferring data from the oscilloscope to the PC. The settings for the capture, such as 
the number of traces that are going to be performed and the number of clock cycles of 
the traces that are to be captured, are entered into the GUI, shown in Figure 5-6, the 
program then calculates the appropriate time-base settings and sets up the relevant 
channels on the oscilloscope for capture.  The program also sends requests for data to 
the oscilloscope. When the FPGA is performing an encryption a “Doing” signal is set 
high, the oscilloscope uses this as a trigger and captures the power consumption data. 
Now it has data in its buffers is can fulfil the program’s request to send the data to the 
PC.  For  simplicity  of  design  there  is  no  communication  between  the  PC  and  the 
FPGA, the plaintexts were generated by an on-chip LFSR and there was a counter that 
ensured a fixed period of time occurred between encryptions. If this was greater than 
the  time  taken  to  transfer  data  between  the  oscilloscope  and  the  PC  then  the 
oscilloscope would receive another request for a transfer before the next encryption 
took place and the process would repeat. There was another counter on the FPGA that 
stopped it after a certain number of encryptions had been performed, there was also a 
counter in the program that counted the number of datasets that had been received. If 
the data transfer between the PC and oscilloscope took longer than the time between 
encryptions  the  program  would  not  capture  the  expected  number  of  traces  and  it 
would be apparent that the capturing process had failed. The output from this was 
stored in comma delimited files ready for processing by other programs. 
 
Figure 5-6:  GUI for the program that controls the transferral of data between the oscilloscope 
and the PC. Chapter 5 Recording and Analysing Power Data and Benchmark DPA Results  115 
 
 
Figure 5-7: GUI for the DPA analysis program when attacking simulated power data. 
 
Figure 5-8: GUI for the DPA analysis program when attacking FPGA power data. 
The majority of the basic level algorithms for performing the various types of 
correlation attacks were very similar, for this reason one program was written that 
incorporated the analysis of both the simulated results and the power traces captured 
from the FPGA. Different options in the GUI could be set to control aspects of the 
analysis such as the number of traces, how the plaintexts were generated, either a file 
with a list of them or an LFSR, and which, if any, of the countermeasures proposed in 
sections 7.2.1 - 7.2.3 were used. The GUI for the program when performing DPA on a 
simulated AES and FPGA data are shown in Figure 5-7 and Figure 5-8 respectively. 
There are several available settings displayed in Figure 5-8, most are self-explanatory. Chapter 5 Recording and Analysing Power Data and Benchmark DPA Results  116 
 
In the Countermeasure section there are four options: None, for when there is no 
countermeasure; Mixed, for when the countermeasure is the additional Mix Columns 
operation (see section 7.2.2); May, for when the countermeasure was the strengthened 
AES key schedule developed by May et al [30] (see section 7.2.1); and Rolling, for 
when the key schedule continues expanding the key indefinitely (see section 7.2.3). It 
should also be noted that the option marked “cheat to reduce data” does not really 
cheat but performs the correlation using the correct value of the key byte (which is 
already known to the analysis program) to find the sample in the power consumption 
trace that gives the highest correlation. This is then the only sample that is used when 
calculating the correlation for the other 255 key-byte guesses which makes the data 
analysis stage much faster. 
5.4  Effects of the Position of the Target Register on Correlation 
Attacks 
The correlation attacks described in section 5.3 all target the register at the start 
of the first round after the initial Add Key operation (apart from Figure 5-4, where 
there is only an s-box and a register). This was chosen as in the AES design each 
round was performed in one clock cycle so there were no registers after the s-box and 
it was a simpler modification to reset the initial register at the start of each encryption 
than to alter the structure of the round. A simulation of power analysis was performed 
in Matlab where the target of the attack was a register that stored the results of the 
substitution. A graph of the correlation from all 256 key values from a simulated DPA 
attack is shown in Figure 5-9, and an attack on a real FPGA is shown in Figure 5-10, 
in both cases the correct key value was 43. Chapter 5 Recording and Analysing Power Data and Benchmark DPA Results  117 
 
 
Figure 5-9: Graph showing the correlation of the 256 key guesses for the Matlab model of a 
1,000 trace correlation attack on AES targeting the algorithm after the S-Box. 
 
Figure 5-10: Correlation of the 256 key guesses for a 30,000 trace correlation attack on an 
FPGA AES implementation, targeting the algorithm after the s-box. Chapter 5 Recording and Analysing Power Data and Benchmark DPA Results  118 
 
A number of differences become immediately apparent when comparing this 
graph to the one shown in Figure 5-2. In Figure 5-2 the variable plaintext byte is 
XORed with constant key, the statistics are like those described in section 4.3.5.1, 
with a reduction in the correlation by ¼, in an 8-bit attack, from the maximum for 
each incorrect bit in a guess. It is significantly easier to extract the correct value from 
a post s-box attack. This is because there is potentially a high correlation between the 
predictions for correct and incorrect key hypothesis when the target is (Plaintext XOR 
KeyGuess) as one bit difference in the key leads to only 1 bit difference in the output. 
In contrast, as the s-box is a complex, non-linear function then after it is applied a 
single bit difference in the key guess leads to a vastly different output and hence there 
is a much lower correlation for incorrect key guesses. As explained by Prouff in [74] 
the same properties that make an s-box satisfy the propagation criterion to give an 
algorithm  resistance  to  linear  and  differential  cryptanalysis  also  make  the  s-box 
fundamentally vulnerable to DPA. 
Performing  a  2-byte  power  analysis  attack  has  an  analogous  effect  on  the 
correlation; an example is given in Figure 5-11. 
 
Figure 5-11: Graph showing the correlation of the 65,536 key guesses for the Matlab model 
of a post s-box correlation attack on 2 bytes of AES (2B 7E) with 1,000 traces. 
Knowing the position of the registers in the AES design would not always be 
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function clearly this will not give the correct result. It is however unlikely that the 
result that is given will be confused with the correct one as they look significantly 
different. If the target is pre s-box when it should be after it then it looks similar to a 
correct attack, there is no large peak indicating the correct result but there is still the 
same characteristic shape in the graph, this is because there is still the same pattern in 
the values of the prediction matrix irrespective of whether any of the predictions are 
accurate.  If  the  target  is  post  s-box  instead  of  before  it  then  the  graph  looks 
significantly different, there are not the same number of levels for the correlation and 
the highest and lowest values are significantly reduced. This is illustrated in Figure 
5-12.  
 
Figure 5-12: Graphs showing the results of a correlation when the attack targets the incorrect 
side of the s-box, the graph on the left targets post s-box and the graph on the right targets pre 
s-box, in both cases the correct key, 43, is not represented by the highest peak. 
Figure 5-13 shows three DPA traces where the correlation values have been 
sorted into descending order. Each has an SNR of 0.25 but a different number of 
traces. As the number of traces increases the correlation line becomes flatter and it 
appears that the correlation for incorrect guesses will approach zero. This is however 
not quite the case, the amount of variability of the calculated values decreases as the 
number of traces increases. This is discussed further in Chapter 6.  Chapter 5 Recording and Analysing Power Data and Benchmark DPA Results  120 
 
 
Figure 5-13: Correlation of all 256 key guesses for 3 different numbers of traces arranged in 
descending order. 
5.5  Conclusion 
A number of different methods for performing DPA have been developed. A 
system that records the power consumption of an FPGA configured as an AES core 
was  made  and  programs  that  analyse  the  data  were  written.  Also  a  method  of 
performing DPA using Modelsim VHDL simulations was made which also proved 
effective, this creates measurements with much less noise than a real system which 
means that less power traces are required to perform DPA saving time collecting and 
processing data. It does only measure register transitions so any information leaked 
through other sources, such as logic gates, would not show up in these simulations. 
Additionally  a  model  of  DPA  was  made  in  Matlab,  this  allowed  even  faster 
experiments to be performed, which is important in order to perform Monte Carlo 
simulations of a DPA system so the properties of DPA can be better understood, this 
will be used extensively in Chapter 6. 
After  gaining  experience  of  collecting  and  analysing  DPA  data  it  was 
discovered  that  the  choice  of  the  position  in  the  algorithm  that  is  attacked  has  a 
significant  effect  on  the  results  and  the  number  of  traces  required  to  successfully 
retrieve a the value of a byte of the key. If the value targeted is after the s-box then it Chapter 5 Recording and Analysing Power Data and Benchmark DPA Results  121 
 
is much easier to perform DPA. This is because of the non-linear properties of the s-
box,  even  if  there  is  only  a  single  bit  error  in  the  key  guess  this  will  lead  a 
significantly different value after the s-box and hence the correlation for an incorrect 
key guess will be lower and therefore easier to distinguish from the correct value. 
  
 
Chapter 6  The Statistics of 
Differential Power Analysis 
6.1  Introduction 
Differential Power Analysis is a statistical attack, understanding the statistical 
properties of it can yield techniques for evaluating the vulnerability of a system and 
the efficacy of countermeasures, as well as other insights into the attack. In previous 
sections  the  number  of  traces  that  were  required  to  retrieve  the  key  for  different 
scenarios have been given as an indication as to the ease at which the system was 
cracked. Due to the statistical nature of the attack these are not definite values, but are 
product of the implementation being attacked, the choice of the inputs that were used 
and the noise in the system. Just because it required 1,000 traces to crack a system 
with on Monday there is no guarantee that 1,000 traces will succeed on Tuesday. 
With a given number of traces and a specific level of random noise there is a 
fixed probability of success. In order to investigate this relationship further, a Monte 
Carlo simulation of DPA was performed with different numbers of traces each time 
using  different  random  generated  plaintexts  and  keys.  To  form  the  consumption 
matrix the plaintext was XORed with key and the Hamming weight was calculated. 
No additional noise was added but the contribution to the consumption model from 
the bytes in the plaintext that were not being attacked would act as noise. The number 
of times a byte of the key was successfully retrieved was recorded and the probability 
of success against the number of traces was plotted, this can be seen in Figure 6-1. 
The  simulation  was  repeated  with  16  and  32  bytes  in  the  plaintext  and  key,  this 
changes the amount of noise in the system. Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  123 
 
 
Figure 6-1: A graph showing the probability of successfully retrieving a key byte against the 
number of traces taken in simulation calculating 16 and 32 bytes concurrently. 
It can be plainly seen from the graph that the more traces that have been used 
the greater the probability of success. Also, the more noise there is in the system the 
greater the number of traces that are required to achieve the same success rate. In 
order to determine the precise relationship between these variables a statistical model 
of DPA is derived and from this, a technique to calculate the probability of success 
from the amount of noise in the system and the number of traces that have been taken 
is established. 
Detecting the effect of a particular pattern of register transitions can have other 
uses than divining a cryptographic key. This chapter also presents a method for using 
DPA to detect the presence of a particular pseudo-random sequence that has been 
added to a design as a sort of watermark to protect intellectual property. 
6.2  Statistical Model of DPA 
6.2.1  Introduction 
In  order  for  DPA  to  be  successful  the  correlation  relating  to  the  set  of 
predictions based on the correct key guess must be higher than the predictions relating 
to the 255 incorrect key values. The specific value of the correlation generated by the 
predictions  based  on  the  correct  and  incorrect  key  guesses  can  vary  between Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  124 
 
successive runs of DPA depending on the values of the plaintext and the key that are 
used and the noise in the rest of the circuit. This means the value obtained is just an 
estimate of the true correlation; this estimate is called the sample correlation as it is 
based  on  the  samples  taken.  The  true  correlation  is  that  calculated  if  the  entire 
population was sampled (therefore this is referred to as the population correlation) and 
as the population is all potentially observable values, this implies an infinite number. 
This means that there is a random element to the values created and hence the chance 
of the guess with the largest correlation not being the correct key. 
In order to investigate this relationship between the noise and variables, and to 
verify the accuracy of the model a Monte Carlo simulation of several DPA attacks 
was  performed  using  a  16-bit  key  and  putting  it  through  the  AES  s-box.  Each 
plaintext was then used to generate 256 prediction values for each byte. After a fixed 
number  of  plaintexts  had  been  generated  the  power  consumption  values  were 
correlated with each column of the prediction matrix and the correlation values for 
each key guess were recorded. The first byte of the key was kept constant and the rest 
were changed to new random values and the process was repeated a large number of 
times.  One  byte  of  the  key  was  kept  at  a  constant  value  so  it  was  possible  to 
investigate  the  statistics  of  the  correlations  generated  by  each  incorrect  key  guess 
individually. There was no random noise added to the power consumption values as 
the 16 bytes were independent of each other so the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 
each byte is given in equation (6-1) where the SNR in this case is the ratio of the 
standard deviations of the data dependent part of the signal and the noise. 
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6.2.2  Statistical Model of DPA 
In order to develop a statistical model of DPA it is important to understand the 
statistics  of  correlation.  The  distribution  of  the  sample  correlations  around  the 
population correlation is called the sampling distribution. Due to the fact that the 
value  for  the  correlation  between  two  variables  is  bounded  between  -1  and  1  the 
sampling distribution of it is not normal, as when the population correlation is positive 
the sample correlation can vary more in the negative direction than in the positive and Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  125 
 
vice  versa.  In  order  to  convert  it  to  a  normally  distributed  variable  the  Fisher 
transform [72] must be applied to the data as given in (6-2): 
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This means that after the Fisher transform has been applied the correlation can 
be modelled as a normally distributed random variable. This is only accurate when the 
number  of  samples  is  greater  than  30,  but  this  does  not  matter  because  in  most 
practical examples of DPA the number of traces is much higher than 30. For the rest 
of  this  discussion  all  data  is  assumed  to  be  after  the  Fisher  transform  unless 
specifically stated.  
The standard deviation of a sampling distribution is called the standard error, for 
the post-Fisher correlation it is controlled by the number of traces that were used in 
the correlation and is given by (6-3): 
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Correlation is a measure of how much of the variance of one variable is due to 
the variance of another. This is the same as how much of the total signal is made up of 
the information that we are interested in. This will be referred to as PercentSignal and 
is related to the SNR as shown in equation (6-4): 
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This  is  the  correlation  of  the  correct  prediction  values  with  the  power 
consumption  and  after  the  Fisher  transform  gives  the  mean  of  the  sampling 
distribution for the correct key.  
DPA in AES separates the key into groups of 8 bits and so there is 1 correct and 
255 incorrect correlations, each taken from their own normal distribution. Section 
6.2.2.1 deals with the distribution of the correlation between the power consumption 
and  the  predictions  with  the  correct  key  guess;  this  is  referred  to  as  the  Correct 
distribution. Section 6.2.2.2 describes the distributions of the correlation between the 
power consumption and the predictions with the 255 incorrect key guesses, referred to 
from now on as the Error distributions. Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  126 
 
6.2.2.1  Correlation with the Correct Key 
After the Fisher Transformation has been applied the correlation between the 
consumption matrix and the prediction matrix generated with the correct key forms a 
normal distribution. The standard deviation of the distribution is related to the number 
of traces and can be calculated from equation (6-5). The mean is the PercentSignal of 
the  system.  Figure  6-2  shows  four  distributions  of  correlation  using  a  different 
number of traces. 
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Figure 6-2: Distribution of correlations from the correct key guess using different numbers of 
traces. 
6.2.2.2  Correlation with the Incorrect Key 
As  there  are  255  different  incorrect  key  values  and  hence  255  prediction 
matrices, clearly there have to be 255 different correlation distributions. Each will 
have properties controlled by signal SNR of the crypto system, the number of traces 
and particular details of the implementation. Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  127 
 
6.2.2.2.1 Mean 
Each  of  the  distributions  has  its  own  mean.  The  values  of  each  mean  is 
controlled by two factors, the SNR of the system and constant that is determined by 
the  correlation  between  the  prediction  matrix  for  the  correct  key  guess  and  the 
prediction matrix for incorrect key guess relating to the distribution.  
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By definition the noise and the prediction matrices are independent, therefore this 
reduces to: 
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From equation (6-13) and (6-4) it can been seen that this is: 
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The  correlation  between  the  Correct  and  Error  prediction  matrices  can  be 
estimated to a reasonable degree of accuracy by randomly generating large prediction 
matrices for the 256 key values and calculating the correlation between them. As this 
is a relatively quick calculation (compared to simulating an entire DPA system) a Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  128 
 
large  number  of  samples  can  be  used,  this  will  reduce  the  standard  error  of  the 
estimate which is given in (6-3). 
Clearly the Correct prediction matrix, and therefore the MeanError, is affected 
by  the  choice  of  key.  This  means  that  in  the  general  case,  where  the  key  is  not 
specified, there are 256 different possible sets of arrays of MeanError. In order to 
investigate this all 256 * 255 values were estimated using a large number of samples. 
This is discussed further in section 6.4. 
6.2.2.2.2 Standard Deviation 
The standard deviation of the distribution of correlations is controlled by the 
number of samples in the correlation, this is the same for both the Correct and Error 
distributions. 
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6.2.2.2.3 Correlation between the Correct and Error distributions 
Now both the mean and standard deviation have been found it would be easy to 
think  that  the  model  is  complete,  unfortunately  the  relationship  is  not  quite  that 
simple.  There  is  a  correlation  between  the  Correct  and  Error  distributions.  This 
means that if a sample from the Correct distribution is above the mean it affects the 
probability of a sample from each of the Error distributions being above their mean. 
This also has to be modelled. 
Like  MeanError  the  correlation  between  Correct  and  Error,  referred  to  as 
CorrCorr, is controlled by the correlation between their respective prediction matrices 
and  the  SNR  of  the  system.  Figure  6-3  shows  the  variation  of  CorrCorr  with 
PercentSignal when the correct key is 0 and the key guess is 1. When PercentSignal 
approaches 0, when there is a large amount of noise, CorrCorr tends towards the 
correlation between the Correct and Error prediction matrices. As the PercentSignal 
approaches 1, when the noise drops off to 0, the CorrCorr tends towards another 
constant that can be determined by simulation. The relationship between CorrCorr 
and S can be modelled using the inverse tan function, as shown in (6-16): Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  129 
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Where Last is the value that CorrCorr tends towards when PercentSignal is 
approaches 1. The modelled curve is plotted next to the actual curve in Figure 6-3. 
 
Figure 6-3: The correlation of Correct and Error and the model curve versus PercentSignal 
6.2.2.3  Summary of the Model 
The Correct correlation can be modelled by the normal distribution shown in 
equation (6-17) where N ( , σ) is a normally distributed random variable with a mean 
of   and a standard deviation of σ. The Error correlations can be modelled as the 
normal distributions described in (6-18), where i ∈ 0 … 254. 
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6.3  Predicting Success 
From  the  model  developed  in  section  6.2  we  can  generate  a  formula  to 
determine the probability of successfully determining the correct key using DPA on a 
system. This is achieved by calculating the probability of the highest of the 255 Error 
values  being  greater  than  a  particular  value,  denoted  by  t,  and  the  Correct  value 
equalling t, then integrating across all possible values of t. 
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) ( ) ( , t t Correct P Std t MeanCorrec ϕ = =   (6-23) 
The probability of an Error distribution being less than the Correct when it is at 
t  is  the  probability  of  the  distribution  that  was  used  to  model  the  lack  of  perfect 
correlation between the two variables being less than t. 
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Where φ ,σ is the probability density function (PDF), and Φ ,σ is the cumulative 
probability  density  function  (CDF)  for  the  normal  distribution.  Unfortunately  this 
cannot be directly evaluated as the CDF for the normal function does not have any 
elementary primitives and so certainly cannot be integrated. There are techniques to 
approximate it, however, so the integration in (6-25) can then be approximated using 
numerical integration.  Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  131 
 
It is important to note that the formula calculates the probability of successfully 
extracting  1  byte  of  the  key.  In  order  to  calculate  the  probability  of  successfully 
retrieving the entire 16-byte AES key the resultant value would need to be raised to 
the 16
th power. 
6.3.1  Calculating the Other Variables 
While it is useful to calculate the probability of success from the number of 
traces for a given signal to noise ratio, it would be more useful for an attacker to be 
able to calculate the number of traces required to ensure a particular probability of 
success on a system with a given SNR, and more useful to a designer to be able to 
determine the amount of noise in a system that would require the attacker to take a 
particular number of traces if they wanted to have a given probability of success. 
Due to the formula not being able to be evaluated directly, it is not possible to 
rearrange it for these purposes. It is however possible to use the original technique to 
perform an iterative search for the value of the desired variable. This entails either the 
SNR or the number of traces and making an initial estimate of the value of the other 
one that will give the desired probability of success. The probability of success is then 
determined and if the initial guess was too low it is increased, if it was too high then a 
binary search can take place to efficiently determine the correct value.  
6.3.2  Testing the Formula 
In order to verify the efficacy of the formula an FPGA implementation of an 
AES s-box was fed 50,000 random plaintexts XORed with a constant byte and the 
power consumption was recorded, DPA was performed for the correct key using all 
50,000 traces to get a accurate estimate of the population correlation, the standard 
error of the estimate was 0.0045 and the correlation was estimated to be 0.8642. DPA 
was then performed on 20 traces from the 50,000 taken at random and it was recorded 
whether the correct key was retrieved, this was repeated 100,000 times. The success 
rate was 76.24%. The estimated PercentSignal was used to evaluate the probability of 
success when 20 traces were used, the result returned was 72%. The process was 
repeated on a similar design of an AES s-box, this time with a correlation estimate of 
0.4874, the predicted success rate for 20 traces was 26.54% and the actual success 
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indicator of the probability of successfully retrieving a key using DPA given the SNR 
of the system and the number of traces to be used in an attack. This also implies that 
the statistical model of the attack is accurate. 
6.4  Relative DPA Susceptibility of Keys 
The result of the correlation in DPA is affected by the values that are used to 
compute it and therefore the inputs that are used when performing the encryption. In 
DPA it is assumed that the plaintexts are random and as normally a large number are 
used their effect will average out. Each byte of the key is considered independently 
and only has one value for the entire attack. It is conceivable that the choice of that 
value  can  influence  the  probability  of  success,  this  section  investigates  that 
possibility. 
The probability of successfully retrieving a key is related to the relative position 
of the mean of the incorrect distributions compared to that of the correct distribution. 
This is controlled by the SNR of the system and the correlation between the prediction 
matrices for the Correct and Error distributions. The correlations between prediction 
matrices is controlled by the structure of the s-box so this analysis is only valid for 
algorithms that use the  AES s-box. As stated in section 6.2 there is a set of 255 
MeanError values for each possible key value. As they are different it is possible that 
different keys have different levels of susceptibility to DPA. To investigate this all 
65,280 different MeanError values were estimated for a particular prediction function 
using a large number of samples. Each row has similar values, a KS test is not able to 
reject the null hypothesis that the values are drawn from different distributions. 
These values are just estimates, the possibility that the true values for different 
keys are the same was tested by calculating the lowest value for all different keys with 
two different numbers of samples and the Fisher transformation was applied to the 
results. If the variation in the values was due to an estimation error then the values 
would be normally distributed around the true value with a standard deviation related 
to  the  number  of  samples  used  in  the  estimate  of  the  correlation.  The  standard 
deviation for both sets of values was 0.0035; the standard deviations predicted by the 
number of samples for the two estimates were 0.001 and 0.00057. Additionally the 
distribution of values was not normal, the Lilliefors test, a version of the KS test 
optimised  for  normality  testing,  showed  this.  This  refutes  the  possibility  that  the Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  133 
 
variance in the values of the correlation between the Correct and Error prediction 
using different keys is due to the inaccuracy of the estimates. 
This leaves the problem of how to select which of the 256 sets of MeanError to 
use. The most accurate choice would be to calculate the probability of success for all 
256 key values and take the average, this would be rather computationally intensive as 
it  would  require  calculating  65,280  mean  values  in  addition  to  performing  256 
integrations. How worthwhile this is, is determined by the overall effect the difference 
in key value has on the calculated probability. 
In  order  to  investigate  the  variability  in  probability  of  success  due  to  the 
difference in key, the probabilities for all keys were calculated for a particular system, 
these are shown in Figure 6-4. While there is a difference it is very small, the standard 
deviation of the probabilities is 0.000091. The variation is much lower than other 
errors in the system and so it makes little difference which of the 256 sets of values is 
used. 
 
Figure 6-4: The probability of successfully retrieving a key using DPA for the different 
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6.5  Protecting Intellectual Property Using a DPA Detectable 
Watermark 
6.5.1  Introduction 
Intellectual Property (IP) is a valuable commodity and can form the main source 
of income for a company. It is, therefore, important to protect it.  There have been 
several  proposed  methods  for  achieving  this.  In  [100]  Alkabani  and  Koushanfar 
propose adding a series of initial states to a state machine that require a unique and 
unpredictable set of inputs that only the designer knows to bring the device into its 
functional state. Koushanfar, Hong and Potkonjak developed techniques for adding a 
signature to the structural properties of designs [101]. 
If the design of an integrated circuit contains a small section that produces a 
known bit pattern in a set of registers, like a pseudo random bit generator (PRBG), 
then it would be possible to use DPA to detect this. This would act like a watermark 
and would be useful for determining if a piece of hardware contains the relevant piece 
of intellectual property (IP). 
6.5.2  Power Consumption Watermarks 
6.5.2.1  Adding a Watermark 
In  order  to  detect  a  watermark  in  the  power  consumption  of  a  device  a 
characteristic fingerprint needs to be added to it. This can be achieved quite simply by 
the  addition  of  a  pseudo  random  bit  generator  (PRBG).  The  pseudo  random,  but 
deterministic, values generated in the registers of the PRBG will add a specific pattern 
to the power consumption.  
6.5.2.2  Measuring Power Consumption 
In order to determine whether a watermark is present in the power consumption 
of a design the power consumption must be recorded. Assuming the PRBG generates 
a  new  multi-bit  value  each  clock  cycle  then  the  power  consumption  needs  to  be 
sampled  each  clock  cycle.  The  correlation  between  the  power  values  and  the 
Hamming  distance  in  the  registers  of  the  PRBG  in  successive  values  is  then 
calculated. Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  135 
 
6.5.3  Detecting the Watermark 
If  the  watermark  is  present  in  the  power  consumption  then  the  population 
correlation  will  have  the  value  of  the  ratio  between  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
power consumption of the watermarking hardware and the standard deviation of the 
total power consumption. If the IP is included within a larger design it may not be 
possible  for  the  rights  holder  to  know  the  value  of  this.  They  could  measure  the 
standard deviation of the total power consumption but the standard deviation of the 
power  consumption  of  the  watermarking  hardware  would  be  dependent  on  the 
technology that it was implemented on, so would not necessarily be the same as their 
reference version. 
What is known is that if the watermarking hardware is there then the population 
correlation will be positive and if it isn’t then it will be 0. After the sample correlation 
has been calculated it can be determined whether it is reasonable to reject the null 
hypothesis that the correlation was drawn from a distribution with a mean that is not 
greater than zero and hence there is no watermarking hardware present. In order to do 
this a p-value is calculated using a z-table. The p-value is the probability of observing 
by chance a result that is at least as extreme as the one being tested. A z-table contains 
the probabilities of a standard normal distribution, one with a mean of 0 and standard 
deviation of 1, being greater than a set of values. 
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It is determined by looking up on a z-table the associated probability for the 
value of z which can be calculated with (6-26) where x is the mean sample correlation, 
in this case the Fisher transform of the sample correlation, µ0 is the value of the mean 
in the null hypothesis, in this case 0, σ is the  standard deviation of the sampling 
distribution, given by (6-2) and n is the number of samples in the mean of the sample 
correlation, as only one correlation is being calculated this is 1. 
6.5.3.1  Summary of method 
In order to tell whether the power consumption data supports the presence of a 
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1) The power consumption (P) of the device is measured from its reset state and 
the  Hamming  distance  (H)  of  the  registers  in  the  PRBG  for  the  same  number  of 
samples (T) is recorded. 
2) The correlation between the two is calculated. 
ρ = Corr (P, H)  (6-27) 
3) The Fisher transform is applied to the correlation.  
F = Fisher (ρ)  (6-28) 
4)  The  confidence  level  must  be  decided.  This  is the  probability  incorrectly 
detecting a watermark when there is none. A typical value is 0.05.  
C = 0.05  (6-29) 
5) The p-value is calculated.  
P = Z (F (T-3)
1/2)  (6-30) 
6) If the p-value is lower than the confidence level then the null hypothesis can 
be rejected and the watermark has been detected. 
6.5.3.2  Experimental Results 
Watermark  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Samples  5000  5000  1000  1000  1000  1000 
σ Total  1  1  1  1  1  1 
σ Watermark  0.05  -  0.1  -  0.05  - 
Null Hypotheses 
rejected (%) 
97  4.8  93.9  5.0  46.6  4.8 
Table 6-1: Summary of the simulation results. 
A series of simulations was performed in order to verify the method. The power 
consumption of the watermarking hardware was modelled by generating a series of 
random numbers between 0 and 255 and calculating the Hamming distance between 
them,  giving  values  between  0  and  8.  Noise  was  included  by  adding  a  series  of 
normally distributed random numbers to the model. The noise represents both the 
power consumption from the rest of the circuit and any non-linearity in the power 
consumption  vs.  Hamming  distance.  The  correlation  was  performed  between  the 
Hamming  distance  values  and  the  power  consumption  model.  This  was  repeated Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  137 
 
10,000 times for different numbers of samples and with different amounts of noise. 
Simulations of hardware power consumption with no watermark were also performed. 
In these, the Hamming distance for a watermark was calculated in the same way and 
they were correlated with normally distributed random numbers that had the same 
standard deviation as the total power consumption for the watermarked simulations. 
The results are summarised in Table 6-1. 
6.5.3.3  Type I and II Errors 
There are two types of errors when trying to detect a watermark: detecting one 
that is not there and not detecting one that is. The probability of incorrectly rejecting 
the null hypothesis and falsely claiming there is a watermark is the significance level 
chosen for the p-value test. This is why the number of times a watermark was detected 
in the simulations when there was none was always approximately 5% irrespective of 
the number of samples taken and the population correlation.  
 
Figure 6-5 : A graph illustrating the effect of increasing the number of samples of the ease of 
detecting a watermark 
The probability of not detecting a watermark that is there is controlled by two 
factors:  the  population  correlation  and  the  number  of  samples.  The  smaller  the 
population correlation the greater the number of samples that must be taken to ensure 
the  same  probability  of  detecting  the  watermark.  This  is  because  increasing  the Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  138 
 
number  of  samples  reduces  the  standard  deviation  of  the  sampling  distributions 
making it easier to differentiate between the two. This is illustrated in Figure 6-5, the 
curves  in  both  plots  are  normal  distributions  with  the  same  mean  but  different 
standard  deviations,  the  shaded  area  represents  the  amount  of  the  sampling 
distribution that the correlation can come from in order to reject the null hypothesis 
with  a  confidence  of  0.95.  It  is  clearly  more  likely  to  successfully  detect  the 
watermark from the lower graph. 
6.5.4  Calculating the Number of Traces if the Population Correlation is Known 
In the previous section it was assumed that the population correlation could not 
be reasonably estimated before trying to detect the watermark. While this would most 
likely be the case if the IP in question is an entire chip design then the population 
correlation could be estimated.  
If this is the case then it is possible to use this information to calculate the 
number of power consumption samples that need to be recorded in order to give a 
particular probability of successfully detecting the watermark. The following method 
can be used to calculate the number of samples required to give a 90% chance that the 
null hypothesis will be rejected at the 0.05 level. First the z-table is consulted to find 
the value that the standard normal distribution has a 95% chance of being lower than 
and 90% chance of being higher than, these will be referred to as z<95 and z>90. 
To  reject  the  null  hypothesis  at  0.05  the  correlation  must  be  higher  than 
equation (6-31). 
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Also, there is a 90% chance that the correlation will be greater than equation (6-32). 
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In order for there to be a 90% chance of rejecting the null hypothesis at the 0.05 
level these two values must be the same, this is demonstrated in Figure 6-6. The dark 
grey shaded area represents 90% of the area under the right hand curve which is the 
sampling distribution of the correlation. The light grey shading represents 95% of the 
area  under  the  left  hand  curve  which  is  what  the  sampling  distribution  of  the 
correlation would be if the null hypothesis was correct. Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  139 
 
 
Figure 6-6: A graph illustrating the requirements for rejecting the null hypothesis at the 0.05 
level 90% of the time when the population correlation is known. 
The number of traces required to achieve this is given by equation (6-35). 
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In order to verify this method a simulation was performed, 100,000 correlations 
were performed with 10,000 samples where the population correlation was 1/34. A 
population correlation of 1/34 would require approximately 10,000 samples to reject 
the  null  hypothesis  at  the  0.05  level  90%  of  the  time  and  with  10,000  traces  the 
sample correlation would have to be 0.0165 or greater as shown by equations (6-36) 
and (6-37) respectively. 
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Out of the 100,000 correlations generated in the simulation 90,231 were higher than 
this  value  so  would  have  rejected  the  null  hypothesis  at  the  0.05  level,  this  is 
approximately 90%. 
6.5.5  How much area should be given to the watermarking hardware? 
The  probability  of  successfully  detecting  the  watermark  is  related  to  the 
population  correlation,  which  is  determined  by  the  power  consumption  of  the Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  140 
 
watermarking  hardware.  The  greater  the  amount  of  area  that  is  dedicated  to 
watermarking  hardware  the  easier  it  will  be  to  detect  but  the  larger  the  overhead 
involved.  Assuming  that  power  consumption  is  directly  proportional  to  area  the 
population correlation of the watermark can be estimated using (6-38) where W is the 
percent increase in area due to the watermarking hardware. 
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Using this and equation (6-36) it is possible to calculate the number of samples 
that  would  be  required  to  give  a  chosen  probability  of  successfully  detecting  a 
watermark with a given significance level. Table 6-2 gives the number of samples 
required to successfully detect a watermark 90% of the time with a significance level 
of  0.05  after  different  amounts  of  area  have  been  dedicated  to  the  watermarking 
hardware. 
When performing DPA to retrieve cryptographic keys the samples are relatively 
difficult to collect, the attacker has no control over when they are generated or how 
many are generated before a new key is used. When using DPA to detect watermarks 
this is not true and it is easy to collect however many are deemed necessary. It is not 
unlikely that 10 million samples could be quite easily taken, this would give a good 
chance of detecting a watermark that added less than 0.1% to the area of a design. 
Increase in area  Samples  Increase in area  Samples 
10%  862  0.5%  342,560 
5%  3,431  0.2%  2,141,000 
2%  21,415  0.1%  8,563,900 
1%  85,644     
Table 6-2: The number of samples required to detect a watermark using a given percentage of 
the hardware with a 90% accuracy. 
6.5.6  Conclusion 
It is possible for designers to add hardware to their designs that will create a 
known pattern of register transitions as a way of using DPA to detect whether their IP 
has been used without their permission. As DPA is a statistical technique it does not 
give  a  definite  answer,  but  if  the  correlation  between  the  watermarking  register Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  141 
 
transitions  and  the  power  consumption  is  calculated  it  is  easy  to  calculate  the 
probability  that  the  measured  result  would  have  been  observed  assuming  the 
watermark was not there. If this is sufficiently unlikely it gives reasonable confidence 
in  the  falseness  of  the  null  hypothesis  and  by  extension  the  hypothesis  that  the 
watermarking is present. The overhead incurred by this protection can be chosen by 
the designer and a method of calculating the amount of effort they would need to go 
to in order to detect it based on their choice is also presented. It has been shown that 
the overhead can be very low (< 0.1%) and still produce a signal that can be most 
likely detected with a realistic amount of data collecting. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  p-value  is  not  the  probability  that  the  null 
hypothesis is true, but the probability of getting the observed result given that the null 
hypothesis  is  true.  Bayes’  theorem  could  be  used  to  convert  between  these  two 
probabilities  but  it  would  involve  knowing  the  probability  that  the  watermark  is 
present (without having performed any tests to see if it is) and the probability of 
getting the observed correlation (without any knowledge or assumptions about the 
sampling distribution that it was drawn from). It is not practical to estimate these 
values. 
6.6  Conclusion 
As  DPA  is  a  statistical  attack  it  is  important  to  understand  the  statistical 
properties. The analysis of these properties has led to a technique for calculating the 
probability of key retrieval with a given number of traces for a particular system with 
a known SNR. This technique can be easily adapted to calculate one of the other 
variables, each being arguably more useful to either an attacker or a designer of a 
crypto-system. A designer may wish to calculate the amount of noise that must be 
present in a system in order to reduce the probability of a successful attack to a given 
level assuming the attacker has access to a known and finite number of traces. An 
attacker, having previously analysed the power consumption for the SNR of the data 
dependence may wish to know how many traces he is required to take to give him a 
good chance at retrieving the entire key. Additionally it has been determined that 
although there is a slight variation in the susceptibility of different key values to DPA 
the overall effect is negligible, so there are no particular key values that it would be 
best to avoid if concerned about DPA susceptibility. Improving the understanding of Chapter 6 The Statistics of Differential Power Analysis  142 
 
the mathematics of the attack was one of the main aims of the thesis. This has been 
achieved. 
The ability of DPA to discern a characteristic pattern of processed data in the 
power  consumption  of  a  device  can  be  put  to  more  benign  uses  than  cracking 
encryption. If a section is added to a design to generate a known pattern of register 
transitions then it would be possible to use this as a watermark to detect theft of 
intellectual property. 
 
 
 
   
 
Chapter 7  Novel Algorithmic-
Based Power Analysis 
Countermeasures  
7.1  Introduction 
All the countermeasures to power analysis attacks described previously have 
been  added  to  implementations  of  a  cryptographic  algorithm.  As  summarised  in 
section  4.3.8.5,  they  come  at  a  large  cost  in  terms  of  either  the  speed  of  the 
implementation or its requirements in memory or area, and when their effectiveness is 
evaluated  they,  at  best,  simply  frustrate  the  attacker,  forcing  him  to  collect  more 
power consumption data, or perform High-Order DPA, rather than stopping the attack 
completely.  It  is  unlikely  that  any  countermeasure  that  involves  attempting  to 
eliminate the leakage of information through the power  consumption will ever be 
completely effective. In can be seen from the relationship between the SNR of the 
data dependence in the power consumption and the number of power traces required 
to give a particular probability of successfully that was derived in Chapter 6 that any 
correlation, no matter how small, can be exploited by an attacker to discern the key if 
they have enough traces. Any attempts to remove the correlation will be imperfect and 
will leave the device vulnerable. 
If DPA is ever going to be completely eliminated as a potential avenue of attack 
a  new  method  will  be  required.  Rather  than  adding  ad-hoc  and  expensive 
countermeasures a better alternative would be if algorithms were secured against this 
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some possible algorithmic countermeasures. It is important to note that in this thesis 
only  the  resistance  to  power  analysis  attacks  is  examined.  There  has  been  no 
investigation  into  the  effects  these  changes  have  on  the  general  security  of  the 
algorithm, although all the modifications involve measures that ought to strengthen 
algorithms,  either  adding  additional  layers  of  existing  cryptographic  primitives  or 
increasing the confusion and diffusion properties of the key schedule. 
Section 7.2 describes the evaluation of a set of different ideas on how to modify 
AES to protect it from DPA. Only one of the ideas, a perpetually expanding key 
schedule  (section 7.2.3) is effective.  In section 7.3 TDES is modified to be DPA 
resistant, however the algorithm isn’t well suited to the countermeasure and it comes 
at a significant cost in terms of area. Other modern cryptographic algorithms were 
investigated to determine their suitability to the countermeasure, this is described in 
section 7.4 and one of them, ARIA, is shown to perform well with the modification in 
section 7.5. This leads to a second attempt at protecting TDES in section 7.6 with 
much better results. 
7.2  AES Algorithm Alterations 
This section describes the investigation into the resistance to power analysis 
attacks imparted to a modified version of the AES algorithm by several techniques, 
and their effect on the resources required to implement it. The countermeasures were 
added to the same AES design that was used in section 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.2; a 128-bit 
encryptor  with  an  online  key  schedule  that  calculates  one  round  per  clock  cycle. 
When the design was synthesised for a Virtex-E 1000 it used 2,446 slices and 516 flip 
flops, and it had a clock speed of 33.4 MHz, giving a throughput of 427 MB/s. The 
first  modification  is  based  on  the  strengthened  key  schedule  described  in  section 
4.2.2.2. The next uses an additional Mix Columns operation before the first round to 
decrease  the  predictability  of  the  target  registers.  The  final  one  uses  a  constantly 
changing  key  to  remove  the  ability  of  the  attacker  to  exploit  data  across  a  large 
number of encryptions. 
7.2.1  Strengthened Key Schedule 
The AES key schedule  has a number of weaknesses as described in section 
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described in 4.2.2.2 in order to test whether the new key schedule adds any resistance 
to power analysis attacks. As the first sub-key is no longer the master key and the key 
schedule is a one way function in order to fully crack this algorithm all sub-keys must 
be extracted. After the first sub-key is extracted it is possible to predict values in the 
first round up to the Add Key operation. From here the attack can be performed again 
to extract the next sub-key, this will increase the amount of computation an attacker 
has to do. 
7.2.1.1  Effects on the Efficiency of the Algorithm 
There were significant changes to the design of the AES core. The key schedule 
used the same hardware as the encryption so they had to be calculated consecutively 
rather than concurrently. This meant that a more complicated controller was needed, 
so the number of registers increased to 521 and the number of clock cycles increased 
to 54. The clock speed was 31.2 MHz, so the throughput fell by 83% to 74 MB/s. 
Although the design had a more complicated controller the datapath was reused by the 
key schedule, this reduced the total size of the design to 1,699 slices, 69% of the size 
of the original AES implementation, fulfilling the third property in May et al’s list of 
requirements for a good key schedule [30]. 
The  throughput  of  the  new  algorithm  is  significantly  reduced  because  each 
round requires a round key which takes four clock cycles to generate. If the design 
was  changed  from  an  online  key  schedule  to  an  offline  one  this  would  make 
significant savings in time, the round keys would still take 40 clock cycles to calculate 
but it would only have to happen once so the average number of clock cycles required 
to encrypt one plaintext would return to 10. Clearly the offline key schedule would 
require more area than an online one, but as the datapath is reused in this scheme it 
would still require less area than a standard AES offline key schedule. 
7.2.1.2  Attack on a Simulated System 
In order to determine if the new key schedule afforded any protection from DPA 
an attack was performed using a Modelsim simulation as described in 5.3.1.1. The 
attack was successful. A graph of the correlation for 256 possible key values of the 
first byte of the first round key is shown in Figure 7-1. The key byte had the value 35, 
or 0x23, it can be seen as the largest peak in Figure 7-1. Although the number of 
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new data during the target clock cycle so there are no additional transitions and hence 
the signal to noise ratio remains the same. The first sub-key was retrieved using 761 
traces.  
 
Figure 7-1: Graph showing the correlation after 1000 traces of the 256 key guesses for a DPA 
attack on a Modelsim simulation of an FPGA running AES with a strengthened key schedule 
targeting the first byte of the first round key before the s-box. 
 
Figure 7-2: Graph showing the correlation after 1000 traces of the 256 key guesses for a DPA 
attack on a Modelsim simulation of an FPGA running AES with a strengthened key schedule 
targeting the first byte of the first round key after the s-box. Chapter 7 Novel Algorithmic-Based Power Analysis Countermeasures  147 
 
When the target was changed to after the Sub Bytes operation the number of 
traces required to crack it fell to 291. A graph of the correlation for 256 possible key 
values of the first byte of the first round key when the DPA attack targets the data 
after the s-box is shown in Figure 7-2, again the correct value of the key is clearly 
shown as the largest peak. 
 
Figure 7-3: Graph showing the correlation after 1000 traces of the 256 key guesses for a DPA 
attack on a Modelsim simulation of an FPGA running AES with a strengthened key schedule 
targeting the first byte of the second round key before the s-box. 
As mentioned in section 4.2.2.2 the round keys are created using a one way 
function and the master key is no longer used in the first round. This means that all 
round keys must be cracked to allow decryption of the ciphertext. Once the first round 
key has been retrieved this can be fed into the algorithm and the 128-bit state just after 
the  first  Mix  Columns  operation  can  be  calculated,  this  is  the  data  that  interacts 
directly with the key data in the Add Key operation in the first round. The DPA 
algorithm  can  be  repeated  using  this  value  instead  of  the  plaintext  to retrieve  the 
second round key. To do this on the improved AES algorithm required 999 traces if 
the target was before the s-box and 332 if it was after. Graphs of the correlations for 
the 256 key values for these two attacks, before and after the s-box, on the first byte 
of the second round key are shown in Figure 7-3 and Figure 7-4 respectively. The Chapter 7 Novel Algorithmic-Based Power Analysis Countermeasures  148 
 
value of the first byte of the second round key was 0x81, or 129 in decimal notation, 
and is revealed as the largest peak in both graphs. 
 
Figure 7-4: Graph showing the correlation after 1000 traces of the 256 key guesses for a DPA 
attack on a Modelsim simulation of an FPGA running AES with a strengthened key schedule 
targeting the first byte of the second round key after the s-box. 
7.2.1.3  Conclusion 
While the modifications to the key schedule that were proposed in [30] arguably 
increase the security of the algorithm against some attacks, DPA is not one of them. 
While it is more irritating for the attacker as they have to run the DPA analysis once 
for each round key, the attack is no harder and they can still use the traces from the 
same encryptions used to crack the first key for the second and hence no additional 
traces are required compared to standard AES. 
7.2.2  Addition of Initial Diffusion 
As explained in section 4.3.2.3, attacks like DPA and correlation attacks cannot 
target all positions in an algorithm but can only yield useful information when the 
target registers are full and predictable. The efficiency of these attacks is related to the 
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the key. If an extra Mix Columns operation is added to the algorithm after the initial 
Add Key but before the first set of registers then all bits of the key and plaintext in 1 
column have an effect on the value and therefore the Hamming weight of the register. 
This  means  that  instead  of  checking  the  correlation  of  the  256  columns  of  the 
prediction matrix corresponding to all possible values in one byte of the key all 2
32 
must be checked. It would be possible to increase this to 2
128 by adding an analogous 
mix rows operation. 
It is important to note that, unlike later on in the algorithm, the Mix Columns 
comes after the Add Key; this is because the unpredictable element, the key, has to be 
mixed with the known plaintext. A block diagram of the modified algorithm is shown 
in Figure 7-5. It is important to note that the Mix Columns operation must be between 
the Add Key and the first register. If there are any registers between the two then this 
can be the target for the attack and the countermeasure is rendered useless. For this 
reason  this  is  only  suitable  for  an  FPGA  or  ASIC  implementation  rather  than  a 
microprocessor  as  each  byte  of  the  Add  Key  would  be  calculated  and  stored  in 
registers on different clock cycles. 
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7.2.2.1  Effects on the Efficiency of the Algorithm 
There is very little difference between an implementation of an encryptor of this 
algorithm and one of normal AES. There are still 516 registers, a small combinational 
section was added, but due to some slight differences in implementation the number 
of slices used in the design fell to 2,395 when synthesised for a Xilinx Virtex-E. The 
clock speed fell to 27 MHz, reducing the throughput by 20% to 346 MB/s. 
7.2.2.2  Attack on a Simulated System 
 
Figure 7-6: Graph of the correlation for each key guess when attacking the first byte of the 
sub-key of AES with additional diffusion using the normal DPA algorithm. 
There is the same number of registers in this design and the design of regular 
AES that was attacked in section 5.3.1.1. This means that there is the same amount of 
noise in the system and hence if DPA was successful it should identify the correct key 
with a correlation of approximately 0.2. The first byte of the key was targeted, it had 
the value 43 and 4,096 traces were used. Using normal DPA the key could not be 
retrieved. The correlation from each key guess is shown in Figure 7-6. The largest 
peak is at 30, with a value of 0.03484, much lower than what would be expected from 
a series of correct prediction about the transitions in the target register. The correct 
value of 43 has a correlation of 0.004951. It is not feasible that an attacker could 
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it was assumed that the attacker knew the other values in the column of sub-key bytes. 
The correlation from each key guess is shown in Figure 7-7 correct value of 43 had 
the highest peak at 0.2398. Using this approach required 674 traces to successfully 
retrieve all 16 bytes of the key. 
 
Figure 7-7: Graph of the correlation for each key guess when attacking the first byte of the 
sub-key of AES with additional diffusion using a DPA algorithm that assumes the attacker 
known the other sub-key bytes in the column. 
7.2.2.3  Conclusion 
This countermeasure increases the key space that must be searched in order to 
determine the correct key as each byte that is stored in the registers is dependent on an 
entire column of the key. As stated previously this technique relies on the fact that the 
Mix Columns operation is performed before any values are stored in registers, this 
means that the technique is unsuitable for use with microcontrollers as they would not 
be able to perform it atomically. Even if algorithms are protected with this system it 
would be possible for a naive designer to put registers in the wrong place in the design 
and open up DPA vulnerability. Also, if the attacker knows the values of some of the 
bytes in the key then DPA can be used to discover the values of other bytes. 
It is possible that a technique similar to that used in [93], where the target for 
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able  to  retrieve  the  key  from  this  algorithm.  This  would  require  more  detailed 
knowledge of the design and, as the logic gates consume less power than registers, 
more traces, so it would make DPA harder, but not impossible.  
7.2.3  Perpetually Expanding Key Schedule 
The reason DPA is so effective is that it is able to combine the information from 
several encryptions, combining the small variations in power consumption into usable 
information. This is only possible because the attacker is able to make predictions of 
the values inside registers based on a hypothesis of the value of a byte of the key. In 
AES the key is expanded once and this data is used for every block, this means the 
key hypothesis is valid across all of the encryptions using the same key. 
The proposed modification would continue to expand the key so the same round 
keys are not reused. This undermines the attacker’s ability to make predictions about 
the values inside registers. Due to the nature of the AES key schedule, after each 
round of key expansion the value of each byte becomes dependent on the value of an 
additional byte in the original key. This means that after encrypting two plaintexts 
with the modified algorithm the value of each byte in the round key is dependent on 
all bits in the original key. This means that to make any accurate predictions of the 
value of any hypothesis about the value of one byte assumptions about all bytes would 
need to be made. The attack would therefore offer no advantage over brute force. 
7.2.3.1  Effects on the Efficiency of the Algorithm 
Other than potentially providing resistance to DPA this countermeasure is that 
there can no longer be random access of the encrypted data as the key for each block 
is different and has to be calculated in sequence. This is not necessarily that much of a 
disadvantage as ECB is the only mode of operation for block ciphers that allows this 
and using this method can lead to some insecurities, like replay attacks.  
Ultimately  the  effect  of  this  modification  on  the  efficiency  of  the 
implementation  depends  on  what  features  the  implementation  requires.  For  an 
implementation that is only an encryptor it is not practical to have an offline key 
schedule, as the round keys will not be the same for the next encryption so have to be 
re-calculated  anyway.  As  the  round  keys  are  used  in  reverse  for  decryption  any 
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schedule would be the obvious choice. With the new approach the implementation 
would have the disadvantages both the online and offline styles, the key would have 
to be calculated each time and additional memory would still be required.  
Implementation  Clock 
(MHz) 
Cycles / 
Result 
Throughput 
(Mb/s) 
Slices  DFFs 
128-bit Enc  29.1  12  310  2,576  651 
128-bit Enc/Dec off.  28.1  21  171  4,575  2,074 
128-bit Enc/Dec Unroll.   6.3  11  73  6,395  780 
128-bit Enc/Dec Piped  17.5  11 - 13  203-172  6,394  1,164 
128-bit Enc/Dec 2*Mem.  26.4  11  307  5,616  3,209 
Table 7-1: A summary of the performance of different implementation s of modified AES 
with a perpetually expanding key schedule. 
In order to further investigate the performance  impact of the modification 4 
different versions of the algorithm were made and synthesised for a Xilinx Virtex-E 
with a speed grade of -6. The performance of these designs is summarised in Table 
7-1.  A  standard  128-bit  encryptor  was  made,  this  was  very  similar  to  the 
implementation of the unmodified algorithm. 
Next  an  implementation  that  could  also  decrypt  was  made.  As  decryption 
requires the keys in reverse order the keys have to be calculated first and stored, this 
doubles the number of clock cycles required for processing a block. In order to try and 
make the implementation more efficient the key schedule was unrolled, this means 
that the entire expanded key is calculated combinationally, it does increase the area 
requirements as there are four s-boxes required for the generation of each round key, 
also  the  critical  path  becomes  significantly  longer,  reducing  the  maximum  clock 
speed. In order to increase the clock speed of the unrolled implementation registers 
were added in the key schedule, this means the key expansion is performed across 
several clock cycles, increasing the number of cycles per result but the critical path 
falls.  With  three  blocks  of  registers  in  the  unrolled  key  schedule  the  clock  cycle 
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this  is  significantly  higher  than  the  unrolled  version  but  there  is  only  a  marginal 
increase in throughput compared to the offline version. 
An  alternative  way  of  increasing  the  throughput  was  then  investigated  that 
involved doubling the amount of memory the key schedule has and while reading the 
round keys for the processing of one block it calculates and stores the keys for the 
next. Using this technique the throughput was returned to nearly that of the encryptor, 
there is a significant increase in the amount of area used, over 1,000 more slices 
compared to the simple decryptor, and clearly it involves nearly twice the amount of 
flip flops for storing the round keys. 
7.2.3.2  Attack on a Simulated System 
 
Figure 7-8: Graph of the correlation for each key guess when attacking the first byte of the 
sub-key of AES with a perpetually expanding key schedule before the s-box using the normal 
DPA algorithm with 4096 traces. 
A  DPA  was  performed  on  a  simulation  of  a  device  running  the  modified 
algorithm. The initial value for the first byte of the first sub-key was 43, 0x2B. A 
graph of the correlation of the key guesses after 4,096 traces when the target register 
is before the s-box is shown in Figure 7-8, the key guess with the largest peak was 
212  giving  a  correlation  of  0.02274.  This  is  not  the  correct  key  value  and  the 
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given the signal-to-noise ratio of the system. The correlation after 4,096 traces when 
the target register is after the s-box is shown in Figure 7-9, the key guess with the 
largest peak was 111 giving a correlation of 0.04413. This is also not the correct key 
value and the correlation value is again much lower than what would be expected for 
a successful attack, the highest peak does not really distinguish itself from the rest of 
the results. 
 
Figure 7-9: Graph of the correlation for each key guess when attacking the first byte of the 
sub-key of AES with a perpetually expanding key schedule after the s-box using the normal 
DPA algorithm with 4096 traces. 
7.2.3.3  Attack on a Physical System 
After the algorithm was attacked in simulation the design was implemented on a 
Virtex-E 1000 FPGA and the power consumption was measured while the device was 
performing encryptions using the setup described in section 5.3.2. After 45,000 traces 
none of the correct key values could be retrieved from the system. The initial value 
for the first byte of the key was 0x2B, or 43 in decimal notation, a graph of the 
correlation for each key guess is shown in Figure 7-10. The value with the highest 
correlation is 137 with a correlation of 0.01029; the correct value of 43 is significantly 
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Figure 7-10: Graph of the correlation for each key guess when attacking the first byte of the 
sub-key of AES with a perpetually expanding key schedule after the s-box using the normal 
DPA algorithm with 45,000 traces. 
7.2.3.4  Conclusion 
Experimental  results  suggest  that  this  algorithm  is  resistant  to  DPA. This  is 
because the DPA algorithm does not really apply to the modified algorithm as it is not 
possible to make any meaningful predictions about the contents of registers as the 
assumption that the sub-key byte that is being targeted is constant is no longer valid. 
As there are no hardware countermeasures implemented, if a new prediction formula 
could be derived that got around the changing sub-keys this design would be just as 
susceptible to DPA as any other. 
Due to the way the AES key schedule works after the generation of each new 
sub-key  the  value  of  each  byte  of  the  new  key  is  determined  by  the  value  of  an 
additional byte of the original key. This means that, for a 128-bit key, after 16 round, 
less than two encryption blocks, each byte of the sub-key is dependent on every byte 
in the original key. Making predictions about values inside registers now involves 
assumptions about the entire key and so this method would offer no advantage over 
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7.2.4  Summary of Results 
Algorithm  Pre S-Box  Post S-Box 
AES  742  345 
Strengthened K.S.  761  291 
Strengthened K.S. 2
nd Byte  999  332 
Initial Diffusion  4,096+  4,096+ 
Initial Diff., (some knowledge of key)  674  - 
Perpetually Expanding K.S.  4,096+  4,096+ 
Table 7-2: Summary of results for DPA attacks on Modelsim simulations of AES. 
The results of the attacks on the Modelsim simulations for various versions of 
AES  are  summarised  in  Table  7-2.  Strengthening  the  key  schedule  using  the 
technique proposed by May et al [30] does not add significantly more security in 
terms of the number of traces that are required for complete key retrieval, although as 
the other round keys cannot be derived from the first all must be extracted using DPA 
increasing the overall computation time by a factor of 16.  
Adding another level of diffusion after adding the first key does offer some 
frustration  to  an  attacker.  Attempting  unmodified  DPA  on  a  system  running  this 
algorithm  did  not  reveal  the  key.  With  knowledge  of  three  bytes  of  the  key  in  a 
column  the  attacker  could  use  minimally  modified  DPA  to  retrieve  the  4
th  with 
approximately the same level of effort as regular DPA. There are some other practical 
issues when attempting to implement such a system, there must be no registers storing 
the intermediate data after the initial Add Key, as this would be a potential target for 
the attacker that completely bypasses the countermeasure. This makes it unsuitable for 
software implementations. Additionally, with sensitive enough measurements, it may 
be possible to target logic gates within the additional Mix Columns operation again 
bypassing the effects of the countermeasure completely 
The results of the tests on the perpetually expanding key schedule indicate that 
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7.3  TDES 
TDES became the de facto replacement to DES after it was recognised that the 
security that DES provided was no longer sufficient. It is slowly being replaced by 
AES as security systems are upgraded, one area where it remains in widespread use it 
in the electronic payments industry, for example EMV [102], more commonly known 
as Chip and Pin. Section 7.3.1.1 reports the results from a simulated DPA attack on 
TDES. Section 7.3.2 discusses the application of the algorithm modification described 
in  section  7.2.3  to  TDES,  and  the  effect  on  the  size  and  throughput  of  the 
implementation. 
7.3.1.1  Attack on TDES 
In order to verify the efficacy of the countermeasure compared to normal TDES 
DPA  was  performed  on  an  unprotected  version  of  the  algorithm.  First  a  VHDL 
implementation of TDES was downloaded from opencores.org [103], this was then 
synthesised for a Xilinx Virtex-E 1000 and simulated in Modelsim and the register 
transitions were recorded using the same method as described in section 5.3.1.1. 
 
Figure 7-11: The correlation for each key guess in the first key section in the first DES block 
of TDES with 1,000 traces. 
The  entire  key  could  be  retrieved  with  1,640  traces.  This  is  more  than  is 
required for the AES implementations. The sections of the key that are individually 
targeted are only 6 bits long and in each DES block there are 48-bit keys, giving a Chapter 7 Novel Algorithmic-Based Power Analysis Countermeasures  159 
 
total of 144 key bits for TDES all influencing the number of register bits that are 
changing in the target cock cycle. This means that there is a lower signal-to-noise 
ratio for the TDES simulation than in AES. A graph of the correlation between the 
prediction and consumption matrices for the first key section for a DPA with 1,000 
traces is shown in Figure 7-11. The actual value of the first key section was 0x22, or 
34, and the value retrieved from the DPA was also 34 meaning the correct key had 
been retrieved. Although 1,000 traces was not enough to extract all eight keys in the 
experiment it was enough to get six and Figure 7-11 shows a clear peak compared to 
the noise. 
7.3.2  Modified TDES 
The DES key schedule forms the various round keys by bit shifting the master 
key  and  selecting  specific  bits  from  it.  This  can  only  give  a  limited  number  of 
possibilities for the key so the technique of continuing the key expansion cannot be 
directly applied to TDES. For this reason the key schedule in each DES block was 
replaced by the AES key schedule with a couple of modifications. Firstly, the AES 
key schedule has four s-boxes that substitute the values inside a 32-bit vector, these 
are replaced by the expansion function, which converts the 32-bit vector to a 48-bit 
one, and the eight DES s-boxes, each having a 6-bit input and a 4-bit output returning 
the  data  to  32  bits.  Obviously,  it  was  allowed  to  continue  expanding  for  each 
successive block as described in section 7.2.3.  
In order to ensure backwards compatibility with DES, TDES is often used in 
EDE  (encryption-decryption-encryption)  mode,  as  supplying  the  same  key  to  all 
blocks gives the same result as supplying the same key to a single DES block. Due to 
its popularity this was the version that was implemented. This meant that the ability to 
perform decryption  was required by at least one of the DES blocks, this requires 
additional resources as unlike the original DES key schedule, the AES one can only 
generate  the  round  keys  forwards,  so  when  they  are  needed  in  reverse  order  for 
decryption then need to be stored. In the standard algorithms the round keys do not 
change so they are calculated once at the start and stored. This is only a small delay of 
a few clock cycles for each key. With the constantly expanding approach this time 
penalty is applied to every block so it becomes more significant. In order to overcome 
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used the second set, for the next block, it being calculated. This does however require 
more space. 
The AES key schedule works on blocks of 128 bits, the TDES key is not that 
long the system must be modified to take this into account. There are several solutions 
to this, one would be padding the keys, or repeating them or increasing the size of the 
key space to 384 bits. The solution that was chosen was increasing the size of the 3 
DES keys to 64 bits and combining these in different ways to form the 128-bit keys as 
shown in Table 7-3. These changes make no difference to the internal working of the 
algorithm, the only effect is that it is supplied with a different set of round keys. 
TDES Key Number  Key Formation 
1  DES Key 1 + DES Key 3 
2  DES Key 2 + DES Key 1 
3  DES Key 3 + DES Key 2 
Table 7-3 : Arrangemet of keys for the Modified TDES. 
7.3.3  Effect on Efficiency 
The modified TDES design was synthesised for a Xilinx Virtex-E 1000, as was 
the original TDES. The size requirements and the clock speed for the two designs are 
summarised in Table 7-4. There is a significantly greater penalty for the alterations 
than in AES, the number of slices required increases by a factor of nearly 6. The DES 
key schedule is simple to implement, it is just a series of bit shifts and permutations, 
the AES key schedule is significantly more complicated, involving substitutions and 
XOR operations, and has the additional disadvantage of requiring the storage of round 
keys for decryption.  Also this penalty applies to each DES block so the effect is 
tripled. The design increases by so much that the modified TDES is larger than the 
modified AES, which only required 5,616 slices. The clock speed of the design does 
not change significantly however. This is because the critical path for the orignal 
design included both the key schedule and the datapath, the datapth being responsible 
for nearly half of the delay. The modification to the algorithm required the addition of 
registers between the two sections so although the delay for the key schedule was 
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  TDES  Modified TDES 
Slices  1,201  6,940 
DFFs  1,215  6,323  
Clock Speed (MHz)  49.478  43.537 
Cycles / Plaintext  19  19 
Throughput (MB/s)  166.66 MB/s  146.65 MB/s 
Table 7-4 : Summary of speed and area requirements for the standard and modified TDES 
when synthesised to a Virtex-E 1000. 
7.3.4  Attack on a Simulated System 
 
Figure 7-12: Correlation for all 64 key guesses for an attack on a Modelsim simulation of a 
modified TDES system with 4,096 traces. 
The modified TDES was synthesised for a Xilinx Virtex-E 1000 and simulated 
in Modelsim and the register transitions were recorded using the same method as 
described in section 5.3.1.1. The correlation between the prediction and consumption 
matrices for all 64 key guesses using 4,096 traces is shown in. The actual value of the Chapter 7 Novel Algorithmic-Based Power Analysis Countermeasures  162 
 
first  key  section  was  10,  and  the  value  retrieved  from  the  DPA  was  17,  with  a 
correlation nearly 4 times higher, meaning the correct key had not been retrieved. 
7.3.5  Conclusion 
The technique of continually changing the round keys between block can also 
be  adapted  to  protect  TDES  from  DPA.  There  are  however  some  properties  of 
algorithm that mean the implementational penalties for doing this are greater. DES, 
and by extension TDES, has a very simple key schedule, it consumes little area but 
can only generate a limited number of round keys. This limitation meant that for the 
purpose of the modification it had to be replaced with a more complex one. As the 
original DES key schedule was so compact the modification significantly increased 
the size of each block and because there are three DES blocks in TDES the area 
penalties were tripled. The increase in cost is so great that after the technique has been 
applied the TDES design is larger than the modified AES system. 
While this is a powerful technique for making algorithms immune to DPA it is 
not necessarily appropriate to retrofit all current algorithms using this method. Section 
7.4 outlines the requirements it to be implemented in an efficient way and investigates 
several  modern  algorithms  in  order  to  identify  the  most  appropriate  design  for 
perpetually expanding key schedules. 
7.4  Application of Perpetual Key Schedule to Other Algorithms 
Using  a  key  schedule  that  continually  generates  different  round  keys  for 
successive encryption blocks to defeat DPA generally does not have a high overhead 
compared to an implementation of the same algorithm with a normal key schedule. 
There are some limits on when it can be used, the key schedule has to be complex 
enough to generate a large sequence of bits, the DES, and hence TDES, key schedule 
cannot  do  this  so  when  TDES  was  modified  to  be  secure  against  DPA  the  key 
schedule was replaced by the one from AES. This greatly increased the hardware and 
performance overhead compared to standard TDES.  
When  the  new  algorithm  was  implemented  as  an  encryptor  there  was  a 
significantly  smaller  overhead  than  when  the  implementation  could  also  perform 
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in reverse order, but they can only be generated forwards. This meant that either a 
new set of round keys had to be generated for each block before decryption could take 
place, or additional memory was required to store the results of the calculation of the 
next set while the current set was being used. Algorithms that can generate the round 
keys in any order would not suffer from this problem, further reducing the overhead 
for the technique. This section evaluates a number of modern encryption algorithms 
for  their  suitability  for  this  countermeasure  and  identifies  the  properties  of  key 
schedules that give the best performance in terms of the relative cost of changing the 
key schedule. Section 7.4.1 describes the key schedules of the algorithms that are 
being investigated and section 7.4.2 discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the 
various properties the different key schedules have. 
7.4.1  Key Schedules of Modern Algorithms 
The following algorithms were selected as AES finalists or are recommended 
algorithms for either NESSIE, (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and 
Encryption)  a  European  project  to  identify  secure  cryptographic  algorithms,  or 
CRYPTREC, an equivalent project set up by the Japanese government. 
7.4.1.1  MARS 
MARS [104] was developed by IBM in 1998, the design team included Don 
Coppersmith, who also helped design DES. MARS was a finalist in the AES process, 
and as such works on a block size of 128 bits, processing the data in 32-bit words, and 
supports variable key lengths, from 128 bits to 448. It has a Feistel structure and is 20 
rounds long and so requires 40 words, or 1,280 bits, of expanded key data. 
7.4.1.1.1 Key schedule description 
The master key is placed into a table of 15 32-bit words called T, the key will 
always be shorter than this so it is concatenated with a binary value of its length in 
words and then padded with 0s. The array T is then put through four rounds of the 
following transformations: 
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for j = 0 to 3 
for i = 0 to 14 
) 4 ( ) 3 ) (( 15 mod 2 15 mod 7 j i T T T T i i i i + ⊕ <<< ⊕ ⊕ = − −  
for k = 0 to 3 
  for i = 0 to 14 
Ti= Ti ⊕ S (Low 9 bits of Ti-1 mod 15)<<<9  
for i = 0  to 9 
15 mod 4 10 i i j T K = +  
Figure 7-13: Pseudo-code for the key schedule of the MARS algorithm. 
Where S is MARS’s s-box. Finally, to ensure that none of the key words that are 
involved in multiplication, K5, 7, … 35, in the algorithm have certain properties, namely 
that the lowest two bits are set to 1 and there are no groups of ten consecutive 1s or 0s 
the following operation is performed. 
The lowest two bits of Ki are recorded and set to 1. If patterns of more than ten 
consecutive 1s or 0s are detected in Ki then the runs are XORed with bits from entries 
265 through to 268 of the s-box, the particular entry being selected by the original 
value of the two lowest bits in Ki, and rotated by a number of bits selected using the 
value of the five lowest bits in Ki-1. In the final section i = 5, 7, … 35. 
7.4.1.1.2 Analysis 
The key schedule of MARS could be modified to use a perpetually expanding 
key schedule, the use of the s-box and significant bit mixing between sub key bytes 
ensures a complex enough relationship and the last 480 bits of the expanded key could 
be used as a new input.  
While the key schedule uses the same s-boxes as the datapath the structure is 
significantly different and so hardware specifically to expand the key will have to be 
included. It will always be possible to generate round keys in parallel with the main 
datapath. In decryption keys are needed in reverse order so have to be pre-generated 
and stored. The key expansion for MARS is quite complex, requiring multiple clock 
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modest 1,280 bits. Due to this, double buffering the key schedule as described in 
section 7.2.3 will not have as large an area penalty as for other algorithms. 
7.4.1.2  RC6 
RC6 [105] was published in 1998 by Ron Rivest, Matt Robshaw, Ray Sidney, 
and Yiqun Lisa Yin. It was submitted as a candidate for AES and it was a finalist. 
RC6 is a Feistel network that acts on variable blocks sizes, number of rounds and key 
lengths. Technically the algorithm is specified as RC6-w/r/b where w is the data word 
size, r is the number of rounds and b is the number of bytes in the key. The version 
that shall be discussed here is the one that was submitted as a candidate for AES, so 
acts on block sizes of 128 bits, four 32-bit words, supporting key lengths of 128, 192 
and 256 and consists of 20 rounds. RC6 requires 2 (r + 1) words of expanded key 
data. This variant of RC6 requires a total of 1,344 bits of expanded key data. The 
designers have largely recycled the key schedule from the 1995 RC5 algorithm. 
7.4.1.2.1 Key schedule description 
The key schedule of RC5, and hence RC6 initialises the expanded key space 
with two “magic constants”, P and Q, which are both odd and of length w, and are 
derived from the hexadecimal representation of Euler’s constant and the Golden Ratio 
[106]. The first word in the expanded key, S, is set to P and each successive word is 
set to the previous word + Q, where the addition is performed modulo-2
w. Next the 
master key is copied to the array L and mixed in with the pseudo random bit streams 
in the following way: 
A = B = 0  
i = j = 0 
Repeat (3 * # words in S) 
) 4 ( ) 3 ) ( j i B A S S A i i + ⊕ <<< + + = =  
) ( ) ( B A B A L L B j j + <<< + + = =
 
i = (i + 1) mod # words in S 
j = (j + 1) mod # words in L 
Figure 7-14: Pseudcode for the bit mixing of the key schedule of RC6. Chapter 7 Novel Algorithmic-Based Power Analysis Countermeasures  166 
 
7.4.1.2.2 Analysis 
RC6 can be protected from DPA by taking the final 128, 192 or 256 bits of the 
expanded key, copying it into the array L and repeating the key expansion process. 
This key schedule cannot generate the sub-keys in any order. In AES a given round 
key depends only on the round key before it, in RC6 the sub-keys are generated with a 
three stage process so cannot be derived in an online fashion. This means that the 
expanded key would probably be pre-computed and stored, as the only other option 
would be to replicate hardware to unroll the loop which would be expensive. The 
offline  design  makes  the  maximum  area  penalty  slightly  less  for  the  comparison 
between  the  original  algorithm  and  a  modified  version  as  there  must  always  be 
enough memory to store the entire expanded key. As the key schedule does not use 
the  cryptographic  primitives  from  the  main  datapath  there  is  little  area  penalty 
incurred from providing the hardware to enable the new encryption key in parallel 
with  the  encryption  of  the  previous  plaintext.  This  would  require  the  addition  of 
another 1,344 bits of memory. 
7.4.1.3  Serpent 
Serpent was published in 1998 [107] by Ross Anderson, Eli Biham, and Lars 
Knudsen, it was submitted as a potential algorithm for AES and was a finalist. Serpent 
is a 32 round SPN and like the other AES submissions it works on 128-bit blocks and 
supports key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits. In the final round an additional round 
key is also used bringing the total amount of expanded key data up to 33 round keys 
or 4,224 bits. 
7.4.1.3.1 Key schedule description 
The master key is padded to 256 bits by adding a 1 followed by as many 0s as is 
required  and  split  un  into  eight  32-bit  words  labelled  w-8  to  w-1.  These  are  then 
expanded into 132 intermediate keys w0 to w131 using the following relationship: 
  11 ) ( 1 3 5 8 <<< ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ = − − − − i w w w w w i i i i i φ   (7-1) 
Where φ has the value 0x9e3779b9, the fractional part of the golden ratio in 
hexadecimal. The intermediate keys are then converted into the final round keys by 
passing them through Serpent’s s-boxes. Serpent has eight different 4-bit to 4-bit s-
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algorithm, was designed using a bit slice technique. The intermediate key word is 
substituted  not  as  a  series  of  4–bit  words,  but  a  single  bit  from  four  consecutive 
intermediate words is put into an s-box and the final round keys are made of the 
corresponding s-box output bits. 
7.4.1.3.2 Analysis 
If the key schedule of Serpent was modified so that the expansion of the master 
key  into  w  did  not  stop,  but  continued,  generating  132  intermediate  keys,  for 
conversion into round keys, for each plaintext that needed to be encrypted then the 
algorithm could be protected from DPA. 
Serpent requires a large number of expanded key bits so pre-calculating the 
expanded  key  and  storing  it  would  require  a  lot  of  RAM,  making  an  offline  key 
schedule expensive in terms of area. Conversely, generating one round key requires 
the same number of s-boxes as processing one round so calculating the round keys in 
parallel  would  require  doubling  the  number  of  s-boxes.  S-boxes  are  a  significant 
factor in the size of most hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms, so 
doubling the number would have a serious area penalty. There is a compromise of 
interleaving round key generation and one round of encryption on alternating clock 
cycles, this would only require storing the 12 32-bit words that the current round key 
is based on. This is true for the original algorithm as well as a modified version, and 
the cost of modifying the algorithm can only be compared to an implementation of the 
original.  
For an encryptor that alternated between generating round keys and performing 
encryption to reduce the area of the design there would not be a significant cost in 
terms of area or speed for modifying the algorithm, the round keys would have to be 
generated for each plaintext anyway and no additional memory would be needed. If 
the round keys were pre-calculated and stored the amount of time required to process 
a  plaintext  would  double  as  the  keys  would  still  have  to  be  calculated  for  each 
plaintext. 
As a decryptor has to provide the round keys in reverse order but can only 
generate them in the actual order any design that can decrypt would need enough 
memory to store all the round keys and would pre-calculate them. After modification 
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amount of time taken to process a plaintext would double. This could be mitigated 
with the same double buffering technique that was described in section 7.2.3, but this 
would require doubling the, already significant, amount of memory for storing round 
keys and also adding another 16 s-boxes so the next set of keys could be calculated 
which the current plaintext was being processed. 
7.4.1.4  MISTY 1 
MISTY was developed by Mitsuru Matsui in 1995 [108]. It uses blocks of 64 
bits  and  keys  of  128  bits,  it  is  a  recommended  algorithm  for  both  NESSIE  and 
CRYPTREC. It uses a nested Feistel structure, where each round is made up of a 
three  round  Feistel  structure  with  a  32-bit  datapath,  with  each  sub-round  being 
composed of a smaller three round 16-bit Feistel structure where the two halves are 
split into 7 and 9 bits. MISTY can have any number of rounds on the condition that it 
is divisible by four. MISTY1 only requires 256 bits of expanded key data. 
7.4.1.4.1 Key schedule description 
As MISTY1 does not require to expand the key very much, only to double the 
amount of key data, the key schedule is fairly simple. The master key is separated into 
eight 16-bit words and these are all fed through the 16-bit round function, consisting 
of three rounds of the lowest level Feistel structure. The round key for each 16-bit 
word is the master key from the word to its right. During a set of four rounds of 
encryption all 16 key words are used. 
7.4.1.4.2 Analysis 
The key schedule for MISTY could have a perpetually expanding key schedule. 
The second half of the expanded key could be used as the new master key, the round 
function  is  complex  enough  to  remove  the  possibility  if  short  repeating  patterns 
appearing in the expanded keys. As the expansion of the key involves putting one 
word of the key into the round function using another master key word as the round 
key there is mixing between key words. After eight encryption blocks the value of 
each block of the key would be affected by the value of each bit in the original master 
key. 
The keys in MISTY can be generated in any order, normally this would enable 
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little different. Due to the small nature of the expanded key, the fact that the entire 
expanded key is required in the first four top level rounds and the reuse of the second 
level round function to generate the expanded key the more efficient design would 
still be offline. Very little memory would be required to store the entire key and this 
would be traded off against the area cost of replicating the 16-bit round function. The 
speed penalty for pre-expanding the key would only have to be paid once for the 
original algorithm, but it would be incurred once encryption for the modified one. 
The size of this cost as a proportion of the total run time is dependent on the 
number of rounds. Each top level round contains three of the second level rounds that 
are used to expand the key and 8 key expansions are required. Expanding the key with 
whatever hardware there is in the system will require the same amount of time as 8/3 
top level rounds, if there are only four rounds this is a 66% decrease in throughput, 
33% for 8 round and so on. There is very little increase in area, no additional storage 
is needed, but a more complex controller will be required. 
7.4.1.5  Camellia 
Camellia was developed by Mitsubishi in 2000 [109]. It has a block size of 128 
bits  and  supports  key  lengths  of  128,  192  and  256  bits.  It  was  selected  as  a 
recommended algorithm for both CRYPTREC and NESSIE. It uses a Feistel structure 
and consists of 18 rounds when a 128-bit key is being used and 24 for a 192 and 256-
bit key. There is also additional key mixing at the start and end of the algorithm and 
every six rounds two round keys are used this bring the total number of 64-bit round 
keys required by the algorithm to 26 for the 128-bit key and 34 for 192 and 256-bit 
keys. 
7.4.1.5.1 Key schedule description 
The key schedule of Camellia uses the same cryptographic primitives as the 
main algorithm to expand the master key into  the round keys. The master key is 
separated into two 128-bit blocks KL and KR. In the case of the 128-bit key length KR 
is set to 0, in the case of the 192 bit key the right hand side of the KR is set to the 
compliment of the left hand side. KL is XORed with KR and this is then encrypted for 
four rounds with a constant set of round keys, the new value is KA. For key lengths 
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giving KB. The final values of the 64-bit round keys are then selected from KL and KA 
for the 128-bit key and from all four values for the 192 and 256-bit keys. 
7.4.1.5.2 Analysis 
The Camellia key schedule can be modified to prevent DPA by setting KR and 
KL to KA and KB, generating a new KA and KB and deriving the next set of round key 
from these values. The cipher reuses the round function to expand the key, so a new 
set of round keys could not be calculated in parallel without almost doubling the size 
of a design, this is not a significant problem for the original algorithm as the keys only 
have to be calculated once and the amount of RAM needed to store them is small as 
they are derived from four 128-bit values. For the modified version these values need 
to  be  re-initialised  for  every  plaintext,  adding  six  clock  cycles  for  every  18,  an 
increase of 33%. The round keys can be generated in any order meaning that there is a 
greater consistency in the performance of a design that can decrypt compared to one 
that can only encrypt. 
7.4.1.6  Hierocrypt-3 
Hierocrypt-3  was  developed  by  Toshiba  in  2000  [110].  The  structure  of 
Hierocrypt-3 is a 16 round nested SPN in which a higher level s-box is itself a smaller 
SPN. It works on blocks of 128 bits using keys of length 128, 192 and 256 bits which 
have 6, 7 or 8 rounds respectively. Each round requires two 128-bit round keys and 
there  is  one  final  key  addition,  therefore  a  total  of  1,664,  1,920  or  2,176  bits  of 
expanded  key  data  are  required  for  the  three  supported  key  lengths.  It  is  a 
recommended cipher from the CRYPTREC program. 
7.4.1.6.1 Key schedule description 
The master key is padded to 256 bits with a series of 32-bit constants derived 
from  the  binary  representations  of  irrational  numbers  and  converted  to  the  first 
intermediate key with the σ0 function. The function σ iteratively generates the first 
four  intermediate  keys  (Z)  for  128  /  192-bit  keys  and  5  for  256-bit  keys.  One 
intermediate key is required for each round and the remaining ones are generated by 
the σ
-1 function. Figure 7-15 shows the structure of the functions σ0, σ and σ
-1. 
In  Figure  7-15  K  denotes  the  actual  round  keys  that  are  derived  from  the 
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prevent periodic patterns appearing the intermediate keys and, like the key padding 
constants, are based on the binary representations of irrational numbers. P is a linear 
permutation that separates the data into four blocks and XORs each block with one 
other. M5E and MB3 are both similar to P except they separate the data into two distinct 
groups of four blocks and XORs data within the groups. The function Fσ separates the 
data into 8 bytes, passes them through Heirocrypt-3’s s-box and then applies the P 
function.  
 
Figure 7-15: The structure of the Heirocrypt-3 key schedule. 
7.4.1.6.2 Analysis 
The  key  schedule  for  Heirocrypt-3  is  fairly  similar  to  that  of  AES.  It  is  an 
iterative key schedule, a function is applied to the master key to generate a set of 
intermediate values from which the first round key is derived, and one of two related 
function  are  repeatedly  applied  to  the  previous  intermediate  data  to  provide  the 
intermediate data for the next set of round keys. The round key iteration functions are 
complex and involve a large degree of bit mixing between sub-key words ensuring the 
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The key schedule design being similar in structure to that of AES has the same 
problems. Assuming an online key schedule has been used, altering the encryption 
algorithm will require very little modification, simply looping the key schedule round. 
While the key schedule uses the s-box from the datapath it does not use any of the 
other  blocks.  This  means  that  the  hardware  for  the  key  schedule  will  have  to  be 
included irrespective of the style of key schedule that is used so there will always be 
the  possibility  of  calculating  round  keys  in  parallel  with  the  main  datapath.  For 
decryption  the  keys  will  be  needed  in  reverse  order  so  they  will  have  to  be  pre-
generated and stored. Using the approaches discussed in section 7.2.2.1 it is possible 
to trade off costs in speed and area by double buffering the memory for the offline key 
schedule, Heirocrypt-3 required between 1,664 and 2,176 bits of expanded key data. 
7.4.1.7  ARIA 
ARIA is a 128-bit SPN based block cipher that uses 128, 192 and 256-bit keys 
[111], it was designed in 2003 by cryptographers in South Korea and in 2004 it was 
selected  by  the  Korean  Agency  for  Technology  and  Standards  to  be  a  standard 
cryptographic algorithm. ARIA has 12, 14 or 16 rounds depending on the key size 
that is used and it requires 128 bits of expanded key data per round, with an additional 
128 bits for a final key addition. In total 1,664, 1,920 or 2,176 bits are required. 
7.4.1.7.1 Key schedule description 
The  key  schedule  in  the  ARIA  algorithm  has  two  phases,  initialisation  and 
expansion. The initialisation phase uses the master key and three 128-bit constants to 
generate four 128-bit sub-keys using a 256-bit Feistel cipher. The left  half of the 
Feistel data is the first 128 bits of the master key, the right half is any unused bits of 
the key padded with zeros to 128 bits. The Feistel cipher is used to generate four 128-
bit values using the odd and even round functions Fe and Fo, who differ due to the fact 
that  ARIA  uses  two  different  s-boxes  and  their  inverses  in  a  different  order  on 
alternating rounds.  
  W0 = KL  (7-2) 
  W1 = Fo (W0, CK1) ⊕ KR  (7-3) 
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  W3 = Fo (W2, CK3) ⊕ W1  (7-5) 
From these values the round keys are generated. This is done by XORing one of 
the values with another after it has been rotated by a certain number of bits. The 
choice of the two values and the amount of rotation are determined by the round. 
7.4.1.7.2 Analysis 
ARIA  can  be  modified  for  DPA  resistance  by  continuing  the  initialisation 
Feistel  cipher  to  generate  four  new  sub-keys  for  every  plaintext  that  must  be 
encrypted. After the initialisation stage of the key schedule the round keys can be 
generated  in  any  order  so  no  additional  area  or  speed  penalties  are  paid  when 
implementing a system that can perform decryption. As the key initialisation phase 
uses  the  round  function  of  the  encryption  datapath  it  could  not  be  performed  in 
parallel without essentially doubling the area requirements of a design, encryption 
would have to be temporarily stopped in order to re-initialise the key, increasing the 
amount of clock cycles per processed plaintext by between 25% and 33% depending 
on the key length. 
7.4.2  Application of Perpetual Key Schedule to Other Algorithms 
Several  of  the  algorithms  described  in  section  7.4.1  have  similar  designs, 
Hierocrypt-3, Serpent, MARS and RC6 iteratively apply a function to the key data, 
the output of which is both a round key and the input for the function to generate the 
next key. Camellia and ARIA use a two stage process, the first stage takes the master 
key  and  generates  four  intermediate  keys,  in  the  key  generation  stage  these  are 
combined  in  a  variety  of  different  ways  to  form  the  round  keys.  All  of  the  key 
schedules  reuse  some  of  the  cryptographic  primitives  that  are  found  in  the  main 
datapath,  Camellia,  ARIA  and  MISTY-1  use  the  entire  round  function  for  key 
expansion.  This  section  discusses  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  key 
schedule structures with respect to modifying algorithms so they have a key schedule 
that protects them from DPA.  
7.4.2.1  Initialisation vs. Iterative  
There are two main approaches to generating round keys in the algorithms that 
have been discussed in section 7.4.1. Firstly there is the iterative approach where a 
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which is a new round key which forms all or part of the input to the next iteration. 
Examples of these are Hierocrypt-3 and Serpent, and MARS and RC6, which repeat 
the  iterative  process  across  a  number  of  rounds.  The  second  approach  uses  an 
initialisation phase, where a, typically more complex, transform converts the master 
key into a relatively small set of intermediate keys, the bits of which are combined in 
a number of different ways to generate the various round keys. This is the technique 
used in Camellia and ARIA. The exception to this is the algorithm MISTY 1, which 
needs such a small amount of expanded key data that it simply applies the round 
function to the master key in order to double the amount of key data available. 
The advantage of the initialisation approach is that once the intermediate keys 
have  been  determined  the  round  keys  can  be  generated  in  any  order.  This  is  a 
significant advantage when performing decryption and it makes the performance of 
encryptors and decryptors a lot more consistent.  
7.4.2.2  Reuse of Cryptographic Primitives 
Lots  of  the  algorithms  have  key  schedules  that  make  some  use  of  the 
cryptographic primitives to expand the key. All of the ones described in section 7.4.1 
make use of their s-box, except RC6, which doesn’t use an s-box. Hierocrypt-3 also 
reuses some of the datapath functions for permuting bits and ARIA, Camellia and 
MISTY 1 reuse the entire round function. 
There are several advantages to reusing the entire round function. The main one 
is that hardware can also be reused making the design potentially much smaller and 
simplifying the implementation process as less has to be designed. Also, as noted by 
May  et  al.  in  [30]  key  schedules  designed  in  an  ad  hoc  fashion  tend  to  perform 
relatively poorly in terms of the confusion and diffusion properties of the expanded 
key. By reusing the round function assuming the cipher performs well in these areas 
the key schedule will also. Having good confusion and diffusion performance will 
also  reduce  the  need  for  time  consuming  complex  multi-round  key  expansion 
algorithms like those in MARS and RC6. 
Reusing the entire round function to generate the key schedule is somewhat of a 
double edged sword, in order to make a design that can calculate expand the key 
schedule  and  perform  the  encryption  in  parallel  the  area  requirements  are  almost 
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that automatically means it can be run in parallel. This is less of a problem with a 
traditional algorithm that only has to generate one set of round keys as they can be 
pre-calculated and stored, but when new round keys have to be generated for each 
plaintext the cost to processing time is incurred for each plaintext. This can be less of 
a disadvantage if the key schedule uses an initialisation approach to generating round 
keys as less will have to be calculated. In ARIA and Camellia only four intermediate 
keys were needed to generate all the round keys. 
7.4.3  Conclusion 
The  majority  of  modern  algorithms  have  complex  enough  key  schedules  to 
produce long enough cycles for perpetually expanding keys to be applied to be a 
practical  countermeasure  to  DPA.  The  design  and  structure  of  the  key  schedule 
clearly has a vast affect on the performance cost of the modification of the algorithm 
in terms of speed and area relative to the original. As a new set of keys must be 
calculated for each plaintext having to pre-calculate the expanded key would greatly 
reduce the speed of encryption. For a normal algorithm it would have a much lower 
effect on the average throughput as the amount of time spent processing the key will 
be insignificant compared to the time encrypting all of the plaintexts. The algorithms 
described in section 7.4.1 that can generate the round keys in any order do so by using 
a two stage process, with a short initialisation phase that generates values which are 
then combined into the round keys. 
In order to save time it is advantageous to be able to generate keys in parallel 
with  the  main  datapath.  Conversely  in  order  to  make  designs  smaller  it  is 
advantageous to reuse the hardware from the datapath to also generate the round keys. 
Reuse of cryptographic primitives also ensures that round key generation adequately 
satisfies the confusion diffusion requirements. 
7.5  Case Study: ARIA 
Of all of the various key schedules in the algorithms described in section 7.4 
designs that use an initialisation phase to generate a relatively small number of values 
that are then combined in various ways to generate the round keys appear to be best 
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algorithm ARIA is modified and the DPA resistance and performance of the new 
version is evaluated. 
In  order  to  test  the  effect  the  modification  had  on  the  speed  and  area 
requirements and to verify the DPA resistance of the new version of the algorithm 
four implementations were designed. Two versions were the original ARIA, one that 
could only encrypt and one that could both encrypt and decrypt. For each of those a 
counterpart implementation was created that used the new key schedule, which is 
described in detail in section 7.5.1. For simplicity all of the versions only used 128-bit 
keys. The VHDL designs were then synthesised for a Virtex-E 1000 bg560 and the 
area and timing requirements were noted, these are discussed in section 7.5.2. Finally 
using the post-synthesis VHDL and the method described in section 5.3.1.1 simulated 
DPA was performed on the two encryptor designs, the results and analysis of this are 
in section 7.5.3. 
7.5.1  Design of Key Schedule 
The original ARIA key schedule generates four 128-bit intermediate keys. This 
is achieved by taking the master key and putting it through a Feistel cipher made from 
the round function of the main datapath. The details of precisely how to generate the 
four intermediate keys are given in equations (7-6) - (7-9) where R represents the 
round function and k is the key used for the process, it is derived from the binary 
representation of 1/π. MK is the master key that can have a length of 128, 192 or 256 
bits. The right hand 128 bits is used in the generation of w1, if the key is not that long 
then it is padded with 0s. 
 
127 0 0 − = MK w   (7-6) 
 
255 128 0 0 1 ) , ( − ⊕ = MK k w R w   (7-7) 
  0 1 1 2 ) , ( w k w R w ⊕ =   (7-8) 
  1 2 2 3 ) , ( w k w R w ⊕ =   (7-9) 
 
These round keys are made by XORing two intermediate keys after a rotation 
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Key   Formation  Key  Formation  Key  Formation 
1  w0 ⊕ (w1>>>19)
  7  w2 ⊕ (w3>>>31)  13  w0 ⊕ (w1>>>97)
 
2  w1 ⊕ (w2>>>19)  8  w3 ⊕ (w0>>>31)  14  w1 ⊕ (w2>>>97) 
3  w2 ⊕ (w3>>>19)  9  w0 ⊕ (w1>>>67)
  15  w2 ⊕ (w3>>>97) 
4  w3 ⊕ (w0>>>19)  10  w1 ⊕ (w2>>>67)  16  w3 ⊕ (w0>>>97) 
5  w0 ⊕ (w1>>>31)
  11  w2 ⊕ (w3>>>67)  17  w0 ⊕ (w1>>>109) 
6  w1 ⊕ (w2>>>31)  12  w3 ⊕ (w0>>>67)     
Table 7-5 definitions of the round keys for AIRA 
The basic concept of the new algorithm is to continue this process in order to 
generate  four  new  intermediate  keys  for  each  plaintext.  Assuming  that  the  round 
function  can  be  performing  on  one  clock  cycle,  calculating  the  intermediate  keys 
would take three clock cycles, also the ARIA specification has three 128-bit constants 
that are used as round keys for the Feistel cipher. For simplicity, in the new scheme 
w3 replaces MK0-127 and w2 replaces MK128-255, by doing this generating a new set of 
keys  still  only  takes  three  clock  cycles  and  requires  the  three  original  128-bit 
constants. This is shown in equations (7-10) - (7-13). As w0 becomes the previous 
version of w3 some key data is reused, this is not a source of insecurity however as to 
generate the round keys two intermediate keys are combined with rotations so no 
round keys will be repeated. 
 
3 0 w w =   (7-10) 
 
2 0 0 1 ) , ( w k w R w ⊕ =   (7-11) 
  0 1 1 2 ) , ( w k w R w ⊕ =   (7-12) 
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7.5.2  Efficiency of Implementation 
Four different implementations of ARIA were produced, one that could only 
encrypt,  one  that  could  both  encrypt  and  decrypt,  and  equivalent  versions  of  the 
algorithm when modified to be resistant to DPA. There is very little difference in the 
overall performance of the hardware. All designs use approximately the same number 
of flip flops, this was expected as they all have the same memory requirements, the 
slightly larger increase in the Modified Encryptor is due to signal duplicated by the 
synthesis tool. The area in general does not change significantly, there is an increase 
in the number of slices for the modified algorithm and the designs that can perform 
decryption of between 11% and 16%. 
The clock speed of the design does not change significantly, it actually slightly 
increases for the modified versions. The largest penalty that is incurred from changing 
the algorithm is the number of clock cycles used to process a plaintext. It rises from 
12 to 15, this is because a new set of sub-keys must be generated each time and as it 
uses the same hardware as the main datapath it cannot be calculated concurrently. 
This decreases the throughput by nearly 20%. 
  ARIA Enc.  ARIA Enc/Dec  Modified Enc.  Modified Enc/Dec 
Slices  2,536  2,962  2,825  2,913 
DFFs  1,052  1,057  1,070  1,059 
Cycles / plaintext  12  12  15  15 
Clock speed  20.191 MHz  19.481 MHz  21.116 MHz  19.939 MHz 
Throughput  215.37 MB/s  207.80 MB/s  180.19 MB/s  170.15 MB/s 
Table 7-6 : Details of the area, clock-speed and throughput for the different versions of 
ARIA: with and without decryption and DPA resistance . 
7.5.3  Countermeasure Efficacy 
In order to verify the efficacy of the algorithm modification, first a DPA attack 
was attempted on the standard implementation of ARIA. This was performed using 
the  Modelsim  simulation  method  as  described  in  section  5.3.1.1.  The  attack  was 
successful.  Figure  7-16  shows  the  correlation  values  for  each  of  the  256  key Chapter 7 Novel Algorithmic-Based Power Analysis Countermeasures  179 
 
hypotheses for the first byte of the first round key, the value of which was 198 or 
0xC6. In Figure 7-16 a large peak at the correct value is unambiguously identifiable. 
679 traces were required to correctly identify all 16 round key bytes. 
DPA was then attempted on the modified algorithm, the first byte of the first 
round key was again 198. After 4,096 traces the correct value was not identifiable. 
The correlation for all 256 key hypotheses are shown in Figure 7-17, the largest peak 
is at 224 with a value of 0.05314 while the correct value of 198 is close to zero and 
slightly negative. The plot gives no indication that the 198 is the correct value. The 
modified algorithm is not susceptible to DPA. 
 
Figure 7-16: Graph showing the correlation of the 256 key guesses for a 1,000 trace DPA 
attack on a Modelsim simulation of an FPGA running ARIA. Chapter 7 Novel Algorithmic-Based Power Analysis Countermeasures  180 
 
 
Figure 7-17 : Graph showing the correlation of the 256 key guesses for a 1,000 trace DPA 
attack on a Modelsim simulation of an FPGA running ARIA. 
7.5.4  Conclusion 
It can be seen from the results in section 7.5.3 that the modified ARIA key 
schedule provides protection from DPA. The protection also comes at a modest cost, 
for the encryptor there is approximately a 10% increase in area. There is even a slight 
increase  in  clock  speed,  although  this  is  more  than  compensated  for  by  the  25% 
increase in the number of clock cycles required to process a plaintext. It is worth 
noting that the percentage increase in the number of clock cycles would fall as longer 
keys are processed as they require more encryption rounds but the same number of 
key expansion rounds. 
The structure of the key  schedule of ARIA is  much more suited to being a 
perpetually expanding one than that of AES as the cost in terms of speed and area is 
comparable between encryptors and decryptors. The key property of the key schedule 
that allows this is its ability to generate the round keys in any order, making pre-
calculating the decryption keys unnecessary. While key initialisation occurs before 
encryption and decryption fewer sub-keys are needed than the number of round keys 
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7.6  Improved Modified TDES 
Drawing from the conclusions of examining the key schedules of other modern 
cryptographic algorithms and modifying the key schedule of ARIA to protect it from 
DPA  it  is  possible  to  vastly  improve  the  modified  version  of  TDES  described  in 
section  7.3.    That  version  was  significantly  larger  than  the  original  TDES,  using 
nearly  six  times  the  number  of  slices  on  a  FPGA.  This  was  largely  due  to  the 
additional registers that were needed to store two sets of round keys. This was needed 
as the round keys need to be provided in reverse order for decryption and so have to 
be pre-calculated. If only one set of round keys could be stored it would have doubled 
the amount of time taken to decrypt and one DES block is used in decryption mode 
during  TDES  encryption.  Additionally  as  TDES  contains  three  DES  blocks  any 
increase in area in a DES block is tripled for TDES.  
Adopting  a  key  schedule  design  similar  to  that  of  ARIA  a  much  smaller 
modified TDES was implemented that still has inherent resistance to DPA. There is a 
greater  throughput  penalty  as  the  initialisation  phase  uses  the  main  datapath  so  it 
cannot  be  performed  in  parallel  without  nearly  doubling  the  amount  of  hardware 
required. Section 7.6.1 describes the new key schedule in more detail, section 7.6.2 
details the effects of the changes to the algorithm on the speed and area requirements 
and section 7.6.3 shows the new design is also immune to DPA. 
7.6.1  Design of Key Schedule 
The improved modification to the TDES key schedule calculates the round keys 
in two phases, initialisation and generation, each DES block uses 64-bit keys, giving a 
total TDES key length of 192 bits. The initialisation phase is heavily based on the key 
schedule of ARIA, it splits the master key into two 32-bit halves and uses the Feistel 
structure to expand the master key into the four sub-keys. As the initialisation phase 
uses the DES round function it needs round keys. The actual values of these are not 
particularly important, it is important that the chosen values do not insert a backdoor 
into that algorithm that only the designers are aware of, for this reason numbers like 
this are generally chosen to be binary expansions of irrational numbers. In ARIA the 
key initialisation round keys come from the value of 1/π, these is no advantage for 
choosing different ones here. Chapter 7 Novel Algorithmic-Based Power Analysis Countermeasures  182 
 
 
63 32 0 31 0 0 ) , ( − − ⊕ = MK k MK R w   (7-14) 
 
63 32 1 0 1 ) , ( − ⊕ = MK k w R w   (7-15) 
  0 2 1 2 ) , ( w k w R w ⊕ =   (7-16) 
  1 3 2 3 ) , ( w k w R w ⊕ =   (7-17) 
Like the  ARIA modification, the key  generation is extended across multiple 
plaintext encryptions by using sub-keys 3 and 2 to replace the first and second halves 
of  the  master  key  respectively,  i.e.  equations  (7-14)  and  (7-15)  are  replaced  with 
(7-18) and (7-19) respectively. 
  2 0 3 0 ) , ( w k w R w ⊕ =   (7-18) 
  3 1 0 1 ) , ( w k w R w ⊕ =   (7-19) 
In DES the size of the Feistel datapath, and hence the length of the sub-keys 
derived from this scheme, is 32 bits, but, due to the expansion function, the size of the 
round keys must be 48 bits. Each round key is split into three 16-bit blocks and these 
are made out of the combination of two halves from two different sub keys. To ensure 
that all sections of the round keys are unique the sub-keys are bit shifted either left or 
right by 5 bits. This is summarised in table Table 7-7, where w signifies the sub-key 
and the a or b determining whether it is the first or second half. 
Key   Formation  Key  Formation 
1 
0 - 15  w0a ⊕ w1b
 
9 
0 - 15  w0a ⊕ (w1)>>>5b
 
16 - 31  w1a ⊕ w2b  16 - 31  (w1)>>>5a ⊕ (w2)<<<5b 
32 - 47  w2a ⊕ w0b  32 - 47  (w2)<<<5a ⊕ w0b 
2 
0 - 15  w1a ⊕ w3b
 
10 
0 - 15  w1a ⊕ (w3)<<<5b
 
16 - 31  w2a ⊕ w1b  16 - 31  (w2)>>>5a ⊕ w1b 
32 - 47  w3a ⊕ w2b  32 - 47  (w3)<<<5a ⊕ (w2)>>>5b 
3 
0 - 15  w2a ⊕ w3b
 
11 
0 - 15  w2a ⊕ (w3)>>>5b
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Key   Formation  Key  Formation 
32 - 47  w0a ⊕ w2b  32 - 47  (w0)<<<5a ⊕ w2b 
4 
0 - 15  w3a ⊕ w1b
 
12 
0 - 15  w3a ⊕ (w1)<<<5b
 
16 - 31  w0a ⊕ w3b  16 - 31  (w0)>>>5a ⊕ w3b 
32 - 47  w1a ⊕ w0b  32 - 47  (w1)<<<5a ⊕ (w0)>>>5b 
5 
0 - 15  (w0)>>>5a ⊕ (w1)<<<5b
 
13 
0 - 15  (w0)<<<5a ⊕ w1b
 
16 - 31  (w1)<<<5a ⊕ w2b  16 - 31  w1a ⊕ (w2)>>>5b 
32 - 47  w2a ⊕ (w0)>>>5b  32 - 47  (w2)>>>5a ⊕ (w0)<<<5b 
6 
0 - 15  (w1)>>>5a ⊕ (w3)<<<5b
 
14 
0 - 15  (w1)<<<5a ⊕ (w3)>>>5b
 
16 - 31  (w2)<<<5a ⊕ w1b  16 - 31  w2a ⊕ (w1)<<<5b 
32 - 47  w3a ⊕ (w2)>>>5b  32 - 47  (w3)>>>5a ⊕ w2b 
7 
0 - 15  (w2)>>>5a ⊕ (w3)<<<5b
 
15 
0 - 15  (w2)<<<5a ⊕ w3b
 
16 - 31  (w3)<<<5a ⊕ w0b  16 - 31  w3a ⊕ (w0)>>>5b 
32 - 47  w0a ⊕ (w2)>>>5b  32 - 47  (w0)>>>5a ⊕ (w2)<<<5b 
8 
0 - 15  (w3)>>>5a ⊕ (w1)<<<5b
 
16 
0 - 15  (w3)<<<5a ⊕ (w1)>>>5b
 
16 - 31  (w0)<<<5a ⊕ w3b  16 - 31  w0a ⊕ (w3)<<<5b 
32 - 47  w1a ⊕ (w0)>>>5b  32 - 47  (w1)>>>5a ⊕ w0b 
Table 7-7: The combination of intermediate keys that makes up the round keys for the second 
version of the modified TDES. 
7.6.2  Efficiency of Implementation 
The area requirements, clock-speeds and throughputs of the three versions of 
TDES  are  compared  in  Table  7-8.  The  new  modified  version  of  TDES  is  much 
smaller  and  has  a  significantly  faster  clock-speed  than  the  first  modified  version, 
although the extra clock cycles required to initialise the key mean the throughput is 
lower. Compared to the original TDES the modified algorithm uses 75% more area 
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the majority of hardware countermeasures and it is important to note that while the 
increase in area is significant TDES, using the DES key schedule, has one of the 
simplest key schedules of all algorithms, it consisting merely of a selection of bits 
from the master key. All other algorithms would have a key schedule that requires 
more hardware and so there would be a smaller relative penalty when it was replaced. 
  TDES  Modified TDES 1  Modified TDES 2 
Slices  1,201  6,940  2,101 
DFFs  1,215  6,323   1,680 
Clock Speed (MHz)  49.478  43.537  50.769  
Cycles / Plaintext  19  19  23 
Throughput (MB/s)  166.66 MB/s  146.65 MB/s  141.27 MB/s 
Table 7-8: The area requirements, clock-speeds and throughputs of the three different 
versions of TDES. 
7.6.3  Countermeasure Efficacy 
 
Figure 7-18 : The correlation for all 64 possible key values of the first 6-bit word of the first 
round key for the second version of the modified TDES. Chapter 7 Novel Algorithmic-Based Power Analysis Countermeasures  185 
 
The new version of the modifications to TDES also protects the algorithm from 
DPA.  In  order  to  show  this  DPA  was  attempted  using  the  Modelsim  simulation 
method described in section 5.3.1.1. The first 6-bit word of the first round key was 20, 
or 0x14, it was not revealed after 4,096 traces. Figure 7-18 shows the correlation for 
all 64 of the key hypotheses after 4,096 traces, the largest peak is at 18 with a value of 
0.04824 and the correct key value is very close to zero and slightly negative at -
0.00856. There is no realistic way an attacker could discern the correct value of the 
key word from this correlation data. 
7.6.4  Conclusion 
As expected, as it is a combination of the countermeasures proposed in sections 
7.2.3 and 7.5, this modification protects TDES from DPA. The design is much smaller 
than the original TDES modification in section 7.3, only being 75% bigger rather than 
nearly 500% bigger. Out of the three designs it does have the lowest throughput, even 
though the clock speed is the highest, this is because it required an additional four 
clock cycles to initialise the key. If a faster design is required it would be possible to 
remove the increase in clock cycles by adding an additional DES datapath that would 
initialise the other three DES blocks’ keys while they processed the input. A single 
DES datapath is approximately 400 slices as the original TDES is 1,201, also an 
additional 768 bits of memory would be required to store the next set of sub-keys. 
7.7  Conclusion 
Hardware  countermeasures  to  DPA  come  with  a  high  cost  in  terms  of  area 
requirements and the throughput of cryptographic designs, sometimes increasing them 
by  a  factor  of  four.  Additionally,  as  discussed  in  section  4.3.8,  they  do  not  offer 
complete  protection,  only  requiring  an  attacker  to  collect  more  traces  before 
successfully performing DPA. A much better solution is to have algorithms that are 
already  immune  to  DPA  so  no  costly  countermeasures  are  needed.  This  chapter 
proposed three different alterations to AES to protect it from DPA. The only one that 
was effective was the perpetually expanding key schedule which generated a new set 
of round keys for each plaintext. This technique is effective as it removes the main 
strength of DPA which is the ability to exploit power consumption data from several 
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Other than its effectiveness, a big advantage of this countermeasure is the low 
overhead, when it was applied to AES the throughput only fell by 28% and the size 
only  increase  by  5%.  The  modification  can  be  easily  applied  to  most  modern 
algorithms,  and  even  when  the  key  schedule  is  unsuitable,  such  as  TDES,  it  can 
simply be replaced before the technique is applied. If this is done it is important to 
select a suitable key schedule structure to replace the original with. The key schedule 
of  ARIA  has  properties  that  work  well  with  this  technique,  and  conform  to  the 
definition of a good key schedule given by May et al. in [30], as, after initialisation, 
the  round  keys  can  be  generated  in  any  order,  making  the  overhead  consistent 
between encryptors and decryptors. Modifying existing algorithms is not the most 
significant  use  of  this  technique,  rather,  the  next  generation  of  algorithms  could 
eliminate DPA entirely as a potential problem.  
 
Chapter 8  Summary 
The current state of cryptography is that there are no published mathematical 
attacks that can break the full versions of modern algorithms, and with 3.4 * 10
38 
different values for even 128-bit keys it is not feasible to use brute force to get a key 
either. With the development of side channel attacks in 1996 [19] another avenue for 
breaking encryption was opened. Side channel attacks exploit the fact that encryption 
is performed by a physical device which is subject to other physical processes, and by 
monitoring those “side channels” it is possible to discern information about the data 
that is being processed by the device. This thesis is mostly concerned with power 
analysis, where power consumption is the channel that leaks information about the 
internal state of the device, specifically, Differential Power Analysis (DPA). DPA 
performs  a  statistical  test  on  a  set  of  power  consumption  data  from  several 
encryptions and predictions about the contents of registers, based on the plaintext and 
a guess about the value of a byte of the key, in order to determine which of the key 
value hypotheses is the most likely. 
DPA  requires  calculating  the  correlation  between  the  predictions  of  register 
transitions  inside  the  device  and  the  measured  power  consumption  of  the  device. 
There are a number of sources of random variability in the result of this calculation. 
Firstly there is noise in the circuit, from the power consumption of other parts of the 
circuit and random thermal noise, and the measurements will also contain errors. All 
of these contribute to the noise in the SNR and will decrease the correlation between 
the prediction and the power consumption. The other source of variation in the results 
is due to the fact that any calculation of the correlation using a series of samples, the 
sample  correlation,  is  only  an  estimation  of  the  true  population  correlation.  The 
difference between the two values is the sampling error. The variance in the sample Chapter 8 Summary                  188 
 
correlation is controlled by the number of samples, in this case the number of power 
traces available to an attacker. 
The  results  of  a  DPA  attack  on  a  single  key  byte  will  be  made  up  of  256 
correlations, one for the correct key and 255 for the incorrect ones. The population 
correlation for the predictions based on the correct key guess will be directly related 
to the SNR. The population correlation of the incorrect values will be the correlation 
between their predictions and the predictions from the correct guess (controlled by the 
structure  of  the  s-box)  multiplied  by  the  population  correlation  for  the  correct 
predictions;  this  means  the  correct  guess  will  always  have  the  highest  population 
correlation. That does not mean that DPA will always be successful. Superimposed on 
the population correlations is the sampling error. This is a random variable with a 
variance  controlled  by  the  number  of  samples.  If  there  is  a  low  SNR  then  the 
difference between the correct and incorrect correlation will be small (in terms of 
absolute value rather than ratio), and easily overwhelmed if not enough samples are 
taken to ensure a small sampling error. 
Even though all the factors in the shape of a set of DPA results are controlled by 
two variables, the SNR and the number of traces, the random element added due to 
the sampling error means that there is a stochastic element to the results and hence it 
is  never  definite  that  a  particular  attack  will  give  the  correct  value.  A  method  to 
calculate the probability of success from the SNR and number of traces was derived in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis. An attacker may like to know how many traces would be 
required to ensure a certain probability of success for a given system with a known 
SNR. A designer may like to know the value of the SNR that will ensure a particular 
number of traces are required to give a chosen probability of success. Methods for 
determining both of these have also been developed in this thesis. 
As is the nature of cryptography, whenever a new cryptanalysis technique is 
developed cryptographers work to develop ways to protect against it. There have been 
several  ideas  for  modifications  to  chip  designs  that  will  help  combat  DPA,  from 
balancing the logic so there is always the same number of transitions [82], to masking 
the intermediate variables in secret shares [8, 23, 88], and using Dynamic Voltage and 
Frequency Scaling (DVFS) to stop the attacker sampling the power consumption at 
the  correct  time  [11].  None  of  them  are  completely  effective.  There  are  ways  of 
defeating some of the countermeasures, such as targeting logic gates with DPA [93], Chapter 8 Summary                  189 
 
or using High-Order DPA (HODPA) [22]. In the cases of DVFS and balanced logic, 
the countermeasures frustrate attempts at DPA by reducing the SNR and requiring an 
attacker to record more power data to give themselves a reasonable chance of success 
[5,  95].  Apart  from  not  offering  complete  protection  from  DPA,  the  other 
disadvantage of the proposed countermeasures is that they often come with a high 
cost, significantly increasing the area of the design or decreasing the data throughput 
sometimes by up to a factor of 4 [5, 23]. 
All these countermeasures are modifications to the hardware implementations of 
algorithms. A better solution would be to design algorithms in a way that defeats 
DPA. In Chapter 7 the DPA mitigation potential of several alterations to the Advanced 
Encryption  Standard  (AES)  algorithm  are  investigated.  The  most  successful  one 
protects the algorithm by using the key schedule to generate a new set of round keys 
for  each  plaintext  rather  than  reuse  the  same  set  each  time.  In  DPA  the  attacker 
combines the changing, but known, plaintext with a guess about one byte of the round 
key, which is constant, so the validity of the guess is the same for each plaintext. This 
is no longer true, and while it would still be possible to correlate predictions about the 
contents  of  registers  with  power  consumption,  with  the  correct  set  of  predictions 
giving the highest value, it becomes infeasible as a way to discover the key. There are 
only two ways an attacker could be ensured to have a set of predictions that contains 
the correct answer. Firstly, by trying all possibly combinations of different values of a 
round  key  byte  for  each  plaintext,  this  gives  256
number  of  plaintexts,  which  quickly 
becomes impossibly large. Secondly, as the influence of the value of a particular byte 
of the master key is diffused through the entire round key more with each successive 
key schedule operation, accurate predictions about the value of a given round key byte 
can only be made when the entire master key is known. An attacker could make a 
guess at the entire master key and they would still be able to use DPA to determine 
which of their guesses was correct, but DPA no longer offers any advantage over 
brute force. 
Other than offering full protection from DPA the other main advantage of an 
algorithmic approach to DPA countermeasures is efficiency of implementation. When 
AES was modified the size of the implementation of an encryptor increased by 5% 
and the speed fell by 17%. For a design that could also decrypt the area increased by 
28%  and  the  speed  fell  by  15%.  Some  key  schedules  are  not  suitable  for  direct Chapter 8 Summary                  190 
 
modification, the key schedule for DES (and hence TDES) generates the different 
round keys by selecting different bits from the master key in different arrangements 
so it can only produce a limited number from a given key schedule. Even the AES key 
schedule has some disadvantages with the design, it can only produce round keys 
forwards, but decryption needs the round keys in reverse order. In order to perform 
decryption an implementation needs to either interleave round key generation with 
decryption, which would reduce the throughput of the design, or calculate and store 
the next set of round keys while one set is being used, which would require more area. 
As TDES uses three DES key schedules they  all had to be replaced with a more 
complex one and TDES always needs to be able to perform decryption. This meant 
the modifications came  at a significant penalty, especially in terms of area  which 
increased by 230%. Throughput fell by 12%. 
After examining a series of modern algorithms a set of design principles for 
efficient  implementation  of  a  modified  key  schedule  was  identified.  The  main 
disadvantage with the AES key schedule in this context is its inability to generate the 
round  keys  in  any  order.  AES  decryption  always  needed  the  round  keys  pre-
calculated, but in the original algorithm they were only calculated once so it was not a 
large overhead. Rather than using an iterative approach to generating round keys it 
would  be  better  to  take  the  master  key  and  apply  a  series  of  transforms  to  it  to 
generate a small number of values and combine these in different ways to get the 
round keys. This would save both time and area as fewer calculations are required to 
get the smaller number of values and they require less memory to store. If the key 
schedules reuse the cryptographic primitives that make up the algorithm then this 
reduces the amount of hardware that is needed and it ensures good levels of confusion 
and diffusion, important measures of the strength of a cipher, in the expanded key. 
The  efficiency  of  key  schedules  designed  with  the  rules  was  confirmed  by 
implementing a modified version of ARIA and an updated modified TDES. The DPA 
protection cost no extra area for ARIA and 75% extra for TDES and reduced the 
speed of ARIA by 18% and TDES by 16%. 
The ability of DPA to extract information from the power consumption of an 
electronic device does not have solely cryptanalytic applications. Using DPA as a 
means for detecting a particular pattern of register transitions can be used to detect a 
“watermark” in the power consumption, proving the device contains a particular piece Chapter 8 Summary                  191 
 
of intellectual property. This can be achieved by adding a block of circuitry whose 
sole  purpose  is  to  produce  a  known  set  of  register  transitions.  There  are  slight 
differences  between  this  technique  and  cryptographic  DPA.  When  trying  to  break 
encryption there are a set of correlations, one of them definitely corresponds to the 
correct key and it is assumed to be the one with the highest value. With watermark 
detecting there is only one value if it above a threshold then the watermark is likely to 
be there. As it is unlikely that it would be possible to determine the SNR of the 
watermark without first knowing that it is present, it is not possible to know what 
value for the correlation to expect, making it difficult to set the threshold. Fortunately, 
there  is  another  important  difference  that  helps,  with  cryptographic  DPA  the 
correlations for the incorrect key guesses were non-zero, if the watermark is not there 
then the correlation will be between two completely unrelated sets of numbers so the 
population correlation will be zero. The probability that the measured value is above a 
particular value, if the watermark is not there, is based on the sampling error, and 
hence  the  number  of  power  traces  that  are  taken.  In  section  6.5  of  this  thesis  a 
statistical test is described that is able to determine whether it is reasonable to assume 
that a watermark is present. In situations where the SNR of the potential watermark is 
known,  a  method  of  calculating  the  number  of  traces  required  to  get  a  given 
probability of successfully detecting it is also derived. 
This thesis presents a novel approach to DPA countermeasures that are both 
efficient to implement in hardware and prevent rather than impede the attack. Also a 
statistical  model  of  DPA  is  derived  and  used  to  find  a  method  to  calculate  the 
probability that a particular attack will be successful. From this it is also possible to 
calculate  the  SNR  or  number  of  traces  that  would  be  required  to  ensure  a  given 
probability  of  success,  useful  for  the  designers  of  either  crypto-systems  or  DPA 
attacks.  A  benign  use  for  DPA  was  also  explored,  and  a  method  for  detecting  a 
watermark for protecting intellectual property was derived.  
 
Chapter 9  Conclusion and 
Future Work 
9.1  Conclusion 
DPA  is  a  statistical  attack,  by  understanding  the  statistics  behinds  how  the 
results are generated knowledge about how they are affected by changes in the SNR 
and number of traces used in the attack can be gained. This is important as it allows 
the analysis of potential countermeasures and attacks before they are implemented. In 
this  thesis  a  statistical  model  of  the  DPA  attack  was  created.  From  the  model  a 
method for calculating the probability of successfully retrieving a single byte of a key 
based on the SNR of the system and the number of traces. Using this it is possible to 
assess whether an attack is likely to succeed before performing it. The method can 
also  be  modified  to  calculate  the  number  of  traces  required  to  ensure  a  given 
probability of success for an attack on a particular system, or the amount of noise 
required to ensure an attacker must take a minimum number of traces in order for 
them to guarantee a given probability of success. These can be used as tools for either 
an attacker to plan his attack in advance (assuming he has knowledge of the SNR), or 
for the designer of a cryptographic device to guarantee a particular level of security 
against the attack.  
There are two problems with previous attempts at adding DPA countermeasures 
to cryptographic hardware, they are very expensive, reducing the performance and 
increasing the size of designs, and that, generally due to inevitable imperfections in 
their  implementation,  they  can  never  offer  complete  protection  from  DPA,  only 
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As  can  be  shown  from  the  statistical  model  of  DPA,  this  reduction  can  never 
completely stop DPA but only make it more inconvenient, requiring an attacker to 
record  more  power  traces.  The  main  innovation  in  the  countermeasure  developed 
during  the  course  of  this  research  was  where  to  put  it,  instead  of  adding  the 
countermeasure to the completed implementation of the hardware it was added to the 
algorithm  itself.  This  has  two  potential  advantages,  the  algorithm  can  still  be 
implemented  in  an  efficient  way,  and  by  using  a  suitable  technique  it  will  offer 
complete protection from DPA. Clearly there is no algorithmic way to divorce the 
power consumption from the data being processed, but by attacking the assumption 
on which DPA is based a technique to prevent it can be found. 
To retrieve a key using DPA the correlation is calculated and used as a test to 
determine which hypothesis about the value of a single byte of the key is correct. This 
is only possible because multiple samples are available, all with the same value for a 
given byte of a round key. If this is rendered untrue then the entire attack falls apart. 
This can be achieved by creating a key schedule that constantly changes the value of 
the round key. The technique was used to modify AES, TDES and ARIA. It always 
offered protection from the attack and during the course of adapting the technique for 
these  algorithms  rules  for  ensuring  the  key  schedules  could  be  implemented 
efficiently  were  developed.  Thus  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  algorithmic 
countermeasures  to  DPA  can  completely  remove  the  threat  of  DPA  which  still 
allowing efficient implementations of the algorithm. 
The uncanny ability of DPA to divine the internal state of a device can be put to 
other, more benign, tasks. This can be seen in the development of a method for adding 
a watermark to intellectual property by including hardware that will produce a known 
set of register transitions, and hence power consumption, that can then be detected 
using a DPA-like technique. 
9.2  Summary of Contributions  
This  work  has  resulted  in  a  conference  paper  and  a  journal  paper  (under 
consideration). The specific contributions are outlined below. 
• A novel, algorithmic based method for defeating DPA was devised. Chapter 9 Conclusion and Future Work            194 
 
• Identification  of  the  design  principles  of  key  schedules  for  efficient 
implementation of algorithms that use the new technique. 
• A statistical model of the DPA attack was derived. 
• A method for calculating the probability that an attack will be successful given 
the number of traces that were recorded and the SNR of the system. 
• A technique for using the above method to calculate the SNR or the number of 
traces required to give a particular probability of success. 
• A  method  for  determining  if  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  a  specific 
watermark is present in the power consumption of a design. 
• A  method  for  calculating  the  number  of  traces  required  to  get  a  given 
probability  of  being  able  to  detect  the  watermark  present  in  the  power 
consumption do a design given the SNR of the watermark. 
9.3  Future Work 
9.3.1  A method for calculating the probability that a set of results from a DPA 
attack gives the correct value. 
DPA  does  not  always  give  the  correct  result.  When  the  attack  is  being 
performed in the lab this is of little practical concern, generally the researcher has set 
the value for the key so already knows the value and can tell if the value is correct or 
not. For an actual attacker this is not true and if the highest peak is small it is not 
always clear whether that is the correct result. The accuracy of a DPA attack can be 
judged approximately by eye, but only with any accuracy when the cases are extreme, 
either with one large, obvious peak or when there are several peaks of approximately 
the same height. If DPA were ever to be used in a real world situation it would need a 
formal method to determine the validity of results. 
9.3.2  A method for estimating the SNR of a system using only the results from 
a relatively small set of DPA results 
Both the population correlation of the correct key guess (which the highest peak 
is in theory an estimate of) and the standard deviation of the results are related to the Chapter 9 Conclusion and Future Work            195 
 
SNR of the system. The SNR is a very useful piece of information to have as it 
enables an attacker to determine how many traces would be required to have a good 
chance of cracking the system, and it would help in evaluating the correctness of any 
results.  In theory  it is possible to take either the highest peak in the DPA or the 
standard deviation of the results and estimate a value for the SNR. The population 
correlation  can  be  converted  into  the  SNR  using  equation  (6-4).  The  standard 
deviation of the DPA results is given by the following formula: 
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The value 9.6 was determined empirically, Figure 9-1 shows a graph of the 
standard  deviation  of  DPA  results  from  a  Matlab  simulation  vs.  SNR,  and  the 
modelled relationship using the above formula. 
 
Figure 9-1 : The standard deviation of DPA results vs SNR for the results from Matlab 
simulations and a model of the relationship. 
The problem is that the estimate will only be accurate if the number of traces is 
fairly large compared to the SNR, and in this case knowing the value of the SNR is 
less useful as the attacker  generally has a clear, unambiguous peak that generally 
indicates a correct result. Finding a way of accurately determining the SNR from the Chapter 9 Conclusion and Future Work            196 
 
results when there are not enough traces to give an accurate key value would enable 
an attacker to better plan and evaluate his attack. 
9.3.3  Improving the accuracy of DPA by tuning the power consumption model 
to a particular device. 
If there is any non-linear behaviour in the power consumption model, i.e. if not 
all bits make the same contribution to the power consumption, or a 0 to 1 transition 
consumes a different amount of power to a 1 to 0 transition, then the population 
correlation of the correct guess could be reduced making it more difficult to perform 
DPA. If this is the case then it might be possible to improve the accuracy of DPA on a 
particular  device  by  measuring  this  and  then  compensating  for  it  in  the  power 
consumption model. 
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